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"When I'm ridin' round the world
And I'm doin' this and I'm signing that"
-The Rolling Stones, "(I Can't Get No) Satisfaction" 1965
Few people would suspect that those intense lyrics, central to possi-
bly the greatest rock and roll song ever performed, in fact contain a
cleverly encoded message expressing Mick Jagger's and Keith Richards'
discreet homage to public international law. But that's how I see it: the
evocative passage incorporates thinly veiled references to the two pri-
mary sources of international law obligations: things countries do (i.e.,
customary international law) and things countries sign (i.e., treaties).
That encrypted message is more relevant today than ever before, be-
cause both sources of international law may be critical, in hitherto
unexplored ways, to the effort to preserve the fragile security of outer
space. Novel types of anti-satellite (commonly abbreviated "ASAT" and
pronounced "ay-sat") weapons threaten to jeopardize the peaceful explo-
ration and exploitation of space. Unless public international law comes
quickly to the rescue, perhaps via novel jurisprudential mechanisms, the
tenuous stability of outer space, and the commercial and military reli-
ance on satellite technology, will soon be jeopardized.
The argument in this Article proceeds through several steps. As
background, Part I outlines the current and projected future human uses
of outer space, emphasizing the plethora of civilian and military applica-
tions that now rely on satellites. The United States, especially, but other
countries, too, are coming to depend on multiple space assets for the per-
formance of a wide array of vital functions; the investment is huge,
diverse, and growing, despite the costs and natural perils of operating in
the harsh exoatmospheric environment.
In Part II, the Article describes the legal milieu, outlining the ac-
complishments of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty' and its progeny, as well
1. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
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as describing the conspicuous gaps in the existing fabric of overt written
international law.
Part III of the Article introduces the modern threats to space security,
describing the ASAT activities of the leading spacefaring States and in-
troducing the two main varieties of satellite-killing technologies. It
annotates the history of developmental testing of those armaments, in-
cluding the most recent provocations by China in January 2007 and by
the United States in February 2008. Complementing that analysis, the
Article describes the abortive efforts to negotiate arms control treaties to
rein in those threats, now stretching back three futile decades, and the
current U.S.-imposed blockage in the leading disarmament negotiating
forum.
The Article then turns to my main thesis: that in the absence of a
new outer space disarmament treaty, the world can productively turn to
customary international law (CIL) as a viable alternative pathway toward
enhancing space security and impeding the development and use of
ASATs. To advance this novel argument, Part IV introduces "general
customary international law," defining it as a recognized, important, and
dynamic source of jurisprudence and explaining where it comes from,
how it operates, and, in particular, how it may impede the erstwhile
freedom of sovereign States to proceed untrammeled toward the
weaponization of space through the testing and use of ASATs.
Part V carries the analysis one step further, by delving into one "spe-
cialized" realm of CIL, the traditional rules that regulate the conduct of
armed conflict. Centuries-old principles that were crafted and shaped for
very different battlefield purposes may nonetheless find application in
outer space, too, impeding at least some specified ASAT activities. As a
companion, Part VI scrutinizes a rather different realm of lex specialis,
the evolving customary international environmental law. Again, the
analysis asserts that existing terrestrial environmental protection norms
can find sometimes-surprising expression in the very different realm of
space.
Lest the reader imagine that this inspection of CIL might be of only
"theoretical" interest in the national security sector, Part VII presents an
illuminating precedent. Chemical weapons (CW) were an equally hotly
contested topic for decades of debate about global peace and security,
with profound implications for national defense. In this area, CIL did,
and still does, play an active role in outlawing selected forms of espe-
cially abhorrent warfare, wholly apart from the explicit constraints of
treaty law. If it happened with CW, I argue, it could happen with ASAT,
too.
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Finally, the Article concludes with some policy recommendations,
suggesting mechanisms for the world community to press forward with
autonomous efforts to promote stability and security in outer space, even
in the face of recalcitrance from the leading space powers. I would cer-
tainly support the negotiation and implementation of a comprehensive
new treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space, and a carefully
drafted, widely accepted accord could accomplish much, well beyond
what customary law alone could create. But the treaty process, too, has
costs and disadvantages, and the world need not pursue just one of these
alternatives in isolation.
If the absence of global consensus currently inhibits agreements that
countries could already sign, perhaps the world community can never-
theless get some "satisfaction" via the operation of CIL, constructing a
similar (although not completely equivalent) edifice of international
regulation of ASATs based simply on what countries do.
I. THE UBIQUITOUS EXPLOITATION OF OUTER SPACE
Satellite services have become integral to all aspects of modern life,
underpinning both the civilian economy and military operations around
the globe. Secure, instantaneous communications links enable the quo-
tidian range of television coverage, telephonic voice and fax links,
Internet searches and email messages, and online shopping and ATM
banking that we now take for granted. Satellite sensors provide the req-
uisite data for daily global weather forecasting, as well as for monitoring
earth resources such as seasonal crop harvests, encroachments on the
rain forests, and the effects of global warming. Global Positioning Sys-
tem satellites enable inexpensive, accurate navigation by aircraft, ships,
and an increasing fleet of private automobiles.2
Satellites now function as essential links in U.S. "critical infrastruc-
ture," and the robust technological advantages have diffused to numerous
other countries around the world, too. By one estimate, some 1100 cor-
2. Robert G. Joseph, Under Sec'y for Arms Control & Int'l Security, Assuring Amer-
ica's Vital Interests, Remarks on the President's National Space Policy (Jan. 11, 2007),
available at http://statelists.state.gov/scripts/wa.exe?A2=indO701b&L=dossdo&P=779 (last
visited June 30, 2009) [hereinafter Remarks of Robert Joseph]. See generally STEVEN LAM-
BAKIS, ON THE EDGE OF EARTH: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN SPACE POWER 13-31 (2001);
PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA ET AL., U.S. SPACE PROGRAMS: CIVILIAN, MILITARY AND
COMMERCIAL 16 (Cong. Research Serv., Issue Brief for Congress, Doc. No. IB9201 l, 2006)
available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-10507:1 (last visited
July 29, 2009); SPACESECURITY.ORG, SPACE SECURITY 2008, at 68-111 (2008), available at
http://www.spacesecurity.org/SS12008.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009) [hereinafter SPACE
SECURITY 2008]; U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEP'T OF DEF., SPACE OPERATIONS, JOINT
PUBLICATION 3-14, Jan. 6, 2009, at IV-16 [hereinafter JCS SPACE OPERATIONS].
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porations now exploit space in one way or another,3 and Kazakhstan re-
cently became the forty-seventh nation to undertake its own civilian
space activities-and there is no indication that this proliferation will
soon abate. Global commercial space revenues now exceed $140 billion
per year, and some estimate that the value of direct U.S. investment in
outer space will soon reach half a trillion dollars, rivaling the size of U.S.
capital investment in Europe.5 Some 850 operational satellites now
jockey for position, and outer space traffic has become congested, espe-
cially in the most favorable orbital sites; competition has also intensified
for the allocation of scarce radio frequency slots for communicating with
those spacecraft.6
In the military sector, photoreconnaissance satellites enable the
United States and Russia reliably to monitor each other's long-range
missiles and other strategic nuclear assets, while different exoatmos-
pheric sensors capture electromagnetic pulses and radar images of
minute earth movements that would evince clandestine nuclear weapons
test explosions. Likewise, early warning satellites would provide the first
alert in the case of a surprise missile attack and the fabled Washington,
D.C. to Moscow "hotline" link for resolving superpower crises is satel-
lite-enabled. A diverse array of spy satellites surreptitiously intercepts
communications and other electronic emissions, enabling intrusive
3. JOHN E. HYTEN, A SEA OF PEACE OR A THEATER OF WAR: DEALING WITH THE
INEVITABLE CONFLICT IN SPACE 7 (2000), available at http://acdis.illinois.edu/assets/docs/
277/ASeaofPeaceoraTheaterofWarDealingwiththelnevitableConflictinSpace.pdf (last visited
July 2, 2009).
4. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 50, 69; see also SPACESECURITY.ORG, SPACE
SECURITY 2009 ch. 3 (forthcoming 2009) (draft on file with author) [hereinafter SPACE SECU-
RITY 2009], (reporting that, in 2008, Vietnam and Venezuela also joined the roster of countries
undertaking space activities, and "Algeria, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Nigeria,
South Africa, and Thailand are all placing a priority on satellites to support social and eco-
nomic development").
5. MICHAEL KREPON & CHRISTOPHER CLARY, HENRY L. STIMSON CTR., SPACE As-
SURANCE OR SPACE DOMINANCE? THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE 44 (2003),
available at www.stimson.org/wos/pdf/spacefront.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009) (citing
space policy expert James Oberg, who expected the cumulative U.S. investment in outer space
to equal the value of all U.S. investment in Europe); SPACE FOUND., THE SPACE REPORT 2009:
THE AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO GLOBAL SPACE ACTIVITY 4 (2009) (describing the global
space industry as a $257 billion business); SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 91 (esti-
mating that global space revenues were $143.31 billion in 2006, an increase of 23 percent over
2005 figures); cf. FUTRON CORP., SATELLITE INDUS. ASS'N, STATE OF THE SATELLITE INDUS-
TRY REPORT 3 (2008), available at http://www.sia.org/files/2008SS1R.pdf (last visited June
30, 2009) (estimating world satellite industry revenues at $123 billion in 2007, with revenues
growing an average of 11.5 percent since 2002); Frank Slijper, From Venus to Mars: The
European Union's Steps Towards the Militarisation of Space, TRANSNAT'L INST., Nov. 2008,
at 30 (reporting $251 billion in space-derived industrial revenues globally in 2007).
6. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 40-41; Marc Kaufman, U.S. Finds It's
Getting Crowded Out There: Dominance in Space Slips as Other Nations Step Up Efforts,
WASH. POST, July 9, 2008, at Al.
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monitoring of terrorists and potential global trouble spots. During times
of conflict, satellites are essential to the reconnaissance and surveillance
functions and to the "command, control, and communications" opera-
tions, enabling senior officials to penetrate the "fog of war" via secure,
real-time links to fielded forces. Satellite-guided "smart bombs" and
remotely piloted "unmanned aerial vehicle" drones provide critical ar-
rows in the warfighter's quiver. In short, it is now almost impossible to
imagine the U.S. military fighting a war without its satellite assets-the
incessant demand for more orbiters, more communications bandwidth,
and more reconnaissance demonstrates the accelerating exploitation of
space as "the new high ground."7 As Army Lt. Gen. Larry J. Dodgen put
it: "Today, space enables virtually everything we do."'
Other countries, too, have devoted their resources to military com-
munications and intelligence-gathering operations in space; at least a
7. See Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Exec. Office of the President, U.S. National
Space Policy (Aug. 31, 2006), at 10, available at http://www.ostp.gov/galleries/default-
file/Unclassified%20National%20Space%2OPolicy%20--%20FINAL.pdf (last visited June 30,
2009) [hereinafter U.S. National Space Policy] (noting that it is now unclassified that "[t]he
United States Government conducts satellite photoreconnaissance that includes a near real-
time capability; overhead signals intelligence collection; and overhead measurement and sig-
nature intelligence collection"); see also KREPON & CLARY, supra note 5, at 10-26 (asserting
that "[t]oday, space assets play a much larger role in the real-time enhancement of military
operations" and describing satellites' contributions to military navigation, remote sensing,
communications, and weaponry); JCS SPACE OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at 11-1 (describing
space mission areas); SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 112-23, 174-77 (noting that
military satellites could be employed to support terrestrial combat operations, to strike space
objects, or to attack earth targets from above); PAUL B. STARES, THE MILITARIZATION OF
SPACE: U.S. POLICY, 1945-1985, at 14-18 (1985) (introducing various military applications of
outer space assets); BARRY D. WATTS, THE MILITARY USE OF SPACE: A DIAGNOSTIC ASSESS-
MENT (2001) (assessing the evolving capabilities for exploitation of near-earth space for
military purposes over the next twenty to twenty-five years); Theresa Hitchens, Weapons in
Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-
Based Weapons, in SPACE WEAPONS: ARE THEY NEEDED? 87, 93 (John M. Logsdon & Gordon
Adams eds., 2003) (reporting that U.S. Army officials repeatedly assert that the famous "left
hook" maneuver undertaken at the outset of Operation Desert Storm, which relied on deceiv-
ing Iraq about Coalition intentions, could not have succeeded if Saddam Hussein had access to
satellite photoreconnaissance of the sort that is commercially available today); Zhong Jing,
China and Space Security, in COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN SPACE: ASIAN PERSPECTIVES 75, 78
(John M. Logsdon & James Clay Moltz eds., 2008) (arguing that "combat effectiveness can
increase at least 50 to 100 percent with the application of space power"); Robert A. Ramey,
Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.E L. REV. 1, 13-27
(2000) (inventorying satellite operations and weapons); Greg Miller, U.S. Spies on Iraqi Army,
Sources Say, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at Al (stating that U.S. authorities are employing space
reconnaissance assets to surreptitiously monitor the activities of the Iraqi army as well as of
terrorists).
8. Larry J. Dodgen, Space: Inextricably Linked to Warfighting, MIL. REV., Jan.-Feb.
2006, at 87. During the fighting in Kosovo, the United States military used twice as much
bandwidth for satellite communications links as had been required during Operation Desert
Storm; during the fighting in Afghanistan, the ratio rose to seven times as much; by the war in
Iraq, it was forty-two times as much. Id. at 86-87.
dozen States have already undertaken to follow the trajectory charted by
U.S. and Soviet rocketeers.' The competition is likely to accelerate in the
future; for example, both the European Union (with its Galileo system)
and Russia (via the "GLONASS array") seek to offer independent rivals
to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS).' ° China has certainly ac-
celerated its space activities in both the military and civilian sectors."
Recently, India, which has long sustained an active civil space program,
decided that it must "optimize space applications for military pur-
poses."'2 While the Japanese Diet passed legislation to remove the
decades-long ban on any use of the country's space assets for defense,
Germany has commissioned its first five spy satellites and French Presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy has proposed doubling the national budget for space
intelligence programs to $1 billion. Even international organizations and
terrorist groups have sought to exploit satellite-derived data for security
9. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 65, 123-24, 129 (describing military space
initiatives by France, Israel, India, Japan, and Canada, among other countries); Slijper, supra
note 5, at 10 (noting the increased space activities of Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, and
Japan).
10. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 83-84 (describing GPS, GLONASS, and
Galileo, as well as a regional satellite navigation system designated Beidou, developed by
China); GPS and Its Competitors: The Status of Satellite Navigation, STRATFOR,
Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090128_gps.and its competitors-status_
satellite-navigation (last visited June 30, 2009).
11. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY POWER OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 3 (2008). See generally MARCIA S. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CHINA'S SPACE PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW (2005); Joan
Johnson-Freese, China's Space Ambitions (Institut Franqais des Relations Intemationales,
Proliferation Paper, 2007); Ashley J. Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Punching the
U.S. Military's 'Soft Ribs': China's Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective, June
2007, available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/pb-5 1.tellis-final.pdf (last visited
July 29, 2009).
12. David R. Sands, China, India Hasten Arms Race in Space, WASH. TIMES, June 25,
2008, at Al. See generally Jessica Guiney, India's Space Ambitions: Headed Toward Space
War?, CTR. FOR DE. INFO., May 2008, available at www.cdi.org/pdfs/GuineylndiaSpace.pdf
(last visited June 30, 2009); Sharad Joshi, India Reacts Cautiously to China's Anti-Satellite
Weapon Test, 13 WMD INSIGHTS 13, 15 (2007) (noting that an Indian government official
asserted that India also possesses an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon but has refrained from
exercising it); Randeep Ramesh, India's Unmanned Moon Mission May Launch Race for
Lunar Landgrab, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 21, 2008, at 23.
13. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 65-66 (describing significant increases in
military investment in space by France and India); SPACE SECURITY 2009, supra note 4, at ch.
2 (stating that the French budget for satellite imaging and surveillance is "intended to double"
under a new White Paper on Defense and National Security). See generally Yomiuri Shimbun,
Ban Lifted on Use of Space for Defense, DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 29, 2008, available at http:I/
www.fourwindsi 0.com/siterun-data/space/space-exploration/news.phpq= 1220217912 (last
visited July 29, 2009) (noting that Japanese basic space law was amended to allow use of
space for defensive purposes); Space Security Update No. 8, CTR. FOR DEF. INFO., Dec. 18,
2008, available at http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentlD=4427
(last visited June 30, 2009) (stating that Germany has allocated $445 million for synthetic-
aperture radar satellites, capable of collecting images at night or during bad weather).
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and other purposes.' 4  Still, the $25 billion per year that the
Pentagon spends on space activities outstrips the rest of the world's
combined defense expenditures in space."
Notably, the military and civilian space programs are not neatly seg-
regated. Many satellites serve both constituencies simultaneously, and
others can be adapted as the needs fluctuate. During the 1999 fighting in
Kosovo and the 2001 combat in Afghanistan, for example, commercial
operators supplied 75-80 percent of the communications resources de-
manded by the Pentagon, and that reliance has continued with the
contemporary fighting in Iraq. By 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense
was spending over $1 billion annually on commercial broadband satellite
services. Other countries, too, have commingled their space programs,
with military operations increasingly dependent on civilian or dual-
capable birds. The clear trend around the world is for ever-increasing
integration of military and civilian space programs and assets.
6
14. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report by the Director General, at 3, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2008/60 (Nov. 19, 2009) (noting the IAEA's use of commercially available and other
satellite imagery in assessing nuclear weapons-related activities at a site in Syria); see also
SPACE SECURITY 2009, supra note 4, ch. 4 (stating that Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International used satellite reconnaissance to monitor activities in Darfur, Georgia, and Sri
Lanka); Peter Eisler, Google Earth Helps Yet Worries Government, USA TODAY, Nov. 6, 2008,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/surveillance/2008-11-06-googleearthN.htm
(last visited June 30, 2009) (noting that terrorist groups in Yemen and Iraq have used imagery
from Google Earth to plan attacks); Emily Wax, Gunmen Used Technology as a Tactical Tool,
WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2008, at Al (stating that attackers used GPS satellite navigation system,
satellite-enabled cellphones, and Google Earth maps in planning and executing the terrorism
in Mumbai, India in November 2008).
15. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 113 (noting that at the end of 2007, the
United States had 136 operational satellites dedicated to military applications, representing
over half the world's total); SPACE SECURITY 2009, supra note 4, at ch. 5 (reporting that by the
end of 2007, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia had launched more than 3000
military satellites between them, while the rest of the world combined had launched fewer
than one hundred); Kaufman, supra note 6 (positing that the traditional large lead that the
United States has enjoyed over other countries in space technology is eroding and that other
countries are investing increasing revenues in space and accomplishing noteworthy goals).
Some authorities assert that the United States now accounts for 95 percent of all global mili-
tary space expenditures; see also Sarah Estabrooks, Space Security 2006, in BUILDING THE
ARCHITECTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE SPACE SECURITY 93, 99 (U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Re-
search ed., 2006).
16. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 105-07. See generally JOAN JOHNSON-
FREESE, SPACE AS A STRATEGIC ASSET 27-50 (2007) (discussing "the conundrum of dual-use
technology" in space); Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and
Challenges in the Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041, 1051 (2004) (discussing
the "increasingly hybrid public-private environment" for space activities and the "integration
of military and civil missions"); Gerard Brachet, Leveraging the Existing UN Space Machin-
ery for Sustainable and Secure Access to Outer Space, in BUILDING THE ARCHITECTURE FOR
SUSTAINABLE SPACE SECURITY, supra note 15, at 107, 109 (noting the "fading distinction
between civilian and military" spacecraft); Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop, Integration of Military
and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and National Security Implications, 55 A.E L. REv. 157
1194 [Vol. 30:1187
Two eternal verities within this realm are the incessant advance of
technology and the irresistible dissemination of that technology to addi-
tional users. To cite one conspicuous example, the capabilities for
overhead photography (an absolutely vital function for both security and
commercial applications) have witnessed successive generations of revo-
lutionary new apparatus. The ground resolution (a measure of the
smallest object on the surface of the earth that a satellite can separately
image) available via public sources has shrunk from eighty meters in
1972, to thirty meters in 1982, to ten meters in 1986, to five meters in
1997, to two meters in 2004, and to less than half a meter today. Beyond
those increments, the even more fine-grained contemporary capacities of
military intelligence satellites are classified, but are surely much more
precise than the commercially available products. 7
(2004) (reporting that military "outsourcing" has led the U.S. military to reply increasingly on
commercial and civilian space assets owned and operated by domestic, foreign, and interna-
tional entities); Jessica West, The Space Security Index: Changing Trends in Space Security
and the Outer Space Treaty, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE 119, 124 (U.N. Inst. for Disar-
mament Research ed., 2007) (stating that the U.S. Department of Defense spent $70 million in
2006 to procure high-resolution satellite imagery from commercial sources); Leonard David,
U.S.-China Space Ties Weighed, SPACE.cOM, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.space.com/news/
060420_chinavisit.html (last visited June 30, 2009) (quoting space expert Joan Johnson-
Freese, "there is no distinction between space technology for civil or military use, since 95
percent of space technology is dual-use, and further-and really problematic- there is often
little or no distinction between military technology that is offensive or defensive in nature");
Jennifer La Fleur, Government, Media Focus on Commercial Satellite Images, NEWS MEDIA
& L., Summer 2003, at 37 (reporting on a June 2002 memorandum from George Tenet, Direc-
tor of the CIA, which stated that "[i]t is the policy of the Intelligence Community to use U.S.
commercial space imagery to the greatest extent possible"); Peter Marino, Independent Study
of the Roles of Commercial Remote Sensing in the Future National System for Geospatial-
Intelligence, Report to the Directors of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and the
National Reconnaissance Office, (July 16, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/
crs.pdf (last visited July 17, 2009) (proposing that U.S. intelligence agencies should do even
more in the future to integrate commercial satellite operations into the government's satellite
intelligence-gathering architecture).
17. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 97, 101-02 (noting that in addition to the
exquisite power of photographic satellites, additional types of sensors, including synthetic
aperture radars, are providing revolutionary capabilities to commercial customers); WATTS,
supra note 7, at 66; Waldrop, supra note 16, at 170-73 ("Though the imagery available from
commercial systems is reportedly not yet as precise as that available from military systems,
commercial high-resolution systems can now produce imagery of a quality formerly only
available from military systems."); GeoEye's New Satellite Offers Unprecedentedly Sharp
Images, DEF. NEWS, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3778072 (last
visited June 30, 2009) (discussing new commercial satellite imaging service, capable of ob-
taining 0.41 meter ground resolution; U.S. government has already agreed to purchase $197
million worth of its imagery); Sharon Weinberger, Can You Spot the Chinese Nuclear Sub?,
DISCOVER MAG., July 21, 2008, http://discovermagazine.com/2008/aug/21-can-you-spot-the-
chinese-nuclear-sub (last visited June 30, 2009) ("Today, with the advent of civilian satellites
here and abroad, we have opened wide the window on places and events that, not so long ago,
only spies could see."); Theresa Hitchens, Commercial Imagery: Benefits and Risks, Presenta-
tion to Conference on U.S. Space Operations in the International Context (Feb. 24, 2004),
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Governments have only limited ability to modulate these technologi-
cal progressions. Regarding private U.S. remote-sensing satellites, the
U.S. government retains the legal right of "shutter control," meaning that
it can require the owner or operator to refrain from acquiring or dissemi-
nating images of sensitive security-related targets during wartime or
crisis." But there is no guarantee that other countries would regulate the
dozen or so foreign public or private reconnaissance assets in a comple-
mentary fashion. During the fighting in Afghanistan in 2001, the United
States was able to persuade the French government to prevent the rele-
vant imagery from its SPOT consortium satellites from reaching the
open market, where it could be accessed by the enemy. To negate the
prospect that other suppliers might fill the gap, the Pentagon also pre-
emptively bought up, for $1.9 million per month, all the other possibly
useful, high-resolution imagery of Afghanistan that the alternative pri-
vate sources, such as Space Imaging Company's Ikonos satellite, could
generate.,9
available at http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentlD=2111 (last
visited June 30, 2009) (reporting that companies in seven countries have commercial imaging
satellites in orbit, several already providing less than one-meter imagery).
18. See Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, 15 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5672 (2000);
Licensing of Private Land Remote-Sensing Space Systems, 15 C.ER. pt. 960 (2008); KREPON
& CLARY, supra note 5, at 17-18 (stating that U.S. companies are subject to determinations by
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense that can prohibit acquisition and dissemi-
nation of satellite imagery for national security or foreign policy justifications; the power has
never been invoked); U.S. Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Exec. Office of the President, U.S.
Commercial Remote Sensing Policy Fact Sheet (Apr. 25, 2003), available at http://
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/space/2003remotesensing-ostp.htm (last visited June 30,
2009). See generally SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 97 (indicating that seven compa-
nies in Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Russia, and the United States provide commercial
remote sensing imagery; global revenues from these sales totals well over $1 billion annually);
Robert A. Ramey, Outer Space Law, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 745, 777 (John Norton
Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005); Waldrop, supra note 16, at 205 (discussing the
controversies over the wisdom and legality of the shutter control policy); La Fleur, supra note
16, at 37 (explaining that the Secretaries of State and Defense, acting without a court order,
and not subject to appellate review, can bar distribution of satellite imagery); Hitchens, supra
note 17 (stating that shutter control policies also apply to export licenses for U.S. satellite
technology).
19. Duncan Campbell, US Buys up all Satellite War Images, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 17,
2001, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/17/physicalsciences.afghanistan/ print
(last visited June 30, 2009); David Whitehouse, US Buys Afghan Image Rights, BBC NEWS,
Oct. 17, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/tech/1604426.stm (last visited June 30, 2009);
see also KREPON & CLARY, supra note 5, at 18 (citing "checkbook shutter control"); Hitchens,
supra note 17.
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II. THE LEGAL REGIME OF OUTER SPACE
For a relatively "young" field of human endeavor, outer space has al-
ready witnessed an impressive conglomeration of international law;
according to some experts, "the USA and USSR have gone further to
achieve arms control in space than in any other area."2°
The foundational instrument, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)2'
articulates the key "constitutional" principles: the exploration and use of
outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries; 22 outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States
without discrimination;23 outer space is not subject to national appropria-
tion by claim of sovereignty or other means; 24 and States shall carry on
their activities in the exploration and use of outer space in accordance
with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.2 5
20. JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, THE POLITICS OF SPACE SECURITY: STRATEGIC RESTRAINT
AND THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS 29 (2008) (quoting WILLIAM H. SCHAUER, THE
POLITICS OF SPACE: A COMPARISON OF THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN PROGRAMS 71 (1976)); see
also SPACE LAW: A TREATISE, (Francis Lyall & Paul B. Larsen eds., 2009); Michel Bourbon-
niere, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites or lus in Bello
Satellitis, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 43 (2004); Jonathan Dean, The Current Legal Regime
Governing the Use of Outer Space, in SAFEGUARDING SPACE FOR ALL: SECURITY AND PEACE-
FUL USES 35 (U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research ed., 2004); Gabrynowicz, supra note 16;
Ramey, supra note 18, at 745; Thomas Graham, The Law and the Military Use of Outer
Space, in SAFEGUARDING SPACE FOR ALL: SECURITY AND PEACEFUL USES, supra, at 87; Mi-
chael C. Mineiro, The United States and the Legality of Outer Space Weaponization: A
Proposal for Greater Transparency and a Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 33 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 441 (2008); Christopher M. Petras, The Debate Over the Weaponization of Space-A
Military-Legal Conspectus, 28 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 171 (2003); Dana J. St. James, The
Legality of Anti-Satellites, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 467 (1980); Nina Tannenwald, Law
Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29
YALE J. INT'L L. 363 (2004); Arjen Vermeer, A Legal Exploration of Force Application in
Outer Space, 46 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 299 (2007); Rex J. Zedalis & Catherine L. Wade,
Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 8 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 454 (1978).
21. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1. See generally DETLEV WOLTER, COMMON SECU-
RITY IN OUTER SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-23 (2005); Michel Bourbonniere &
Ricky J. Lee, Legality of the Deployment of Conventional Weapons in Earth Orbit: Balancing
Space Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 873 (2007); Nancy Gallagher,
Approaches to Regulating Weapons in Space, in SAFEGUARDING SPACE SECURITY: PREVEN-
TION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE 71 (U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research ed., 2005)
[hereinafter SAFEGUARDING SPACE SECURITY]; Raymond L. Garthoff, The Outer Space Treaty,
1967 to the Present, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 877 (Richard
Dean Burns ed., 1993); Jozef Goldblat, Efforts to Control Arms in Outer Space, 34 SECURITY
DIALOGUE 103 (2003); Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An As-
sessment of Legal Obligations Under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321
(2008); Ramey, supra note 18; St. James, supra note 20.
22. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. I.
23. Id.
24. Id. art. II.
25. Id. art. III. The Outer Space Treaty also requires that in the exploration and use of
outer space, countries "shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual
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In addition, the OST establishes noteworthy weapons-related restric-
tions. Parties undertake not to place into orbit around the earth nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, not to install such weap-
ons on celestial bodies, and not to station them in outer space in any other
manner.16 This provision does not impede the stationing of non-nuclear
weapons (including conventional ASAT weapons) in space,27 nor does it
affect a nuclear weapon that makes only a temporary transit of outer
space, as when propelled by an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
toward its target, rather than being "stationed" in space.
Likewise, the OST provides that the moon and other celestial bodies
shall be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes," and it specifies that
parties may not establish military bases, test weapons, or conduct mili-
tary maneuvers in those locations. Significantly, however, the treaty
bans those activities only on the moon and other celestial bodies-
parties are accordingly unrestricted in building forts, testing weapons,
and conducting military maneuvers on artificial satellites or in the void
of space.
assistance," that they shall conduct their activities in space with due regard for the interests of
other parties, and that if a party has reason to believe that its activities in space "would cause
potentially harmful interference" with the space activities of other States, "it shall undertake
appropriate international consultations." Id. art. IX.
26. Id. art. IV.
27. It might be argued, in light of the widespread and long-lasting damage that a non-
nuclear ASAT weapon might inflict on a wide swath of current and future satellites, via the
creation of persistent debris, see infra notes 40-56 and accompanying text, that even a non-
nuclear ASAT weapon should be considered to be a "weapon of mass destruction," and
therefore categorically prohibited by art. IV of the Outer Space Treaty. In view of the more
common usage, however, which generally reserves the term "weapon of mass destruction" for
nuclear, chemical, and biological arms, this Article does not explore this alternative legal
concept in any detail.
28. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV. Some authorities have traditionally argued
that the restriction to "peaceful purposes" forecloses any "military" activities whatsoever. The
United States, in contrast, has argued that this language prohibits only "aggressive" behavior,
and thus allows military actions that are defensive or otherwise non-aggressive in nature.
Elizabeth S. Waldrop, Weaponization of Outer Space: U.S. National Policy, 29 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 329, 339-40 (2004) (claiming that the definition of "peaceful purposes" has ex-
panded over the years as States increasingly use military space assets for non-aggressive
purposes); see also U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SECURITY REV. COMM'N, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 148-49 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS]; S.
Chandrashekar, Problems of Definition: A View of an Emerging Space Power, in PEACEFUL
AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTION
OF AN ARMS RACE 77-105 (Bhupendra Jasani ed., 1991) [hereinafter PEACEFUL AND NON-
PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE]; Petras, supra note 20; Ramey, supra note 7, at 79-82;
Slijper, supra note 5, at 34-35; Ivan A. Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE,
supra, at 37-55; Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Space Warfare:
Emerging United States-China Military Competition, AM. ENTER. INST., Oct. 17, 2007, at 7;
Zedalis & Wade, supra note 20, at 470-78.
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Virtually all the world's spacefaring countries, and ninety-eight
countries in total, are party to the OST.2 9 The OST has also spawned a
cascade of other agreements, adhered to by most of the relevant States,
fleshing out important aspects of the legal regime for space, including
the 1968 Rescue and Return Agreement (requiring parties to assist astro-
nauts in distress and to return de-orbited spacecraft to their owners) 30
and the 1975 Registration Convention (creating procedures for a launch-
ing State to register and take responsibility for its spacecraft).' Of
special note is the 1972 Liability Convention, specifying a two-tiered
tort regime for injury or damage inflicted by a satellite: absolute liability
for harm caused on earth or to aircraft, and liability for "fault" for inju-
ries to other countries' space objects.32
Other treaties, too, contribute to the law of outer space. The 1963
Limited Test Ban Treaty, for example, prohibits nuclear explosions in
outer space,33 and several arms control treaties ban interference with sat-
ellites employed to help parties monitor compliance with the
agreements' terms.34
29. U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space and Related General Assembly Reso-
lutions, Addendum, Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space
as at 1 January 2008, U.N. Doc. ST/SPACE/ll/Rev.2/Add.1 (Jan. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE_ 1 l-Rev2_Add I E.pdf (last visited
June 30, 2009).
30. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
9574 U.N.T.S. 120. The Rescue and Return Agreement has 92 parties, including the United
States, Russia, and China. U.N. Office of Outer Space, Treaty Signatures: Rescue Agreement,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do (last visited June 30, 2009).
31. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14,
1975, 29 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. The Registration Convention has 53 parties, including
the United States, Russia, and China. U.N. Office of Outer Space, Treaty Signatures: Registra-
tion Convention, http:llwww.oosa.unvienna.org/oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do (last visited
June 30, 2009).
32. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects arts.
III-IV, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. The Liability
Convention has 86 parties, including the United States, Russia, and China. Ramey argues that
the Liability Convention's mechanisms for assessing financial responsibility for damage have
never been implemented in practice; the nearest example, when the Soviet Union paid com-
pensation to Canada after the Cosmos 954 satellite crashed into Canadian territory in 1978,
was not formally conducted under the treaty's terms. See Ramey, supra note 7, at 91.
33. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water art. I(l)(a), Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. The Limited Test
Ban Treaty has 108 parties, including the United States, Russia, and China.
34. See, e.g., Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems art. XII, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (no longer in force); Treaty on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles art. XII, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
Dec. 8, 1987, 1657 U.N.T.S. 2; Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe art. XV, Nov.
19, 1990, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-8 (1991), 30 I.L.M. 1; SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note
2, at 53 (noting space-related arms control agreements).
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III. THE EMERGING ASAT THREAT
As countries increasingly exploit and prosper from outer space for
military and civilian purposes, it should come as no surprise that their
rivals and potential enemies increasingly ponder mechanisms to deny
and defeat those applications in time of conflict. Indeed, the more that
countries invest in satellites, the more they become dependent on them,
and the greater the payoff for a hostile force that can disrupt their func-
tions-and the greater the risk that an initial ASAT attack would trigger
retaliation, cascading into general war. As the United States and others
put more and more eggs into the basket of outer space, we all become
nervously vulnerable to hostile efforts that would challenge the growing
reliance.35
And satellites make excellent targets. They are still relatively few in
number (so destroying or damaging even a handful could have a major
impact); they are "soft" (lacking heavy shielding or the ability to defend
themselves from attack); they usually follow known, predictable orbital
paths, with little ability to undertake evasive maneuvers (so they are eas-
ily trackable "sitting ducks"); they are usually not equipped with
onboard sensors that could provide local "situational awareness" (so they
might not even realize they had been attacked, or by whom); and they
are expensive (so States and private corporations do not maintain
standby fleets of spares, to rapidly reconstitute a satellite architecture
that was suddenly degraded by hostile action).36
Accordingly, the leading spacefaring countries began to pursue
ASAT weapons almost as soon as they developed their interest in satel-
lites themselves-for the United States, the first ASAT program, an
35. See Marc Kaufman & Walter Pincus, Effort to Shoot Down Satellite Could Inform
Military Strategy, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2008, at A3 (quoting Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director
of National Intelligence for Analysis, as stating: "It would not be that difficult to inflict sig-
nificant, serious damage to our capabilities over [a] couple of days with ASAT weapons");
Paul Tighe & Takashi Hirokawa, Japan, Australia Ask China to Explain Space Missile,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
aQSEcxOJNoPI&refer=home (last visited June 30, 2009) (quoting Rep. Edward Markey
(D-Mass.) as saying, "American satellites are the soft underbelly of our national security").
36. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 140, 147 (noting the difficulties in detecting
an ASAT attack and characterizing it as such, and concluding that "if an actor has the ability to
overcome these natural defenses [i.e., the speed and distance involved in engaging satellite
targets], there are few options for physically protecting a satellite against a direct attack");
Theresa Hitchens & David Chen, Forging a Sino-US "Grand Bargain" in Space, 24 SPACE
POL'Y 128 (2008), available at http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/HitchensGrandBargain.pdf (last vis-
ited July 2, 2009) (describing steps that would have to be taken to ensure greater survivability
for U.S. satellites); see also KREPON & CLARY, supra note 5, at 24, 68 (describing mecha-
nisms for threatening and defending satellites).
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initial Army feasibility study, was completed within six weeks of the
Soviet Union's first Sputnik orbit in 1957.37
Two basic varieties of ASAT mechanisms have flourished over the
years. The first is "kinetic energy" interceptors, relying on a physical
object that suddenly shoots up from earth and either collides with the
target satellite, destroying it via high-speed impact, or approaches
closely enough to blow up both itself and the target via a suicidal explo-
sion.
The alternative ASAT technology relies instead on "directed energy,"
such as a laser beam, a column of sub-atomic particles, radio-frequency
transmissions, or a microwave generator. These gizmos could burn a fa-
tal hole in the satellite's skin, temporarily and reversibly (or
permanently) blind its sensors, or possibly employ cyber warfare to alter
the satellite's on-board computers, switching it off or even commandeer-
ing it for the attacker's own uses."
Either of these concepts, in principle, would work; without under-
stating the technical and fiscal difficulties that would have to be
overcome to weaponize either ASAT for practical applications, there is
nothing in the physics of either device that would impose insurmount-
able barriers to a determined weaponeer. Either mechanism could be
based on the surface of the earth, on an airplane, or on a "killer satellite"
in space. However, cost and vulnerability are serious impediments, and
designers at present have not been successful at developing power
sources, optics, and other equipment that could adequately miniaturize
high-energy lasers or other directed energy systems for applications in
aircraft or spacecraft. 9
37. See STARES, supra note 7, at 49 (noting that the U.S. Army feasibility study of satel-
lite interceptors began in June 1957 and was ready with recommendations by November 1957,
six weeks after Sputnik).
38. WOLTER, supra note 21, at 32-35; Bhupendra Jasani, Introduction to PEACEFUL
AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 28, at 1, 10-13.
39. See SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 164, 166-67, 184 (discussing the pro-
gress and frustrations of the Airborne Laser Program and noting that "serious technology
challenges" remain); William Spacy, II, Assessing the Military Utility of Space-Based Weap-
ons, in SPACE WEAPONS: ARE THEY NEEDED?, supra note 7, at 121, 126, 148. See generally
CHRISTOPHER BOLKCOM & STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: AIRBORNE LASER (ABL) - ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2007); STEVEN M. KOSIAK,
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS, ARMING THE HEAVENS: A PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL COST AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF SPACE-BASED WEAPONS
(2007) (evaluating the array of possible ASAT mechanisms); Matthew Mowthorpe, The Revo-
lution in Military Affairs and Directed Energy Weapons, AIR & SPACE POWER CHRON., Mar. 8,
2002, available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/energy-weapons/mowthorpe02.htm
(last visited June 30, 2009).
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A. The Hazards of Debris
One special feature that differentiates between the kinetic and di-
rected energy ASATs is the creation of space debris. When the
interceptor rams into or detonates against its target, both spacecraft
fragment into thousands of pieces; in contrast, a laser or particle beam
weapon would usually not compromise the gross physical integrity of its
target, but would leave it intact, if dysfunctional.
This distinction is critical, both legally and factually. Space debris is
now increasingly recognized as a profound problem for current and fu-
ture safe and successful operations in space.40 Traveling at enormous
orbital velocities (30,000 km/hr in low orbit), a chunk of random debris
could obliterate an unlucky satellite; even small fragments could cause
catastrophic damage. An orbiting particle a mere one centimeter in di-
ameter (about the size of a child's marble) carries the impact of a one-
ton safe falling from the top of a five-story building, and is capable of
inflicting serious, perhaps fatal, harm.4' To cite another vivid illustration:
the windows of the Space Shuttle, designed to withstand the enormous
pressures of re-entry into the earth's atmosphere, have repeatedly been
pockmarked by collisions with tiny flecks of dried paint and other minor
objects, traveling at ten times the speed of a high-powered bullet.42
40. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 25-38. See generally Michael W. Taylor,
Trashing the Solar System One Planet at a 7ime: Earth's Orbital Debris Problem, 20 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Christopher D. Williams, Space: The Cluttered Frontier, 60 J.
AIR L. & COM. 1139 (1995); David Wright, Orbital Debris Produced by Kinetic-Energy Anti-
Satellite Weapons, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE, supra note 16, at 155; U.N. Office for
Outer Space Affairs, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sci. & Tech. Subcomm.,
Technical Report on Space Debris, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/720 (1999), available at
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/reports/ac105/ACl05-720E.pdf (last visited June 30,
2009); Leonard David, The Clutter Above, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, July-Aug. 2005, at 32;
NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, INTERAGENCY REPORT ON ORBITAL DEBRIS (1995).
The problems of space debris, and the awareness of its dangers, are not new. By the mid-
1960s, NASA considered orbital debris to be a major threat to the space environment, and the
concern intensified in the subsequent decades as ASAT testing proceeded. However, an inter-
national political consensus about how to deal with the growing danger was much slower to
coalesce. MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 126, 177; Maureen Williams, Safeguarding Outer Space:
On the Road to Debris Mitigation, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note *, at 81 (tracing land-
marks in the global attention to the problem of space debris); see also NICHOLAS L. JOHNSON
ET AL., NASA, HISTORY OF ON-ORBIT SATELLITE FRAGMENTATIONS (14th ed. 2008).
41. Space Security or Space Weapons? A Guide to the Issues, HENRY L. STIMSON CTR.,
Jan. 2005, at 8, available at http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/issueguide.pdf (last visited June
30, 2009).
42. Brad Lemley, The Shooting Gallery, DISCOVER MAG., Jan. 12, 2001, http:l/
discovermagazine.coml200l/decfeatshoot (last visited June 30, 2009) (claiming that debris
creates an average of thirty-two pits on the shuttle's windows on each mission, leading to
frequent replacements, and that 17 percent of the damage has been inflicted by paint frag-
ments); NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Orbital Debris Surface Examinations,
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/measure/surfaceexam.html (last visited June 30, 2009) (stating
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Debris from an ASAT test or attack would generate thousands of
these random fragments, dispersing into a lethal orbiting cloud. China's
January 2007 ASAT experiment, for example (described below), erupted
into a miasma of 2600 pieces of trackable debris, and perhaps 150,000
smaller (but nonetheless hazardous) fragments careening in all direc-
tions. It created a swarm, moving through space like a high-speed lethal
amoeba, stretching from 200 to 2350 kilometers in altitude, through
which over 100 essential earth observation satellites must repeatedly
pass in the years to come. Already, two U.S. satellites have been com-
43pelled to alter their normal orbital courses to avoid this danger zone.
Moreover, the location, density, and direction of the debris cloud are
difficult to discern with sufficient specificity to guide evasive maneuvers.
The U.S. Air Force Space Command, located at Cheyenne Mountain in
Colorado, maintains the most advanced mechanism for cataloguing this
space detritus. This Space Surveillance Network utilizes thirty advanced
sensors worldwide to track 17,300 orbiting items larger than ten centi-
meters, including all manner of junk cast off by earlier space missions.
Experts estimate that there may be 300,000 additional orbiting fragments
between one and ten centimeters in size, and perhaps 35 million bits of
scrap in total-a careening inventory of three to five million kilograms
of unwanted human-created space trash."
Worse yet, much of the space debris is remarkably persistent. Alti-
tude is the key variable here: debris generated at relatively low altitudes
will usually degrade quite quickly, falling out of orbit and ordinarily
burning up when re-entering the earth's atmosphere. But debris at higher
altitudes can remain aloft for years, decades, or even centuries-the
exoatmospheric environment has very little ability to cleanse itself, and
that on average, two windows of the space shuttle must be replaced per mission, due to dam-
age caused by micrometeoroids or orbital debris).
43. SHIRLEY KAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CHINA'S
ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON TEST (2007); JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 40, at I (stating that this
single event contributed 17 percent of the total catalogued debris in orbit); SPACE SECURITY
2008, supra note 2, at 29; Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Creates Most Severe Orbital Debris
Cloud in History, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS (NASA), Apr. 2007, at 2; U.S. Satellites Dodge
Chinese Missile Debris, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at At; T.S. Kelso, Analysis of the 2007
Chinese ASAT Test and the Impact of its Debris on the Space Environment, Presentation at the
2007 AMOS Conference, http://celestrak.comlpublications/AMOS/2007/AMOS-2007.pdf
(last visited June 30, 2009).
44. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 27 (stating that 13,000 of the objects
tracked by the Space Surveillance Network are recorded on the publicly accessible catalog
http://www.space-track.org; suggesting, however, that there may be billions of pieces of hu-
man-created debris too small to identify and track); J.C. Liou & N.L. Johnson, Risks in Space
from Orbiting Debris, 311 Sci. 340, 340 (2006) (estimating that there are 5 million kilograms
of human-made debris in space); see also SPACE SECURITY 2009, supra note 4, ch. I (noting
that Russia also maintains a space surveillance system, and that independent monitoring capa-
bilities are being pursued by the European Union, Canada, China, Japan, and others).
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human beings cannot yet play the janitorial role effectively. In the high-
est orbits, we have to think of each piece of debris as essentially a
permanent problem.
For much of this debris, especially the smaller bits, identification of
the source is impossible; neither the satellite itself nor its ground control-
lers will be reliably able to identify the nature and origin of the particle
that hit and crippled it. Lacking better situational awareness, satellite
owners and operators may be ignorant about the cause of a particular
malfunction-was it an internal snafu, a collision with a micrometeorite,
an accidental impact with random debris, or a deliberate ASAT attack-
and attribution of liability for any damage could not be readily as-
signed.46
Collisions with space junk have already exacted a toll. In July 1996,
the French military reconnaissance satellite Cerise collided with a brief-
case-sized fragment from an Ariane rocket launched ten years earlier. (It
was just coincidental that both items were of French origin.) The colli-
sion tore off a four-meter section of the satellite's stabilization boom,
sending Cerise wobbling out of its normal orbit. If the satellite had been
manned, the accident might have proven fatal, but after some delay,
ground controllers were able to reorient the satellite and continue its
mission-and the severed boom became just another piece of orbital
junk.4 ' At a less catastrophic level, a tiny piece of space debris of un-
known origin ripped a three-fourths inch hole entirely through the
antenna dish of the Hubble Space Telescope.48
More recently-and spectacularly-on February 10, 2009, a fully
operational U.S. commercial communications satellite (Iridium-33,
launched in 1997) was blindsided by a long-defunct, but still-intact, Rus-
sian Cosmos 2251 (launched in 1993). The impact, occurring at 22,000
miles per hour, some 490 miles above Eastern Siberia, shattered both
45. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 25 (noting that 300 pieces of debris from
Soviet ASAT tests during the 1970s and 1980s are still in orbit today); Kelso, supra note 43, at
329 (predicting that 79 percent of the debris created by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test will still
be in orbit one hundred years after the event); see also Michael Krepon & Michael Katz-
Hyman, Space Weapons and Proliferation, in BUILDING THE ARCHITECTURE FOR SUSTAIN-
ABLE SPACE SECURITY, supra note 15, at 39, 41 (noting that when naval battles occur, the
wreckage sinks to the bottom of the ocean, not posing any additional hazards to maritime
traffic, but when ASAT weapons are used, the debris can remain in orbit for long periods,
disrupting normal satellite activities).
46. Williams, supra note 40, at 1158-59 (discussing the difficulties of enforcement of
the Liability Convention's program of tort liability for damage to space objects).
47. David Wright, Space Debris, PHYSICS TODAY, Oct. 2007, at 35, 37, available at
http://ptonline.aip.org/journals/doc/PHTOAD-ft/vol_60/iss_10/35_1.shtml (last visited June
30, 2009); Lemley, supra note 42.
48. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 28; Orbital Debris Surface Examinations,
supra note 42.
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orbiters, but analysts are not yet able to discern precisely how many
fragments-and of what size and trajectory-resulted. Nicholas L. John-
son, NASA's chief scientist for orbital debris, opined that "nothing to
this extent" had ever occurred before-but commentators guaranteed
that it would not be the last such event. Observers had been routinely
tracking both satellites, and a near-pass was certainly foreseeable, but no
warning had been issued about the imminent catastrophe. As if to make
matters worse, many others in the family of Iridium spacecraft are delib-
erately placed into similar orbits, as are multiple other types of valuable
orbiters, so the debris from this sudden impact poses an especially prob-
lematic hazard.49
At least three other inactive satellites have also collided with space
debris: in 1991 the defunct Russian Cosmos 1934 satellite was struck by
fragments from another Cosmos orbiter; in 1997 the U.S. NOAA-7 was
smacked by an unidentified chunk; and a similar impact befell the inac-
tive Russian Cosmos 539 in 2002. Additional debris-to-debris impacts,
such as the January 2005 run-in between a fragment of a Chinese rocket
body and a thirty-one-year-old U.S. rocket body, are also known. More-
over, several other incidents-satellite breakups or malfunctions of
uncertain cause-may have been attributable to impacts with debris par-
ticles too small to track. Unintended, but potentially catastrophic, "close
approaches" (defined as satellites weaving within one kilometer of each
other) occur hundreds of times daily. 0
As Brian Lemley engagingly puts it, "every craft sent into orbit gets
whacked repeatedly" by tiny flakes of debris or micrometeorites,5' and
more telling impacts are likely, too. An average small satellite in a com-
mon near-earth orbit now has a one percent chance per year of colliding
with a piece of space debris so significant as to cause permanent mission
failure; the betting odds on the space shuttle being seriously jeopardized
by human-made debris range between one in fifty and one in 200. By
49. Geoff Brumfiel, Kaputnik Chaos Could Kill Hubble, 475 NATURE 940 (2009); Wil-
liam J. Broad, Debris Spews into Space After Satellites Collide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at
A28; Tim Hepher, Scientists Aware Satellite Paths Would Be Close, REUTERS, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.reuters.con/articlelatestCrisis/idUSLC844164 (last visited June 30, 2009); Tariq
Malik, Debris from Space Collision Poses Threat to Other Satellites, SPACE.cOM, Feb. 13,
2009, http://www.space.com/news/090212-satellite-collision-update.html (last visited June 30,
2009).
50. See generally Lemley, supra note 42; Liou & Johnson, supra note 44; Wright, supra
note 47; Yury Zaitsev, The Problem of Space Junk, RIA NoVOSTI, Feb. 13, 2009, http:l
en.rian.ni/analysis/20090213/120123116.html (last visited July 19, 2009).
51. See generally Lemley, supra note 42.
52. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 28 (stating that collisions between the large
space assets and small pieces of debris are "a daily but manageable problem," and noting that
one large satellite sustained 30,000 hits by debris or meteoroids during its six years in orbit);
Wright, supra note 47; Joel Primack, Pelted by Paint, Downed by Debris, BULL. ATOMIC
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one estimate, we should now anticipate a major collision in space (re-
sulting in significant damage to the satellite) every three to four years,
and a catastrophic crash (resulting in complete fragmentation of the un-
lucky victim) every twelve to fourteen years.53
In the most recent scary near-miss, three astronauts were forced on
March 13, 2009 to temporarily evacuate the International Space Station,
seeking refuge in the attached Russian Soyuz spacecraft that serves as
their emergency escape option, due to an unanticipated "conjunction"
with a wandering five-inch motor component. The fragment, which has
been circling the earth since 1993, follows an erratic orbit; ground con-
trollers were not certain how closely it would approach on that particular
pass.54 Two weeks later, nervous NASA officials ordered astronauts
aboard the space shuttle Discovery, which had docked with the Space
Station, to fire the ship's thrusters briefly, in order to maneuver away
from an oncoming, potentially lethal four-inch piece of an old Chinese
rocket body that was slated to swing uncomfortably nearby.55
Outer space is, of course, a very large place, with lots of room for
satellites to roam and avoid each other. But not all regions of space are
equally valuable, and in the most useful orbits, the traffic gets congested.
Naturally, debris (from prior ASAT tests and from ordinary launch activ-
ity) is most prevalent-and most problematic-in those regions. The
specter of debris-to-debris collisions, multiplying in a hazardous "chain
reaction" is the worst, but all too realistic, scenario.56
SCIENTISTS, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 24. See generally Lemley, supra note 42 (quoting NASA
official as estimating that there is a one-in-twenty chance over ten years that the International
Space Station will suffer a collision resulting in loss of a critical component that could lead to
death or injury of the astronauts); ISS Orbit Adjusted to Dodge Space Junk-Mission Control,
RIA NOVOSTI, Aug. 28, 2008, http://www.space-travel.com/reports/ISS-OrbitAdjusted
ToDodge-Space-Junk_999.html (last visited June 30, 2009) (stating that the International
Space Station's orbit was lowered 1.7 kilometers in order to avoid collision with space debris).
But see SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 28 (reporting a 1995 National Research
Council study that estimated only a one-in-a-thousand chance of a satellite colliding with a
large piece of debris over a decade).
53. Wright, supra note 47, at 37.
54. Joel Achenbach, Astronauts Evacuate Space Station Temporarily During Collision
Scare, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2009, atA2.
55. Space Station, Shuttle Dodge Old Rocket Debris, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2009, at
A2.
56. The possibility of a "super-critical" chain reaction, in which random collisions
generate new debris faster than old debris falls out of orbit, is referred to as the "Kessler syn-
drome," after the scientist who first described it. Debris in some sectors of space is already
sufficiently concentrated that these chain reactions are possible. Liou & Johnson, supra note
44; Williams, supra note 40, at 1145-46; Wright, supra note 47, at 37-38.
James Clay Moltz has imaginatively likened the problem of persistent orbital debris to
the more familiar problem of unexploded ordnance on the conventional battlefield, which
frequently causes harm to unwary civilians long after the war has terminated. "One can only
imagine, for example, the different outcome ... if-as with orbital space debris-all of the
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In recognition of the folly of perpetuating these self-inflicted
wounds, the United States and others have undertaken efforts to reduce
their creation of additional space debris. Mitigation guidelines, both na-
tional and international, have been promulgated and generally well
respected-but these merely slow, not stop or reverse, the accumulation
of the problem.57 The cumulative quantity of space debris grew by 5.5
percent in 2006 (with most of the additional increment being injected
into orbit by the United States) and by a whopping 20.12 percent in 2007
(prompted by the Chinese ASAT test and by the spontaneous breakup of
several large obsolete rocket bodies)." In 2008, a further 2.2 percent in-
crease was registered.59
In further acknowledgement of the foolishness of fouling our own
nest, the U.S. government has promulgated regulations for minimizing
the creation of new orbital debris 6° and the commercial space industry
arrows and bullets fired in those wars of conquest had continued to speed around the Earth
causing damage for decades after they had been fired." MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 17.
57. The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee adopted a set of guide-
lines by consensus in 2002. See INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMM., IADC
SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES (2002), available at http://www.iadc-online.org/
docs-pub/IADC- 101 502.Mit.Guidelines.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009). The U.N. Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space used the IADC guidelines as the basis for its own mitiga-
tion guidelines in 2007. See United Nations Adopts Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines,
ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Apr. 2007, at 1, available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/news-
letter/pdfs/ODQNvl li2.pdf; see also Waldrop, supra note 16, at 212 (discussing the fact that
NASA and the U.S. Department of Defense have made efforts since 1984 to reduce debris,
and the United States has made debris reduction an important objective in its space policy,
while the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) has meanwhile recommended that States devote
more attention to the problem.); G.A. Res. 57/116, U.N. Doc. AIRES/57/116 (Feb. 26, 2003);
G.A. Res. 62/217, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/217 (Feb. 1, 2008): SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note
2, at 32-34; Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, Space Debris and International Law, in SPACE LAW,
supra note 20, at 309; Yang Junhua, Developing Space Peacefully for the Benefit of Humanity,
in COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN SPACE: ASIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 24 (discussing
China's support for efforts to reduce space debris); Martha Mejia-Kaiser, Informal Regulations
and Practices in the Field of Space Debris Mitigation, 34 AIR & SPACE L. 21 (2009); Vladlen
S. Vereshchetin, Outer Space, in MAX PLANCK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 18-28 (2009), available at http://www.mpepil.com/ (discussing international efforts
to mitigate creation of space debris) (last visited July 29, 2009).
58. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 30-31; Jessica West, Next Generation
Space Security Challenges, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note *, at 35.
59. SPACE SECURITY 2009, supra note 4, ch. 2.
60. U.S. National Space Policy, supra note 7, at 9 (stating as official U.S. policy that
"[o]rbital debris poses a risk to continued reliable use of space-based services and operations
and to the safety of persons and property in space and on Earth. The United States shall seek
to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and non-government operations in
space in order to preserve the space environment for future generations .... The United States
shall take a leadership role in international fora to encourage foreign nations and international
organizations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris minimization and shall cooperate
in the exchange of information on debris research and the identification of improved debris
mitigation practices."). See generally NASA, HANDBOOK FOR LIMITING ORBITAL DEBRIS
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has begun to speak out against weapons tests and other programs that
could unnecessarily litter space with hazardous debris.6 ' Likewise, the
U.S. military has also largely turned its attention away from kinetic
energy interceptors toward directed energy systems that generate little or
no debris; Department of Defense policy now favors satellite negation
techniques that "have temporary, localized, and reversible effects. 62 Air
Force Undersecretary for Space Programs Gary Payton rejected kinetic
kill space weapons, stating that "[i]t would be hugely disadvantageous
for the U.S. to get into that game. 63
B. The Historical Pattern of ASAT Development
Throughout the Cold War era, both the United States and the Soviet
Union demonstrated creativity, persistence, and open checkbooks in pur-
suit of diverse ASAT weapon systems. In the earliest iterations, even
nuclear weapons were contemplated for deployment in the kinetic inter-
ceptors. The U.S. Army, in its Program 505, undertook a dozen ASAT
system flight tests with Nike-Zeus missiles between 1962 and 1966; the
Air Force's corresponding Program 437, employing larger Thor missiles,
was tested sixteen times between 1964 and 1970. All told, the United
States conducted thirty-one ASAT tests in space between 1959 and
1970.64
Employing 300 kilograms of conventional high explosive, instead of
nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union's ASAT was tested in space ap-
proximately twenty times (about half of them successful) between 1968
(2008); NASA, PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LIMITING ORBITAL DEBRIS (2008); NASA,
TECHNICAL STANDARD, PROCESS FOR LIMITING ORBITAL DEBRIS (2007).
61. MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 297 (quoting industry group spokespersons as asserting
that "[a]n ASAT weapons race will have the effect of increasing the financial risk of any satel-
lite program, and this will undoubtedly be felt most within the commercial market through
decreased investor confidence and (or) high insurance rates").
62. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: SPACE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY,
FISCAL YEAR 2004/2005 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2005/
AirForce/0603438F.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009). The United States has not totally aban-
doned kinetic energy ASAT systems: the KE-ASAT program was funded through 2005, and in
2008, when the failing USA-193 satellite posed a danger, an interceptor, rather than any di-
rected energy system, was employed to attack it. See infra note 71.
63. MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 295.
64. LAURA GREGO, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SHORT HISTORY OF US AND
SOVIET ASAT PROGRAMS (Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/
documents/nwgs/asatIhistory.pdf (last visited July 19, 2009); STARES, supra note 7, at 106-
34, 261; John Pike & Eric Stambler, Anti-Satellite Weapons and Arms Control, in 2 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 21, at 991; St. James, supra note 20;
Desmond Ball, Austral Special Report: Assessing China's ASAT Program, Nautilus Inst. (June
2007), http://nautilus.rmit.edu.au/forum-reports/0714s-ball; Joan Johnson-Freese, The Viabil-
ity of U.S. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control, U.S. Air Force Inst.
for Nat'l Sec. Stud., Occasional Paper 30 (2000), available at http://www.usafa.af.mil/
df/inss/OCP/ocp3O.pdf (last visited July 17, 2009).
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and 1971 and, after a unilateral moratorium, between 1976 and 1982.
The system was initially capable of reaching targets between 230 and
1000 kilometers above earth; eventually, the range was extended to be-
tween 160 to 1600 kilometers. The United States thereafter deemed the
weapon to be in "operational" status, but it has been dormant for more
than two decades, and the capability has presumably atrophied .
However, in 2009, in view of the apparent renaissance in interest in
ASAT activities in both the United States and China, Russia's Deputy
Defense Minister Valentin Popovkin commented, "[w]e can't sit back
and quietly watch others doing that; such work is being conducted in
Russia."66
During the 1980s, the United States pursued a rather different non-
nuclear ASAT concept, the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV). It relied
on collision, rather than explosion, and consisted of a small missile
launched by a steeply climbing F-15 jet aircraft, rather than a ground-
based rocket. The Air Force tested the MHV in space only three times-
twice in 1984 against an unoccupied designated point in space, and
once, on September 13, 1985, against an obsolescent Solwind solar
observation satellite. That collision, occurring at 24,000 km/hr at 555
kilometers above the earth, shattered the target, generating 300 pieces of
trackable debris, which took nineteen years to degrade out of orbit.67
Some of that hazardous space junk whizzed within one mile of the
International Space Station.68
The MHV program was abandoned in 1987, but the Army and Con-
gressional ASAT enthusiasts persisted in pouring $350 million into a
more sophisticated follow-on model, designated KE-ASAT (for kinetic
energy anti-satellite) in the 1990s and through 2005.69 The notion here
65. GREGO, supra note 64; STARES, supra note 7, at 135-56, 262; James Clay Moltz,
Protecting Safe Access to Space: Lessons from the First 50 Years of Space Security, 23 SPACE
POL'Y 199 (2007); Pike & Stambler, supra note 64, at 994; St. James, supra note 20; Chinese
Anti-satellite Test Creates Most Severe Orbital Debris Cloud in History, supra note 43, at 2, 3
(stating that 301 identifiable pieces of debris from Soviet ASAT tests still remain in orbit);
Ball, supra note 64; Anatoly Zak, Military: IS Anti-Satellite System, http://
www.russianspaceweb.com/is.html (last visited June 30, 2009);.
66. Russia Pursuing Antisatellite Capability, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Mar. 6,
2009, available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw 20090306_1789.php (last visited June 30, 2009).
67. Krepon & Katz-Hyman, supra note 45, at 41-42; Wright, supra note 47, at 36;
Michael Krepon & Samuel Black, Space Security or Anti-Satellite Weapons? (Stimson Ctr.,
Report, May 2009). See generally Johnson-Freese, supra note 64. The satellite destroyed in
this test was roughly the same mass (one ton) as the satellite destroyed in China's 2007 ASAT
test, but because the Chinese event occurred at a higher altitude (850 km instead of 550 kin)
the debris from the later collision will linger in orbit for decades longer. Wright, supra note
47, at 39.
68. Krepon & Katz-Hyman, supra note 45, at 42.
69. GREGO, supra note 64, at 4-5; George C. Wilson, Mr. Smith's Crusade, 33 NAT'L J.
2542, 2542 (2001).
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was that a Minuteman ICBM booster would project the spacecraft into a
rendezvous with its target, and the impact would occur with a giant my-
lar flyswatter attachment, designed to damage or destroy the target, but
without generating so much collateral debris.70 Three models of the
KE-ASAT were built, but none was ever flown, and two of the proto-
types have reportedly been cannibalized for other projects.'
The most recent incarnation of a kinetic satellite-killer was demon-
strated on February 20, 2008, when the U.S. Navy modified a standard
ballistic missile interceptor to enable it to attack the failing USA-193
satellite, which was about to tumble out of orbit. This adaptation (which
also demonstrated the significant inherent overlap between anti-missile
and ASAT capabilities7 2) succeeded in pulverizing the satellite at very
low altitude (approximately 150 miles), so most of the 3000 or so poten-
tially hazardous fragments precipitated out of orbit within a few days or
weeks, not posing any enduring threat to other satellites. The U.S. gov-
ernment asserted that this exercise was not truly a "test"; it was not an
enterprise designed to develop a new ASAT capability. Instead, the
avowed purpose was simply to negate the unique danger posed by the
5000 pound, school bus-sized USA-193, which had eluded U.S. efforts
to re-assert control. The tumbling craft, it was feared, might soon re-
enter the atmosphere intact, possibly surviving re-entry with its fuel tank
full of corrosive chemicals posing a health hazard, should it land in a
populated area. Skeptics, however, asserted that the true purpose was to
flex U.S. ASAT muscle, in response to the February 2007 Chinese test,
to demonstrate an agile space weapons capability, but to do so in a fash-
ion that did not further pollute space with unwanted, long-lasting
debris."
70. GREGO, supra note 64, at 4-5; Wilson, supra note 69, at 2542-43.
71. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 163; Wilson, supra note 69, at 2542-43; see
also GREGO, supra note 64, at 6-7; MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 239, 248-49, 274-75; Letter
from Jack L. Brock, Jr., Managing Dir., U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, Acquisition and Sourcing
Mgmt., to Bob Smith, U.S. Senator, Re: Defense Acquisitions: Status of KE-ASAT Program
(Dec. 5, 2000), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/spacellibrary/report/gao/
d01228r.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009).
72. Zhang Hui, Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective, 2
CHINA SECURITY 24 (2006); David Wright & Laura Grego, ASAT Capabilities of Planned US
Missile Defense System, DISARMAMENT DIPL., Dec. 2002-Jan. 2003, available at http:/I
www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd68/68op02.htm (last visited June 30, 2009).
73. Richard Weitz, U.S. Satellite Shoot-Down Evokes International Concern and
Criticism, 24 WMD INSIGHTS 15 (2008); Kaufman & Pincus, supra note 35, at A3;
Situation Critical, ECON. TIMES (Mumbai), Feb. 17, 2008, available at http:II
economictimes.indiatimes.com/Features/TheSundayET/Backpage/Situation criticaUarticle
show/2788710.cms (last visited June 30, 2009) (citing a U.S. diplomat as promising that the
United States will assume liability for any damage inflicted by the interception of the USA-
193 satellite); see also SPACE SECURITY 2009, supra note 4, ch. I (noting that the last
trackable pieces of USA-193 fell back to earth on Oct. 9, 2008); Mineiro, supra note 21;
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China had been known to be pursuing ASAT technology for some
time,74 with three space tests of its SC-19 interceptor either accidentally
or deliberately just missing their targets in July 2005 and February 2006.
On January 11, 2007, however, China suddenly became the third country
to unveil an operational ASAT capability, destroying its aging Fengyun-
IC weather satellite via high-speed head-on collision at 860 kilometers
altitude. Launched from the Xichang Space Center aboard a mobile two-
stage ballistic missile, the interceptor would be capable of holding at risk
all satellites in low-earth orbit, including many of the world's most vital
and sensitive spacecraft.75
Beyond those three acknowledged ASAT pioneers, any other country
that pursues civilian space launch vehicles or military long-range ballis-
tic missiles (or anti-missiles) simultaneously procures at least a latent
ASAT capacity. The propulsion, guidance, and other interceptor tech-
nologies are certainly not child's play, but neither are they permanently
beyond the capacities of the twenty or more States that have already
Baker Spring, Satellite Shootdown Was a Necessary Operation (Heritage Found., Web Memo
No. 1823, 2008), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/
wm_ I 823.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009); News Release, Office of the Asst. Sec'y of Def.,
U.S. Dep't of Def. (Public Affairs), Satellite Debris Analysis Indicates Hydrazine Tank Hit,
Feb. 25, 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid =11709
(last visited June 30, 2009); News Briefing, U.S. Dep't of Def, Briefing with Gen. James
Cartwright & NASA Admin. Michael Griffin, Feb. 14, 2008, available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=41 (last visited June 30, 2009).
See generally USA-193: SELECTED DOCUMENTS (P.J. Blount & Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz
eds., 2009), available at http://rescommunis.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/usa- 193 -selected-
documents-2.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009).
74. U.S. Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Open Source Ctr., China: PLA Training Emphasizes
Countermeasures Against Imagery Reconnaissance, July 31, 2007, available at http://
www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/china-imagery.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009); U.S. Dep't of Def.,
Office of the Sec'y of Def., Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People's Repub-
lic of China 2008, at 3 ("China is developing a multi-dimensional program to limit or prevent
the use of space-based assets by its potential adversaries during times of crisis or conflict.");
Donald A. Mahley, Acting Dep. Asst. Sec'y for Threat Reduction, Export Controls, The State
of Space Security, Remarks at the State Policy Institute, Elliot Sch. of Int'l Aff., George Wash-
ington Univ. (Jan. 24, 2008), available at www.gwu.edu/-spi/Ambassador%20
Donald%20Mahley.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009); see also KAN, supra note 43; Frank M.
Walsh, Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case for Revaluating the
2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System, 72 J. AIR L. & COM.
759, 766 (2007); Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Space War-
fare: Emerging United States-China Military Competition, AM. ENTER. INST., Oct. 17, 2007,
at 7.
75. KAN, supra note 43; SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 165; Craig Covault,
Space Control, 166 AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. 59 (2007); Geoffrey Forden, After China's
Test: Time for a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons, 37 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 19 (Apr.
2007); Theresa Hitchens, US.-Sino Relations in Space: From "War of Words" to Cold War in
Space? 5 CHINA SECURITY 12 (Winter 2007); Gregory Kulacki & Jeffrey G. Lewis, Under-
standing China's Antisatellite Test, 15 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 335 (2008); Miniero, supra
note 21; Walsh, supra note 74; Ball, supra note 64; Kelso, supra note 43.
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mastered the art of basic space flight, missilery, and satellite operations.76
In particular, the United Kingdom, Israel, and India are said to be explor-
ing techniques for exoatmospheric interception."
Turning to directed energy ASAT systems, the story is more concise.
The only publically acknowledged test of this concept came with the
U.S. MIRACL (Mid-InfraRed Advanced Chemical Laser) experiment in
October 1997. MIRACL was constructed in 1980, but it remains the
United States' most prodigious laser, capable of two megawatts of
power. In the experiment, the Air Force pinpointed it at a defunct MSTI-
3 satellite 420 kilometers overhead, to assess its effectiveness at not only
locating, identifying, and tracking, a typical satellite, but also damaging,
disrupting, or destroying it.71
Remarkably, while the MIRACL itself basically failed to validate the
mission, officials were surprised to discover that a companion lower-
powered laser, intended merely to align the system and track the experi-
ment, proved sufficiently energetic to blind the target satellite
temporarily. Authorities had not anticipated that a piece of essentially
commercially available laser equipment could possess such impressive
79
military power.
The U.S.S.R., too, had experimented with high-powered lasers, in-
cluding exploring possible ASAT missions, but few data are available to
describe the program. U.S. authorities during the 1970s and 1980s had
76. NANCY GALLAGHER & JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, RECONSIDERING THE RULES FOR
SPACE SECURITY 60 (2008); SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 69, 168 (noting that nine
States already have the ability to launch objects into orbit, several more are working in that
direction, eighteen other States have the capacity to launch objects into space without achiev-
ing orbit, and eleven States currently deploy medium- or long-range ballistic missiles);
Rumsfeld Comm'n, Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization 18-22 (2001); Jeffrey Lewis, "Hit-to-Kill" and the
Threat to Space Assets, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE, supra note 16, at 147, 149 (discuss-
ing kinetic interceptor technology research in India, Israel, Japan, and Europe); Thomas
Graham, Jr., Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War, 35 ARMS CONTROL To-
DAY 12, 14 (Dec. 2005) (estimating that twenty-eight countries currently have missiles capable
of launching ASAT weapons into near-earth orbit); Steven Lee Myers, Look Out Below: The
Arms Race in Space May Be On, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at 3.
77. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 163; Guiney, supra note 12.
78. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 164; Pentagon Beams over Military Laser
Test, CNN, Oct. 20, 1997, http://web.archive.org/web/20071230052044/http://www.cnn.com/
US/9710/20/pentagon.laser/ (last visited July 17, 2009); News Briefing, U.S. Dep't of Def.,
Briefing with Kenneth H. Bacon, Dec. 11, 1997, available at http://www.fas.org/
spp/military/programlasat/t 12111997_t1211 asd.html (last visited June 30, 2009); U.S. Laser
Weapon Test, FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION DAILY DIG., Oct. 22, 1997, http://www.fas.org/
spp/military/programlasat/971022-miracl-mr.htm (last visited June 30, 2009).
79. GREGO, supra note 64, at 6; SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 164; John Don-
nelly, Laser of 30 Watts Blinded Satellite 300 Miles High, DEF. WK., Dec. 8, 1997, at 1; see
also STARES, supra note 7, at 214-15 (describing U.S. research on particle beam and laser
ASAT systems during the late 1970s and early 1980s); Ramey, supra note 7, at 23-27.
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identified a site at Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan as a possible focal point
for this effort, but an invited inspection at the facility in 1989 largely
dispelled concerns about its true capacities. 80
More recently, China has also demonstrated its keen interest in di-
rected energy ASATs, and has constructed several energetic lasers that
could be suitable for that mission. Fragmentary reports, difficult to
evaluate or corroborate, suggest that in September 2006, China may have
illuminated overflying U.S. satellites with a high-powered laser, possibly
as a test of a blinding system, perhaps on multiple occasions. To date,
the public record is ambiguous about the true nature of this "laser-
painting" activity and its effects on the supposedly targeted U.S. space-
craft."
Ominously, the relevant technology (employing lasers or other
directed energy systems) may be well within reach of even modest
military powers. One leading group of space security experts reported in
2006 that "[a]s many as 30 states may already have the capability to use
low-power lasers to degrade unhardened satellite sensors. 82 The
governments of Libya, Cuba, and Iran as well as non-state actors such as
the Falun Gong spiritual group in China have exercised the ability to
jam, disrupt, or co-opt the satellite operations of others. 83 The leading
80. Frank von Hippel & Thomas B. Cochran, The Myth of the Soviet "Killer" Laser,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1989, at 23; Christopher Joyce & Jeff Hecht, Threat Dims from Soviet
Laser Weapon, NEW SCIENTIST, July 22, 1989, at 23; Bill Keller, American Team Gets Close
Look at Soviet Laser, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1989, at 1; see also GREGO, supra note 64, at 5;
STARES, supra note 7, at 145-46.
81. Warren Ferster & Colin Clark, NRO Confirms Chinese Laser Test Illuminated U.S.
Spacecraft, SPACE NEWS, Oct. 2, 2006, at 10, available at http://www.space.com/
spacenews/archive06/chinalaser_1002.html (last visited June 30, 2009); Vago Muradian,
China Attempted to Blind U.S. Satellites with Laser, DEF. NEWS, Sept. 28, 2006, at 1. See
generally MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 288; GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 76, at 31
n.87; SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 164; Elaine M. Grossman, Is China Disrupting
U.S. Satellites? INSIDEDEFENSE.COM, Oct. 13, 2006, http://www.military.com/features/
0,15240,116694,00.html; Yousaf M. Butt, Harv.-Smithsonian Ctr. for Astrophysics, Ground-
Space Laser Rules of the Road: Lessons from 2006 Lasing of U.S. SpySat, Presentation at the
Stimson Center (Feb. 12, 2009), (unpublished presentation), available at http://
www.stimson.org/space/pdf/YB-LaserRanging_2_2009.pdf (last visited July 29, 2009) (sug-
gesting that the 2006 blinding incident may have been an accidental effect of Chinese laser
ranging, intended merely to acquire data about U.S. satellite orbits, rather than to dazzle or
damage the satellites); Yousaf Butt, Satellite Laser Ranging in China (Union of Concerned
Scientists, Technical Working Paper, Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/
nuclear.weapons-and-global-security/space-weapons/technicalissues/chinese-lasers-and-
us.html (last visited June 30, 2009).
82. SPACESECURITY.ORG, SPACE SECURITY 2006, at 134 (2006), available at
www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2006.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009), summarized in Estabrooks,
supra note 15, at 103; Donnelly, supra note 79.
83. David Shiga & AFP, Mysterious Source Jams Satellite Communications, NEW SCI-
ENTIST, Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dnl 1033-mysterious-
source-jams-satellite-communications.html (last visited June 30, 2009) (noting incidents of
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group of satellite users has identified fifteen incidents of deliberate
interference with satellite communications since January 20 05 .
Future directions for ASAT activities in the three predominant States
or elsewhere remain impossible to predict. Even for the United States,
the Department of Defense's future budget proposals fail to disclose with
clarity exactly what types of ASAT weapons activities may be under-
taken, or on what timetable; it is clear, however, that the Pentagon has
retained a significant interest in multiple aspects of the field.85 The
Obama administration's policies regarding ASAT development remain,
at this writing, undefined.86
Similarly for China, speculation is rampant about whether the most
recent orbital systems, such as the Shenzhou-7 satellite and its BX-1
companion satellite, launched in September 2008, are intended to ex-
pand Beijing's ASAT capabilities, or whether they will play a more
benign role.87
Indonesia jamming a satellite leased by Tonga to a Hong Kong company and claims by the
United States that Cuba was jamming satellite broadcasts into Iran); see also SPACE SECURITY
2008, supra note 2, at 157-58; Jeffrey Lewis, The Role of Non-State Actors in Outer Space
Security, in BUILDING THE ARCHITECTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE SPACE SECURITY, supra note 15,
at 31.
84. GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNER, supra note 76, at 20, 27.
85. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 169-72 (discussing programs, often classi-
fied or otherwise hidden from public view, in the United States and elsewhere aimed at
developing technological capacities that would enable ASAT functions); Theresa Hitchens et al.,
U.S. Space Weapons: Big Intentions, Little Focus, 13 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 35 (2006); Wil-
liam J. Broad, Administration Conducting Research into Laser Weapon, N.Y TIMES, May 3,
2006, at A22; Guy Gugliotta, Space Invaders, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2008, at 30, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200809/space-war; Victoria Samson, DARPA's Potential
Space Weapons Programs, CTR. FOR DEF. INFO, Aug. 4, 2008, http://
www.secureworldfoundation.org/siteadmin/images/files/file_203.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009);
Spy Satellites Turn Their Gaze onto each Other, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20l26925.800-spy-satellites-turn-their-gaze-onto-
each-other.html (last visited June 30, 2009) (noting that the Pentagon acknowledges using two
miniature covert satellites to inspect closely another satellite-a maneuver that helps develop
both peaceful and ASAT capabilities); FED'N OF Am. SCIENTISTS, ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS,
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/progranasat/index.html (last visited June 30, 2009).
86. President Obama's Defense Agenda, The White House, http:/
www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/ (last visited June 30, 2009).
87. Peter J. Brown, China Gets a Jump on US in Space, ASIA TIMES (Hong Kong), Oct.
25, 2008, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JJ25Ad02.html (last visited June
30, 2009) (noting that the two new satellites closely approached the International Space Sta-
tion; observers disagree whether their maneuvers should be considered potentially hostile);
Brian Weeden, China's BX-J Microsatellite: A Litmus Test for Space Weaponization, SPACE
REV., Oct. 20, 2008, available at http://www.thespacereview.comarticle/1235/l (last visited
June 30, 2009).
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C. Which Verbs to Study
In assessing the future evolution of ASAT activities, observers must
be cognizant of the multiple steps in the weapons development cycle.
Typically, a new weapon (for space applications or any other) must sur-
vive a series of crucibles, variously denominated as: research,
development, testing, manufacturing, deployment, use, and retirement."
Each stage poses its own challenges, but for present purposes, this Arti-
cle focuses on two critical components: testing (especially flight testing
or evaluation in outer space) and use in combat.
The current "box score" of these two types of ASAT activities re-
veals (with some uncertainty, due to incomplete declassification of this
sensitive history, and doubt about how to categorize particular actions)
approximately sixty genuine ASAT tests in space, conducted by three
countries; barely half a dozen of those events occurred within the past
two decades. Regarding use in combat or crisis, the score is zero-
despite numerous profound provocations during the half century since
the Space Age began, no country has ever employed (or, so far as the
public record indicates, even threatened to employ) any type of ASAT
weaponry in hostilities against an enemy."
D. ASAT Treaty Negotiation Efforts
Arms controllers have hardly been ignorant or indifferent about
the danger of ASAT weapons, but so far, they have been largely impotent
to do anything effective about it.90 The failure may be attributed to the
sheer complexity of the issues, the multiplicity of national and commer-
cial interests at play, and the range of competing priorities occupying
negotiators' attentions. But surely one leading impediment has been the
88. See Zhai Yucheng, Legal Approach to Common Security in Outer Space: An Exami-
nation of Solutions to Outer Space Weaponization Issues, in SAFEGUARDING SPACE SECURITY,
supra note 21, at 47 (elaborating on various arms control initiatives that could be applied at
different stages of the weapons development cycle).
89. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 162 (listing ASAT testing programs in
United States, Soviet Union, and China).
90. See GALLAGHER & STEINBRUNNER, supra note 76, 7-12 (describing early efforts to
establish a regime of restraint regarding military use of space). For comparison, a familiar
tactic of arms control has been to negotiate legally binding instruments that declare certain
geographic regions to be "off limits" for weapons, or for certain kinds of weapons. The 1959
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. I, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,402 U.N.T.S. 71, for example, provided some-
thing of a template for the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Likewise, the Treaty on the Prohibition of
the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (informally known as the 1971 Seabed Arms
Control Treaty), Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115, demilitarizes that region.
The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, was the first of several regional accords that prohibit nuclear
weapons and associated activities in specified geographic areas.
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persistent inability of leading authorities in Washington, D.C. and Mos-
cow to decide whether a system of mutual restraint, or a strategy of
unilateral advantage-seeking, offers a better approach to security in
space.
The first and only concerted effort to address the issue internation-
ally came in a 1978-1979 three-round series of bilateral U.S.-Soviet
treaty negotiations. The participants raised (but were largely unable to
reconcile competing viewpoints about) a series of tricky issues such as
how to define appropriately an ASAT (including whether the U.S. space
shuttle program should be included, because despite its manifestly
peaceful purpose, it could nonetheless be used to maneuver toward and
"capture" an enemy space vehicle); how to verify compliance with any
treaty restrictions (because furtive testing and deployment of a covert
ASAT might be difficult for the other side to monitor with the requisite
confidence); and who should be invited to join the treaty regime (that is,
should the agreement be concluded solely between the two superpowers,
or should other spacefaring States also be invited to sign?)9
Those negotiations soon dissolved under the pressure of the deterio-
rating U.S.-Soviet relationship after Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan
in December 1979. A subsequent effort during the Reagan administra-
tion, to address some of the same issues in the Defense and Space Talks
met similar frustration, as there seemed to be precious little consensus
between the two space leviathans about what to ban, what to permit, and
how to reliably ascertain the difference. 92
For the past decade or more, international dialog on space weaponi-
zation has shifted into multilateral fora, especially the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) (operating principally through its Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOUS) and its Legal
Subcommittee)93 and the U.N.-affiliated Conference on Disarmament
(CD).94 The discussion has now been sufficiently prolonged, and suffi-
91. MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 186-87; STARES, supra note 7, at 193-200; Joseph, supra
note 2; Pike & Stambler, supra note 64, at 995; St. James, supra note 20; Report to the Con-
gress on U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control, The White House, Mar. 31, 1984.
92. See Pike & Stambler, supra note 64, at 995; see also CTR. FOR SECURITY POL'Y,
TEST THE MIRACL LASER AGAINST A SATELLITE: THE OUTCOME OF THE NEXT WAR MAY
TURN ON A PROVEN AMERICAN A.S.A.T. CAPABILITY (1997), available at http://
204.96.138.161/p1882.xml (last visited June 30, 2009); Mahley, supra note 74, at 4.
93. Regarding COPUOS and the Legal Subcommittee, see http://www.unoosa.org/
oosa/COPUOS/copuos.html (last visited July 17, 2009). See also Eilene Galloway, Consensus
Decisionmaking by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in
SPACE LAW, supra note 20, at 73.
94. The CD is the leading arms control negotiating venue and has successfully mid-
wifed numerous indispensable international agreements. See generally Manasi Kakatkar,
Conference on Disarmament Comes Up Empty Again, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 2008, at
47; Michael Krepon, The Conference on Disarmament: Means of Rejuvenation, ARMS CON-
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ciently ritualized, to have earned its own distinctive acronym-insider
participants refer knowingly to "PAROS" (or Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space) efforts. The UNGA annually adopts a PAROS
resolution, asserting, in varying formulations, the global interest in
peacefully reconciling the competing uses of outer space and in avoiding
any further compromise of the generally benign security environment.95
The CD also maintains PAROS as a key item on its roster of topics, and
has been the focal point for space-related discussions. Russia and China,
in particular, have repeatedly tabled draft PAROS treaties for considera-
tion by delegates there.96
The United States, however, has been the PAROS naysayer. For sev-
eral years, the U.S. delegate in the UNGA conspicuously abstained from
the annual resolution; in 2005, the United States became the first country
to cast a negative vote in the UNGA on this topic.97 Likewise, Washing-
ton, D.C. authorities have resisted all proposals to give the CD a
TROL TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 18; Paul Meyer, The Conference on Disarmament: Getting Back to
Business, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 16; Conference on Disarmament website,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/2D415EE45C5FAE07C 1257180005523
2B?OpenDocument (last visited July 29, 2009).
95. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, G.A. Res. 63/40, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/63/40 (Jan. 12, 2009). The UNGA has adopted near-identical resolutions in previous
years. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 62/20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/20 (Jan. 10, 2008); G.A. Res. 61/58,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/58 (Jan. 3, 2007); G.A. Res. 60/54, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/54 (Jan. 6,
2006); see also International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res.
61/111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/I 11 (Jan. 15, 2007); International Cooperation in the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 60/99, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/99 (Jan. 6, 2006); Review of the
Implementation of the Recommendations of the Third United Nations Conference on the Ex-
ploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 59/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/2 (Dec. 3,
2004); Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, G.A. Res. 54/68, U.N. Doc. AIRES/54/68 (Feb. 11, 2000).
96. See Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the
Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, P.R.C.-Russ., Feb. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers08/1 session/Feb 12%20Draft%20PPWT.
pdf (last visited June 30, 2009); Letter from Representatives of China and Russia to Secretary-
General of the Conference on Disarmament (June 28, 2002), available at http://
cns.miis.edu/research/space/pdf/cd1679.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009) (transmitting working
paper entitled "Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Preven-
tion of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, The Threat or Use of Force Against Outer
Space Objects"); see also SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 54-55; Wang Daxue, Secu-
rity in Outer Space: Do Not Duplicate Historical Mistakes, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note
*, at 13; Zhang Hui, Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective, 2
CHINA SECURITY 24 (2006); Victor Vasiliev, The Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Place-
ment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, in
NEXT GENERATION, supra note *, at 145.
97. MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 246-47, 282; SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 52,
56; John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,
New Statement of U.S. Space Policy, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 204, 207 (2007) (noting that the vote
in the UNGA in 2006 on the now-traditional PAROS resolution was 178 for, one against
(United States), and one abstention (Israel)).
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mandate to open formal negotiations on space weapons, or even to begin
serious preliminary treaty discussions.9 s Since the CD operates by a strict
"consensus" rule, even as to agenda-setting decisions, U.S. opposition
has effectively spiked all meaningful consideration of the subject.99
The now-familiar U.S. refrain has been to assert that there is no need
for international discussion on "preventing" an arms race in space, be-
cause there is currently no ongoing or imminent arms race there, and any
effort to elaborate additional legal constraints would therefore be prema-
ture and unwise.'0 Astonishingly, for almost ten years, the CD has been
moribund, unable to circumvent the U.S. veto on PAROS or to find any
compromise enabling it to open negotiations on any other arms control
issue, either.'0 '
The most emphatic expression of the U.S. anti-PAROS stance is con-
tained in the Bush administration's U.S. National Space Policy
document, articulated on August 31, 2006. This rather forward-leaning
pronouncement speaks ambitiously about the principle of U.S. "space
control," directly asserting the intention to deny potential enemies the
ability to exploit their space assets in a time of conflict. The text does not
98. MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 246-47, 282.
99. Id. at 246; SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 52, 56; Statements Made at the
2007 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/
political/cd/speeches07/topics.html (last visited June 30, 2009) (indicating that many States
wanted to address the issue of prevention of an arms race in outer space, and regretted that
political conditions did not enable the CD to take up the topic).
100. Paula A. DeSutter, U.S. Asst. Sec'y of State for Verification, Compliance, & Im-
plementation, Is An Outer Space Arms Control Treaty Verifiable?, Remarks at the National
Space Club (Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/officialdocs/
dos/dos030408.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009) (arguing that a treaty limiting ASAT weapons
could not be adequately monitored); Eric M. Javits, U.S. Rep. to the Conference on Disarma-
ment, Remarks to the Conference on Future Security in Space (May 29, 2002), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/spacellibrary/news/2002/space-020530-usia0l.htm (last visited
June 30, 2009) ("There is simply no problem in outer space for arms control to solve."); Jo-
seph, supra note 2 (arguing that "the existing treaty regime is sufficient"); Christina Rocca,
Ambassador, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N., Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,
Statement to the Conference on Disarmament (Feb. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.usmission.ch/Press2007/0213PAROS.html (last visited June 30, 2009); see also
Crook, supra note 97, at 206 (quoting the U.S. delegation's 2006 statement to the United Na-
tions, which asserted that "there is no prospect of an arms race in space" and "space does not
lend itself to an old-style 'arms control' approach"); Zhang Hui, Space Weaponization and
Space Security: A Chinese Perspective, 2 CHINA SECURITY, 24, 29 (2006) (quoting John Bol-
ton, then Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, as stating, "the
current international regime regulating the use of space meets all our purposes. We see no
need for new agreements").
101. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 58; WOLTER, supra note 21, at 67-75; Ste-
phen G. Rademaker, The Conference on Disarmament: lime Is Running Out, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 13; Henrietta Wilson, The Conference on Disarmament in
2008: Still in Denial, DISARMAMENT DIPL., Summer 2008, available at http:ll
www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd88/88newsO2.htm (last visited July 19, 2009); Kakatkar, supra
note 94.
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explicitly adopt the goal of developing a new operational U.S. ASAT
capability, but that is clearly where it is aimed. The policy document fur-
ther implicates the objective of so dominating the possibilities for space
weaponization that other States would be dissuaded or deterred even
from entering any such competition.
' 2
In rejecting calls for any new PAROS treaty that might inhibit pur-
suit of the desired new ASAT muscle, the policy asserts,
[t]he United States will oppose the development of new legal re-
gimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S.
access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or
restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to
conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other
activities in space for U.S. national interests.
From this perspective, outer space is simply a geographic location, a
potential theater of conflict like any other, and a possible battlefield in
which the United States must be prepared to assert its national security
interests, prevailing via force if need be. In fact, since space is appreci-
ated as "the new high ground," potentially decisive in future high-
technology combat, the United States should be especially wary about
agreeing to any restraints that might inhibit the development of ASAT
prowess or the exercise of future space weaponscapablhties.04
102. MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 296; SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 63 (discuss-
ing other related U.S. space policy pronouncements which make similar assertions about
controlling outer space); U.S. National Space Policy, supra note 7, at 2; see also JCS SPACE
OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at 1-1; Marc Kaufman, Talk of Satellite Defense Raises Fears of
Space War, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2006, at A12; Joseph, supra note 2.
In the precursor to the 2006 National Space Policy Document, the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and Organization, chaired by Donald
Rumsfeld (who shortly thereafter became Secretary of Defense) judged that U.S. dependence
on satellite systems created a serious vulnerability to attack, saying that "the U.S. is an attrac-
tive candidate for a Space Pearl Harbor," and pointing to China as a primary threat, noting that
"China's military is developing methods and strategies for defeating the U.S. military in a
high-tech and space-based future war." Rumsfeld Comm'n, supra note 76, at xiv, 22-23.
103. U.S. National Space Policy, supra note 7, at 2; see also Mahley, supra note 74, at 4
("[The Bush administration policy] acknowledges that additional binding arms control agree-
ments are simply not a viable tool for enhancing the long-term space security interests of the
United States or its allies. As we learned from considerable experience, any treaty that seeks
permanent prohibitions, especially on inherently defensive capabilities, in one era can rapidly
become obsolete-and sometimes dangerously obsolete.").
104. HYTEN, supra note 3, at 7-11; MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 262-64 (summarizing the
views of those inside and outside the Bush administration who view outer space as an inevita-
ble, and potentially decisive, theater of combat, in which the United States should be prepared
to fight and prevail); Rumsfeld Comm'n, supra note 76, at 100 (concluding that space warfare
is "a virtual certainty," for "every medium-air, land, and sea-has seen conflict" and
"[r]eality indicates that space will be no different"); see also Karl P. Mueller, Totem and Ta-
boo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate, in SPACE WEAPONS: ARE THEY
NEEDED?, supra note 7, at 1; Columba Peoples, Assuming the Inevitable? Overcoming the
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The Obama administration has signaled a stark change in course on
these matters, posting onto the White House website, only moments after
the January 20, 2009 inauguration, a new national defense policy, declar-
ing:
The Obama-Biden Administration will restore American leader-
ship on space issues, seeking a worldwide ban on weapons that
interfere with military and commercial satellites. They will thor-
oughly assess possible threats to U.S. space assets and the best
options, military and diplomatic, for countering them, establish-
ing contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or
duplicate access to information from space assets and accelerat-
ing programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack.'05
Exactly how this new agenda will be implemented in the Conference on
Disarmament, and regarding PAROS efforts more generally, remains to
be seen.
Finally, before leaving this discussion of the international treaty law
of outer space, and the incomplete and largely frustrated efforts to em-
place more robust legal bulwarks to retard the weaponization of the
exoatmospheric realm, it is important to note also a relatively recent re-
newal of the concept of "non-legally-binding" PAROS proposals.
Inevitability of Outer Space Weaponization and Conflict, 29 CONTEMP. SECURITY POL'Y 502
(2008) (critiquing the "inevitability thesis," which argues that weaponization of outer space is
unavoidable); Jon Kyl, China's Anti-Satellite Weapons and American National Security, HERI-
TAGE FOUND., Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/
h1990.cfm (last visited June 30, 2009).
For critiques and defenses of the 2006 space policy, and contrasts with the predecessor
instrument, see Theresa Hitchens, The Bush National Space Policy: Contrasts and Contradic-
tions, CTR. DEF. INFO., Oct. 13, 2006, available at http://www.cdi.org/program/
document.cfm?DocumentlD=3692&from page=../index.cfm (last visited June 30, 2009) (stat-
ing that the new policy "undercuts 40 years of tradition that has kept competition in space to a
dull roar and dampened drivers to conflict."); see also Steven Lambakis, Space Weapons:
Refuting the Critics, 105 HOOVER INST. POL'Y REV. 41 (2001); Jeff Kueter, The War in Space
Has Already Begun, MARSHALL INST. POL'Y OUTLOOK, Oct. 2006, available at http://
www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/459.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009); The Bush National
Space Policy: Freedom of Action, Not Diplomacy, HENRY L. STIMSON CTR., Oct. 10, 2006,
http://www.stimson.org/?SN=WS200610101122 (last visited June 30, 2009).
105. President Obama's Defense Agenda, supra note 86. See generally Andrea Shalal-
Esa, Challenges Loom as Obama Seeks Space Weapons Ban, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE50015X20090125 (last visited June 30,
2009); Advancing the Frontiers of Space Exploration, BarackObama.com, http://
www.barackobama.com/pdf/policy/Space-Fact-Sheet-FINAL.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009)
(presidential campaign platform regarding "international, cooperative approach to space secu-
rity"); Council for a Livable World, 2008 Presidential Candidates' Full Responses, Question
No. 5, available at http://www.livableworld.org/assets/pdfs/2008-presidentialcandidates_
questionnaire-responses.pdf (last visited July 20, 2009) (quoting then-presidential candidate
Barack Obama as stating that "weapons in space are a bad idea" and that space-faring nations
should pursue either a treaty or "Code of Conduct").
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Several authors and non-governmental organizations-and now, some
governments-have suggested that if U.S. resistance blocks the articula-
tion of a formal arms control treaty for outer space, perhaps some
traction on the problem can be gained via more modest undertakings:
informal agreements on "rules of the road" for outer space; tacit under-
standings that the space powers will mutually avoid especially
provocative actions; or "politically binding" instruments through which
countries express their shared intentions to eschew conduct that could be
misinterpreted as threatening or could lead to accidents or unwanted cri-
se s. 
6
The Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. has sponsored the
most ambitious and successful such "soft law" enterprise, drafting a pro-
posed "Code of Conduct" for outer space, under which countries would
refrain from specified hazardous or irresponsible space activities. Propo-
nents have vetted the concept with experts in and out of government in
several countries, and it has attracted considerable interest. °7 The Euro-
pean Union has explicitly endorsed this approach,' 8 and the British
government has issued a White Paper supporting the suggestion., °9
Until recently, the U.S. government has seemed no more amenable
to these softer constraints on ASAT activities than it has been to com-
mencement of formal PAROS treaty negotiations, and no changes in law,
policy, or practice have yet occurred. But there have been indications
106. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 56-57 (discussing proposals from govern-
ments and non-governmental organizations in 2007 suggesting that the time might be ripe to
turn to non-legally-binding "rules of the road" for outer space); see also Transparency and
Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, G.A. Res. 62/43, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/62/43 (Jan. 8, 2008); Douglas G. Aldworth, Creating Rules-Based Behaviour to Help
Space-Faring Nations Avoid Conflict in Space, in BUILDING THE ARCHITECTURE FOR SUS-
TAINABLE SPACE SECURITY, supra note 15, at 55; Phillip J. Baines, The Potential for Outer
Space Confidence-Building Measures, in BUILDING THE ARCHITECTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE
SPACE SECURITY, supra note 15, at 125; Samuel Black, No Harnful Interference with Space
Objects: The Key to Confidence-Building (Stimson Ctr., Report No. 69, 2008); Andrey
Makarov, Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures: Their Place and Role in Space
Security, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note *, at 69; Anton V. Vasiliev & Alexander A. Kla-
povsky, Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space, in BUILDING THE
ARCHITECTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE SPACE SECURITY, supra note 15, at 139; Jeff Abramson,
EU Issues Space Code of Conduct, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 30, 30-31.
107. See generally Henry L. Stimson Ctr., Space Security Program, http://
www.stimson.org/space/?SN=WS200702131213 (last visited July 19, 2009); European Union,
Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Dec. 8-9, 2008, http://
www.stimson.org/space/pdf/EU-Code-ofConduct.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009).
108. Bernhard Brasack, Perm. Rep. of Germany to the Conf. on Disarmament on Behalf
of the E.U., Statement to the Conference on Disarmament on the Prevention of an Arms Race
in Outer Space (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/
cd/speeches07/l session/Febl 3EUI .pdf (last visited June 30, 2009).
109. U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, LIFTING THE NUCLEAR SHADOW: CRE-
ATING THE CONDITIONS FOR ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 38 (2009), available at http://
www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdfl /nuclear-paper (last visited June 30, 2009).
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that-in the aftermath of the Chinese ASAT enterprise-the official U.S.
posture may yet incline toward somewhat greater receptivity to a space
code of conduct." °
IV. GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASATs
In light of the failure, for some decades now, to address ASAT issues
effectively via treaty law, the various stakeholders should now begin to
consider alternative vehicles. This Article presents one such possibility:
enhancement of customary international law. Non-lawyers, and even
lawyers who are not schooled in public international law specifically,
may not fully appreciate the power and stature of CIL. This Part there-
fore defines this jurisprudence, explains how it is created and how it
operates, and examines the extent to which it might substitute for or
complement formal treaty negotiations in pursuit of PAROS objectives.
CIL is an ancient, albeit somewhat murky, form of obligation, aris-
ing from the unwritten practice of States; it is nonetheless a leading,
well-respected source of international law, fully on par with treaties."'
CIL is specified in the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) as an appropriate set of obligations for the court to apply,"2 and
the ICJ regularly does so," 3 as do the federal courts in the United
110. See MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 299-300 (quoting Air Force General Kevin P Chilton
as calling for the United States to examine anew the potential utility of a space code of con-
duct); Mahley, supra note 74, at 3 ("China's counter-space activities have prompted the U.S.
to consider initiatives based on our long-standing support for voluntary transparency and con-
fidence-building measures.").
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. I,
intro, note (1987). See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
4 (4th ed. 1990); ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
74-97 (1971); JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (2005)
[hereinafter ICRC]; DAVID H. OTT, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN T14E MODERN WORLD 13
(1987); Roger S. Clark, Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 171 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Phil-
ippe Sands eds., 1999); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1992); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Custom-
ary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (1999); W. Michael Reisman, The Cult of
Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 133 (1987) (identifying a resurgence
of CIL); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary Inter-
national Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (2001); Paul Rubenstein, State
Responsibility for Failure to Control the Export of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 23 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 319 (1993).
112. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
113. See generally S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 30 (Sept.
7) (surveying relevant international practice and finding no principle of international law pre-
cluding Turkey from instituting prosecution of French ship captain); Asylum (Colom. v. Peru),
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States."' Although CIL is often less "definite" than treaty law-it can be
difficult to ascertain the precise content of a putative CIL rule, to deter-
mine that it has actually achieved the status of CIL, and to know on
which States it is binding-it is nonetheless an important, dynamic, and
prominent component of the international legal structure, routinely ad-
duced and applied with decisive effect."5
In the words of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, CIL emerges "from a gen-
eral and consistent practice of states, followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation." 6 Two elements must thus be established to create a
binding rule: the "objective" criterion seeks a widespread, longstanding
pattern of concordant state practice; the "subjective" or "psychological"
criterion seeks to attribute that pattern of practice to a "sense of obliga-
tion," rather than merely to habit, courtesy, indifference, or political
expediency.
1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20) (finding that "it is not possible to discern in all this any con-
stant and uniform usage, accepted as law" establishing Colombia's claim regarding grant of
asylum); Right of Passage (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 39-43 (Apr. 12) (holding that a con-
stant and uniform local practice permitted free passage of private persons and goods-but not
of armed forces or police-across Indian territory).
114. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (6 DalI.) 199 (1796); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); The Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
115. A similar conclusion may be reached via a different jurisprudential route: In addi-
tion to customary international law (CIL), "general principles of law" are recognized as an
authoritative source for the ICJ and other decision-makers. ICJ Statute, supra note 112, art.
38(l)(c); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102.4, cmt. L (1987). Among those general principles is the obligation not to injure other
States. See infra notes 199-215 and accompanying text. The United Nations Survey of Inter-
national Law concluded that "[tihere has been general recognition of the rule that a State must
not permit the use of its territory for purposes injurious to the interests of other States in a
manner contrary to international law." Memorandum, The Secretary-General, Survey of Inter-
national Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law Commission,
57, U.N. Doc. A/GN.4/l/Rev.l (Feb. 10, 1949). Judge Lauterpacht of the ICJ concluded that
this maxim is "one of those general principles of law applicable under Article 38(l)(c) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. VI, intro, note (1987); see also Harry H. Almond, Jr., General
Principles of Law-Their Role in the Development of the Law of Outer Space, 57 U. COLO. L.
REv. 871 (1985); Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the
Role of State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 275 (2008)
(differentiating between CIL and general principles of law).
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102.2 (1987); see also ICRC, supra note I 11, at xxxi-xlii; U.S. DEP'T ARMY, FIELD MAN-
UAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 6 (1956) [hereinafter ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-
10].
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A. The Objective Element
The objective element of CIL does not demand absolute unanimity
or perfect consistency in the emerging custom, but the more States par-
ticipate, the better, and the behavior of the "leading" States (those that
are most active in the particular field, or most affected by it) will count
extra." '7 As the ICJ observed in the Nicaragua vs. United States case in
1986,
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as
customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rig-
orous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence
of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct
of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and
that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule
should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not
as indications of the recognition of a new rule. '
In addition, the traditional requirement that the observed pattern of
state behavior must be "longstanding" has also been tempered in the
modem era. If the consensus among States is truly widespread and deep,
its relatively short duration may be overlooked. In particular sectors
where technology emerges rapidly, or where States quickly alter their
policies and attitudes, the oxymoron "instant customary law" may be
installed. A leading illustration of that phenomenon, according to the
Restatement, was the rapid crystallization of a rule allowing coastal
States to exert exclusive claims to the resources of the contiguous oce-
anic continental shelf." 9 As the ICJ explained in the 1969 North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, "the passage of only a short period of time is
117. In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ indicated that the criteria
for evaluating state practice for forming a CIL rule include: (a) the amount of time the rule has
been adhered to; (b) the number and type of States adhering to the rule (especially States hav-
ing a special interest in the subject); and (c) the uniformity of the practice. North Sea
Continental Shelf (ER.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41-45 (Feb. 20); see also ICRC, supra note
111, at xxxviii; John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, Letter to Jacob Kellenberger,
Nov. 3, 2006, at 3 (conveying initial reactions of the U.S. government to the ICRC study of
Customary International Humanitarian Law); Claude C. Emanuelli, Comments on the ICRC
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2006 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 437, (critiqu-
ing ICRC methodology, and noting that the question of what constitutes "state practice" is
always controversial); Ramey, supra note 7, at 69-70.
118. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 98 (June 27).
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
reporters' note 2 (1987) (noting the traditional requirement that a rule of CIL could be estab-
lished only over an extended period of time, but that this rule began to lose its force after
World War II, when improved international communications made the emerging practices of
States well-known more quickly). Id.
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not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of cus-
tomary international law."'
20
To evaluate the relevant behavior of States, CIL contemplates the
full range of a country's words as well as deeds, silences as well as
inactions, and oral as well as written statements. Diplomatic communi-
cations, comments in public fora, and, of course, overt exertions of
military, economic, or political power are all taken into account. The
relevant actions may be unilateral or undertaken in concert with others.
Silence or passivity, however, is often difficult to construe; should it be
interpreted as acquiescence to the emerging norm, or as a failure to
notice it?'
2
'
Most of the relevant state behaviors would ordinarily be exerted by a
country's executive branch, but in suitable circumstances, the legislative
and judicial branches can play their roles, too. Sometimes, even non-
state actors (the United Nations or non-governmental organizations such
as the International Committee of the Red Cross) can undertake actions
that could contribute to the growth of CIL. These days, some very active
States promulgate so much internationally relevant "behavior" that other
countries must attend diligently to the torrent, lest their failure to re-
spond be interpreted as acceptance.1
2
B. The Subjective Element
The subjective element of CIL (the "opinio juris sive necessitatisis")
is often even more problematic. First, it can be impossibly difficult to
discern why a particular State has behaved in a particular way-was it
"from a sense of legal obligation" or for other lesser motivations? States
do not routinely announce their motivations, and multiple, conflicting
121factors may contribute to a national decision-making process.
At a deeper level, this psychological factor poses something of a co-
nundrum-it appears that an emerging pattern of state behavior counts
as CIL only if States behave in that concordant fashion out of a sense
that they are already legally obligated to do so. If they instead perceive
themselves to be undertaking merely voluntary behaviors, from which
120. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J., at 44.
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. B (1987); ICRC, supra note 111, at xxxii. But see Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 117, at
1-2 (critiquing ICRC methodology for assessing sources of CIL).
122. ICRC, supra note 111, at xxxiv-xxxv.
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. C (1987); Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 117, at 2.
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they remain legally free to depart at any point without incurring interna-
tional legal liability, then when can a CIL standard emerge?' 2
One path for escaping that conundrum is to suggest that a CIL norm
may evolve slowly or gradually, as the pattern of state behavior creeps
from "voluntary" toward "compulsory." That is, an individual State may
act in a particular way purely for self-interested reasons, with no sugges-
tion that it (or others) would be obligated to do so. But perhaps other
States, appreciating the wisdom and virtue of that behavior, begin to
similarly adopt it as their own. And perhaps over time that emerging
"pattern" of behavior is followed (still voluntarily) by additional States,
gradually accreting into a common thread. At some point, States may
come to "expect" that others will continue to follow the pattern; they
may come to "rely" on that continuity; they may eventually come to feel
that it is "legitimate" to do so and "improper" to depart. Eventually, the
conformity may rise to the level where the international consensus is
deemed to have "crystallized" or "hardened" into a binding rule of CIL,
departure from which is then no longer simply "unwelcome" or "regret-
table," but positively "illegal." Any particular State may be surprised to
discover that what had begun as purely a voluntary and individual prac-
tice had ripened into a binding and universal international rule, but that
is the law-making process of CIL.'
25
C. Weighing the Objective and Subjective Elements
of Customary International Law
Scholars debate the relative importance of the objective and subjec-
tive elements of CIL. Some "positivists" argue for emphasis on the
naked facts of state behavior, focusing strictly on the actions that States
undertake in the world, discounting any inquiry into the underlying ra-
tionale, justification or motivation. For example, the International Law
Association in 2000 adopted a "Statement of Principles" espousing that
postulate, asserting that "it is not usually necessary to demonstrate the
existence of the subjective element before a customary rule can be said
to have come into being."'
26
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
reporters' note 2 (1987); Sienho Yee, The News That Opinio Juris "Is Not a Necessary Ele-
ment of Customary [International] Law" Is Greatly Exaggerated, 2000 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L.
227.
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
reporters' note 2 (1987).
126. Int'l Law Ass'n [ILA], Comm. on Formation of Customary Int'l Law, Statement of
Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law: Report of
the Sixty-Ninth Conference, London, 712, 713 (2000); see also Yee, supra note 124.
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Some prominent case law demonstrates a similar bent. In The
Paquete Habana, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1900 first articulated the
principle that
[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdic-
tion, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there
is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or ju-
dicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations. 27
To ascertain the relevant rights in that case (involving the seizure as
prizes of war of two fishing vessels operating out of Havana at the out-
break of the Spanish-American War), the Court surveyed some 500 years
of maritime history to discern whether a pattern of state practice had be-
come sufficiently entrenched to exempt from seizure certain categories
of coastal fishing ships. In that painstaking exegesis, the Court inquired
into the cognizable actions of England, Japan, and other States, but
commented little on their articulated reasons or the perception of legal
compulsion justifying those externally observable actions. 2
In contrast, the Restatement and most other contemporary authorities
continue to emphasize the subjective as well as the objective elements,
differentiating mere habit or comity from binding law. In fact, some au-
thorities would elevate the subjective element to primacy, suggesting that
if States generally believe something to be illegal (or permitted, or man-
datory, depending on how the norm is phrased) it is less important that
their actual behavior conform to that standard.'
29
To that effect is Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,'30 the famous Second Circuit
1980 Alien Tort Claims Act case that opened U.S. courts to human rights
suits seeking redress for state-sponsored torture conducted in a foreign
land. There, the court relied on "the universal condemnation of torture"
in numerous global and regional human rights treaties and on "the re-
nunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy" in the national
constitutions of at least fifty-five States. 3' On the other hand, the court
had to acknowledge that this outlawry of torture was "in principle if not
127. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
128. Id. at 686-710.
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. C (1987); Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" Interna-
tional Customary Law?, 5 IND. J. INT'L L. 23, 36 (1965).
130. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
131. Id. at 880.
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in practice," and it dropped a footnote explaining that "[t]he fact that
the prohibition of torture is often honored in the breach does not dimin-
ish its binding effect as a norm of international law."'33 In this view, the
fact that States generally proclaim the illegality of torture outweighs, for
purposes of adducing a CIL standard, the fact that many of them con-
tinue to employ it as a frequent tool of national policy.
The ICJ continues to espouse both elements as required for CIL. 34 In
its remarkable 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons,'35 the ICJ observed that nuclear weapons had
not been employed in combat since 1945, a span of half a century of
zero use. (Eight countries have conducted 2051 explosive tests of nuclear
weapons since 1945.)136 Despite that objective pattern of restraint, the
court was unable to find a CIL prohibiting nuclear weapons, because the
opinio juris element was absent. The nuclear weapons-possessing States
had asserted that, pursuant to the policy and practice of deterrence, they
had always reserved the legal right to threaten, and even to use, their nu-
clear weapons in the exercise of self-defense. In addition, numerous
treaties regulate-but manifestly do not purport to ban completely-
nuclear weapons, an implicit acknowledgement of their lawfulness. As
the ICJ characterized the argument, the abstention from use of nuclear
weapons "is not on account of an existing or nascent custom but merely
because circumstances that might justify their use have fortunately not
arisen."1
3 7
D. Customary International Law and Treaties
Although treaties and customary international law norms are of
equivalent legal weight, there is one sense in which CIL is even more
132. Id.
133. Id. at 884 n.15.
134. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 109 (June 27) (holding that "[elither the States taking such action or other States in a
position to react to it, must have behaved so that their conduct is 'evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it'" (quoting the
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20)); Continental Shelf
(Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29-30 (June 3) ("It is of course axiomatic that the material of
customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opiniojuris
of States."); ICRC, supra note 111, at xxxii (asserting "there can be no customary law without
confirmation of the rule in state practice"); Petersen, supra note 115, at 3 (arguing that the ICJ
in practice favors analysis of the subjective element of CIL, disregarding the objective);
Ramey, supra note 7, at 69-70 (adopting the "classic" approach to assessing CIL, requiring
both state practice and a belief that the practice is obligatory).
135. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
136. Arms Control Ass'n, Fact Sheet: The Nuclear Testing Tally (2007), available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/NuclearTestingTally.pdf (last visited July 17, 2009).
137. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 254.
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assertive and far-reaching than the written instruments. That is, once a
CIL norm is established (through the above-described arcane objective
and subjective criteria), it becomes automatically binding on all States-
even those that did not participate in the emerging pattern, that may not
have been fully cognizant that a trend was developing, and that may not
be fully supportive of the rule, if they took the occasion to think about it
seriously. In fact, new countries (e.g., former colonies) that were not
even in existence at the time a prior CIL norm had emerged are nonethe-
less bound by it-a new State may have some ability to pick and choose
which treaty obligations of its former regime should continue to apply to
the new entity, but it is generally deemed to have consented automati-
cally to the entire corpus of CIL that exists on the date of its
independence.38
The only exemption from CIL is available to a "persistent objector."
That is, a State that publicly and consistently repudiates a newly arising
norm of CIL, from the time that it emerges through its effectuation as
law, is not bound by it. There are, however, few examples of successful
invocation of this exception; it is rare for a State to be sufficiently pre-
scient and conscientious to preserve its autonomy as a new CIL rule
advances.'39
In contrast, of course, any State may avoid any treaty obligation
simply by deciding not to sign or ratify it. Treaties rarely directly impli-
cate the rights and responsibilities of non-parties, and passivity or
inaction therefore results in the absence of legal responsibility. With
CIL, on the other hand, the "default position" is reversed.
The relationship between treaty and CIL is also intricate with respect
to sequencing. That is, sometimes CIL can precede, and lead to, a treaty:
if the world develops a growing sense that a particular form of state be-
havior ought to be obligatory (or permitted, or prohibited), that
consensus can generate, as we have seen, a CIL norm. Later (or simulta-
neously) that same sentiment can inspire countries to negotiate a treaty,
reducing the inchoate CIL rules to explicit written text.
138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102, reporters' note 2 (1987) (providing that newly independent States are bound by existing
CIL).
139. Id. § 102 cmt. d; Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Devel-
opment of Customary International Law, 1985 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1; Martin D. Dupuis et al.,
The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 415, 444
(1987) [hereinafter Conference on International Humanitarian Law] (remarks of Theodor
Meron); Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985).
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Alternatively, sometimes the treaty predates, and leads to, the CIL.
That is, the articulation and implementation of a multilateral treaty, es-
pecially one that is intended to attract very broad participation and does,
in fact, succeed in inspiring near-universal affiliation, can itself become
evidence of concordant state practice and a sense of opinio juris. In that
way, a particular accord may reflect the general consensus of the world
community and pass, in whole or in part, into CIL. Of course, not all
treaties are automatically transformed into CIL in this fashion; some
accords are intended to be "contractual" in nature, imposing obligations
only among the participants, while others may be characterized as "law-
making" treaties, which more broadly attempt to promulgate rules that
will be effective, sooner or later, for the entire world. In the latter situa-
tion, the treaty norms can eventually become binding on all countries
(except, of course, any persistent objector), including those that had de-
liberately or unconsciously stayed away from the treaty itself. Strictly
speaking, the treaty itself is not binding on non-parties, but the contents
of the treaty, to the extent that they have come to meet the criteria for
CIL, can become obligatory for all.'
40
This relationship necessarily implies that a particular norm could be
simultaneously a rule of CIL and a rule of treaty law; either expression
could be binding (or not) on any particular State. The drafting and con-
clusion of a treaty do not extinguish the CIL status of the underlying
norm, nor does the emergence of a new CIL rule displace a prior treaty
that had incorporated the same standards.' 4'
Where a treaty and a CIL rule conflict, the jurisprudence becomes a
bit more complicated. In general, a "last-in-time" rule prevails, holding
that the newest pronouncement provides the binding law. Thus, where a
new CIL norm emerges, it will displace, to the extent of any antagonism,
the rules written into pre-existing treaties. Conversely, a new treaty can
extinguish a prior CIL rule, at least among parties to the accord. Obvi-
ously, these sorts of gross contradictions between broad, global legal
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. i, reporters' note 5 (1987); ICRC, supra note 11l, at xlii; Clark, supra note 111, at 172;
Conference on International Humanitarian Law, supra note 139, at 440 (remarks of the mod-
erator).
141. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 92-97 (June 27) (explaining that even where court was unable to apply treaty law to
resolve a dispute, similar or identical rules of CIL were still applicable); see also Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679
("[N]othing ... precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State
as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such.").
1230 [Vol. 30:1187
ASAT-isfaction
principles are rare, but they can occur, and they carry those discernable
142
consequences.
E. The U.N. General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament,
and the Articulation of Customary International Law
The United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Dis-
armament are not listed on the usual rosters of "sources of public
international law." Unlike, for example, the United Nations Security
Council'43 and the ICJ,'" the UNGA and the CD do not benefit from
Member States' standing commitments to observe the bodies' resolutions
as binding law. Instead, their enactments are characteristically cast as
recommendations or exhortations, urging States to conform their behav-
iors to the articulated norms, but they do not, in themselves, carry the
weight of international law.
On the other hand, the UNGA (and, within the specialized sphere of
arms control, the CD) can play valuable roles in helping to foster the
growth of CIL. The UNGA serves as the most convenient forum within
which countries assert their views about the wide range of world
events-assertions that can directly contribute to both the objective and
subjective criteria founding CIL. A UNGA resolution-depending on
how it is worded, what the drafters' intentions are, and how overwhelm-
ingly it is supported-can constitute strong evidence of the existence and
content of a putative CIL rule.4 5
The CD, likewise, serves as the world's foremost venue for collect-
ing and displaying States' views about arms control norms. Where States
affirmatively decide to take advantage of this forum for expressing their
opinions about weapons-related behaviors that they find unacceptable,
requisite, or laudatory, those proclamations, too, can contribute directly
to CIL, whether or not they simultaneously lead directly to crafting a
new treaty. In this way, the CD-as does the UNGA in considering the
broader panorama of issues-voices the expectations of the world com-
munity regarding the current and possible future state of the CIL of
weaponry.
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. j, reporters' note 4 (1987).
143. See U.N. Charter art. 25 (providing that parties "agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council").
144. See id. art. 94 (providing that each party "undertakes to comply with the decision of
the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party").
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. g, reporters' note 2 (1987); id. § 103 cmt. c, reporters' note 2; Clark, supra note 111, at
176.
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F. The Customary International Law of Space
Outer space illustrates particularly well many of the principles and
practices described above. First, regarding the sometimes swift pace for
the evocation of CIL, in response to the world community's demand for
new global rules in fast-breaking areas, the practices of States in the
1950s regarding satellite overflights provide a leading illustration of the
concept of "instant customary international law."'
46
That is, before the first Sputnik flights (and the soon-to-follow U.S.
counterparts) no one could have known what the rules would be regard-
ing outer space transits. Would the overflown country have the right to
protest, to demand that its permission must be obtained, and to charge a
fee for satellites that passed overhead? That structure of rights does de-
scribe (in very short form) the relationships that obtain regarding
national jurisdiction over the superjacent airspace-a State's control over
its land territory is assimilated to its air buffer, and other States are not
privileged to enter national airspace without permission, which may be
denied, conditioned, or granted only at a fee. But does the national
power over airspace stretch upwards indefinitely, to embrace as well the
sector of outer space that lies directly overhead?'47
In the opening phases of the Space Age, the United States and the
Soviet Union did not, in fact, request permission from the States that
were overflown (and shortly thereafter made the subject of remote re-
connaissance) by satellites. The subjacent States-fully cognizant, of
course, of the existence of these pioneer spacecraft--did not protest or
complain; indeed, the world robustly applauded the scientific achieve-
ments. Perhaps the other countries, lulled by the peaceful and non-
intrusive nature of the first satellites, were largely unaware of the full
extent of the potential rights they were sleeping on, and insufficiently
146. Bin Cheng, supra note 129, at 23; Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, The Outer Space
Treaty and Enhancing Space Security, in BUILDING THE ARCHITECTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE
SECURITY, supra note 15, at 113, 118-19; Ramey, supra note 7, at 67-68; Vladlen S.
Vereshchetin & Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of International Law of Outer
Space, in SPACE LAW, supra note 20, at 113.
147. 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 28, at 147-50; GALLAGHER &
STEINBRUNER, supra note 76, at 7-10 (describing early U.S.-Soviet dialogue regarding the
legality of satellite overflights); DELBERT R. TERRILL, JR., THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN DEVELOP-
ING INTERNATIONAL OUTER SPACE LAW (1999); Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M. Arons, The
Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, in SPACE LAW, supra note 20, at 151; Note, National
Sovereignty of Outer Space, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1961); M.J. Peterson, The Use of Analo-
gies in Developing Outer Space Law, 51 INT'L ORG. 245 (1997); Tannenwald, supra note 20;
Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Space Warfare: Emerging
United States-China Military Competition, Address to American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, at 5 (Oct. 17, 2007), available at http://www.aei.org/paper/26977 (last vis-
ited June 30, 2009).
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focused on the nature of the novel legal regime that was being surrepti-
tiously generated.'
48
In any event, the failure to object to the superpowers' conspicuous
activity, and the tacit acceptance of the proposition that outer space, un-
like airspace, was free for transit without permission, tolls, or regulation
by the overflown State, quickly crystallized a new CIL set of rules.
Within only a few years, the regime was established-and it was dis-
tinctly more advantageous to the high-technology users of the resource
than would be a simple extension upward of the sovereign control of the
land State. Unlike in The Paquete Habana,'49 there was no need for in-
cremental state practice over 500 years to effectuate a new rule; CIL can
move quite quickly when sufficiently prodded."O
Second, the world community's experience with outer space law il-
lustrates the sometimes tricky relationship between treaty and custom.
That is, the OST was opened for signature on January 27, 1967; it was
swiftly ratified, and entered into force for its parties on October 10,
1967. But many of the treaty's provisions, including most of the key
"constitutional" postulates that characterize the realm, had likely been
established as CIL well before 1967.'5'
It is difficult to be certain exactly what parts of the legal regime were
actually institutionalized as CIL, and on what date those rules would
have become operative, because there was no authoritative judgment on
point from the ICJ or any other competent tribunal. But we can
confidently assert that both law-making processes (treaty and custom)
were engaged during the 1950s and 1960s, that they were advancing
148. Note, National Sovereignty of Outer Space, supra note 147.
Even after the creation of the two alternative legal regimes (one for air and a substan-
tially different one for space), uncertainty has persisted about the precise dividing line
between them. No consensus has developed among international authorities about the altitude
at which the law of air ends and the law of space begins to apply. See Raymond J. Barrett,
Outer Space and Air Space: The Difficulties in Definition, AIR U. REV., May-June 1973,
available at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1973/may-junlbarrett.html
(last visited June 30, 2009); Vladimir Kopal, The Question of Defining Outer Space, in SPACE
LAW, supra note 20, at 129; Ramey, supra note 18, at 745, 752; Caesar Voute, Boundaries in
Space, in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 28, at 19-35.
149. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
150. J.F. McMahon, Legal Aspects of Outer Space: Recent Developments, in SPACE
LAW, supra note 20, at 189; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677; GALLAGHER &
STEINBRUNER, supra note 76, at 42 (reporting that lawyers for the U.S. Department of De-
fense have argued that other countries' failure to object to the American interpretation of the
Outer Space Treaty-an interpretation that permits all "non-aggressive" uses of space as being
"peaceful"-quickly rendered that interpretation an accepted part of CIL); Mejia-Kaiser, su-
pra note 57, at 31 (inquiring whether a new norm of CIL is emerging that would require States
to adopt procedures to mitigate the creation of new space debris).
151. Gabrynowicz, supra note 146, at 113-14; Ramey, supra note 7, at 71; Vereshchetin
& Danilenko, supra note 146, at 116, 123 (discussing fundamental principles and rules of
outer space law that were created by CIL before conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty).
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substantively similar legal rules, and that at least to some extent, the CIL
avenue was operating more rapidly than the treaty mechanism.'52
Remarkably, the CIL version of the law of outer space would achieve
even more comprehensive geographic coverage than the treaty version.
Half of the countries in the world have not yet gotten around to ratifying
the OST; even larger cohorts have not acted to affiliate themselves with
the other important space-related instruments. In contrast, all countries
would be bound by the CIL of outer space; it is hard to imagine any
"persistent objectors" who have exempted themselves from any aspect of
the now-entrenched custom, and any new States that emerge onto the
world scene would automatically be covered by the body of space-
related CIL, even if they do not affirmatively join the treaties.
Third, outer space also illustrates the law-making role of the UNGA.
When the legal regime for space was first emerging, many countries
opted to employ the UNGA as the most apt mechanism for expressing
themselves about the putative rules for exoatmospheric interaction; their
statements in this "global town meeting" carry weight in the evaluation
of emerging CIL. Successive UNGA resolutions, especially the 1963
Outer Space Declaration'5 3 (which initiated and expressed many of the
principles that were later cast into treaty vocabulary in the OST) were
prepared with a solemnity (and adopted via unanimous vote) suggesting
a conscious legislative function. As the Restatement notes,
[t]he Outer Space Declaration, for example, might have become
law even if a formal treaty had not followed, since it was ap-
proved by all, including the principal "space powers." ... A
152. See U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/spacel.html#2 (last visited June 30,
2009) (explaining that negotiation and conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty were somewhat
delayed between 1959 and 1962 because the United States and the Soviet Union-while
generally agreeing on the content of the principles that should govern activities in outer space-
disagreed on whether to link progress on outer space to progress on other contemporary
disarmament issues); see also Bin Cheng, supra note 129, at 43 (quoting the U.S. delegate to
United Nations as stating that the American government "considered that the legal principles
contained in the draft Declaration [by the UNGA of principles governing the activities of States
in space] reflected international law as accepted by Members of the United Nations," and
noting that other leading States issued similar statements, and that the contents of the
declaration therefore quickly became established as CIL); Garthoff, supra note 21.
153. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, U.N.
Doc. A15515 (Dec. 13, 1963). Much of the language of this UNGA resolution was adopted
directly into the text of the Outer Space Treaty; see also Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 2222, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2222 (Dec.
19, 1966) (commending the Outer Space Treaty and hoping for the widest possible adherence
to it).
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spokesman for the United States stated that his Government con-
sidered that the Declaration "reflected international law as
accepted by the members of the United Nations," and both the
United States and the U.S.S.R. indicated that they intended to
abide by the Declaration.
5 4
Of course, not every enactment of the UNGA (still less, the actions of
the CD) is automatically entitled to the status of CL, but the elusive
mechanisms of customary law-making sometimes do repose special re-
spect to the weightiest resolutions of those global instrumentalities
5
G. The Customary International Law of ASATs
We thus come to the fundamental question of what, if any, restric-
tions general CL might already impose on ASAT weaponry. The
standard two-pronged CL inquiry asks (on the objective level) what
have States have actually done about ASAT testing and use, and (on the
subjective level) whether they have felt a sense of obligation driving
them toward that pattern.
Regarding observable behavior, the "box score" noted above reveals
a surprisingly low level of ASAT activity. Tests of satellite-killers in
outer space have averaged approximately one per year since the space
age began, but the vast bulk of that activity occurred more than twenty-
five years ago. Since 1985, there have been (depending on how one
counts the ambiguous or incompletely documented cases) one kinetic
interceptor test in space by the United States (in 2008); one high-energy
laser ASAT test by the United States (in 1997); four interceptor tests by
China (in 2005-2007); two or three directed energy ASAT events by
China (in 2006); and no tests of either sort by the Soviet Union or Rus-
sia. (There may have been additional instances of non-destructive tests
that have not been publicly identified.)
Regarding the other verb of special interest, no State has ever used
its ASAT system in hostilities or in a time of crisis against the spacecraft
of another country.
Two immediate objections to the significance of this box score must
be noted. First, admittedly, relatively few States have had the sheer ca-
pacity for undertaking ASAT tests or uses. Evidence of States generally
refraining from pursuing a contested activity would surely count for less,
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
reporters' note 2 (1987); Andrei D. Terekhov, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and Outer
Space Law, in SPACE LAW, supra note 20, at 101, 103-05.
155. Vladimir Kopal, The Role of United Nations Declarations of Principles in the Pro-
gressive Development of Space Law, in SPACE LAW, supra note 20, at 85; Terekhov, supra
note 154.
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if the abstention were due to technological or financial impossibility. But
in fact, many more States could have effectively pursued ASAT mecha-
nisms, if they had decided to do so. Many Members of the European
Union, for example, individually or collaboratively through the Euro-
pean Space Agency, as well as Japan, surely could have devoted
themselves to articulation of ASAT interceptor capabilities over the
years-the know-how for launching peaceful civilian satellites is not so
impossibly different from the weapons applications, and forty-seven
States now undertake some level of autonomous space activity. '16 James
Clay Moltz has estimated that any of a "handful" of countries other than
the United States and the Soviet Union could have undertaken calami-
tous ASAT tests or operations in space, and that today, about two dozen
countries would have the ability to render vast expanses of space unus-
able by others for an indefinite period of time, via capricious and
indiscriminate kinetic energy ASATs.1
57
The potential for directed energy ASAT weaponry may be even more
widely proliferated--dozens of countries have access to lasers of suffi-
ciently high quality that weapons applications would not be impossibly
out of reach. 5'
A second partial admission would be an acknowledgement that some
of the explanation for the absence of any uses of ASAT systems in combat
to date has been simply because the three ASAT-possessing countries have
never yet found it necessary to employ those dramatically new devices. In
all their recent wars, these States have discovered sufficiently robust other
mechanisms to seize the military advantage over their opponents-ASAT
systems simply would not have added measurably to the mix. When the
Soviet Union/Russia was engaged in intense ground warfare in Afghani-
stan (1979-1989), for example, or in Chechnya (1994-1996 and again
from 1999-2004), the nature of those conflicts, and Moscow's one-sided
technological edge, obviated any reason to exercise weapons in space.
Similarly, when the United States fought in Vietnam (1965-1973), Iraq
(1991 and 2003 to present), Kosovo (1999), or Afghanistan (2001 to pre-
sent) the asymmetrical nature of each country's military assets and
vulnerabilities provided little occasion to shoot at objects in space.
Still, there were provocations. When the United States apprehended
in 2001 that satellites operated by European or other foreign corpora-
tions or government agencies might acquire photographic or other data
that could be useful to opposing forces in the Afghanistan conflict, the
Pentagon was pressed to. act. On that occasion, political suasion and
market power sufficed to ensure that the most revealing imagery did not
156. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 13.
157. MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 5.
158. Id.
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reach the enemy,5 9 but a similar strategy was deemed too expensive to
adopt regarding Iraq in 2003, when there were too many potential sup-
pliers of satellite products to buy off. Who knows what might happen
next time?' 60
More deeply, the mainstream view of the definition of general CIL
also requires inquiry about the opinio juris, a demonstration that an af-
firmative "sense of legal obligation" was the subjective reason why
States have refrained from testing or using ASATs. Frankly, the evidence
for that proposition is weak.
The three ASAT-active States have certainly never indicated that any
existing legal compulsion circumscribes their actions. They behave as
though sheer national policy, rather than international law, is the driving
force behind their space weapons programs. They have never exhibited
any embarrassment about ASAT testing activities, and never suggested
that it was improper or illegal to undertake the measures they have
adopted. When they criticize each other's ASAT experiments (which
they routinely do), their rhetoric asserts that what the other country has
done is unwise, unwelcome, adverse for international peace and secu-
rity-but not illegal.
The U.S. reaction to the Chinese 2007 ASAT test, for
example, labeled the event "regrettable, '' 6' "very troubling,"'62 and
159. Id.
160. Jessica West, The Space Security Index: Changing Trends in Space Security and the
Outer Space Treaty, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE, supra note 16, at 119, 123 (noting that
many States, including North Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, and Japan, are developing independent
military reconnaissance satellites); Randy Barrett, As War Nears, U.S. Officials Reluctant to
Curb Sale of Satellite Images of Iraq, SPACE NEWS, Mar. 24, 2003, available at
http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive03/iraqarch_032403.htm (last visited July 29, 2009)
(stating that U.S. authorities are reluctant to return to "checkbook shutter control" because
now there are too many potential suppliers of satellite imagery); Peter de Selding, Europe
Moves Ahead with Weather Satellite Blacklist, SPACE NEWS, Jan. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.space.com/spacenews/businessmonday060l09.html (last visited July 29, 2009)
(stating that European government officials resisted, but ultimately acceded to, pressure from
the U.S. government to prepare to deny data from weather satellites to hostile States during
times of emergency); see also La Fleur, supra note 16, at 37; Hitchens, supra note 17, at 4
(noting that during the 2003 fighting in Iraq, many satellite operators acted as "good citizens,"
voluntarily restricting sales of imagery that might have been valuable to opposing forces).
161. Christina Rocca, Ambassador, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Na-
tions, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Statement to the Conference on
Disarmament (Feb. 13, 2007), http://www.usmission.ch/Press2007/0213PAROS.html (last
visited June 30, 2009) (expressing the U.S. government's view that China's 2007 ASAT test
was "regrettable"); see also Marc Kaufman & Dafna Linzer, China Criticized for Anti-
Satellite Missile Test, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2007, at Al (quoting U.S. administration official
saying: "It's unfortunate that China is going down this path .... This sort of thing is such a
throwback to the Cold War.").
162. Hitchens, supra note 75, at 25 (quoting U.S. Department of State Deputy Spokes-
person Tom Casey, who, referring to debris-creating ASAT tests, stated, "[w]e don't believe
anyone should be doing these kinds of activities"); Wade Boese, Chinese Satellite Destruction
Stirs Debate, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 2007, at 27, 28 (quoting U.S. government officials
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"destabilizing,"'' 63 and complained that it was "inconsistent with the
spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space
area"6"-but conspicuously did not label it as "illegal" or "inconsistent
with" any particular legal obligations. Conversely, after the United
States' shootdown of the USA-193 satellite in 2008, China warned that
the event could threaten security in outer space, it asked that the U.S.
government promptly share data about the debris created in the episode,
and it cautioned that "China is continuously following closely the
possible harm caused by the U.S. action to outer space security and
relevant countries.' ' 65 Russia, for its part, described the Chinese event in
negative terms, but declined to reprimand overtly Beijing. President
Vladimir Putin also protested the U.S. test and blamed the United States
for generating an arms race in space, but he did not directly sound
"legality" as a theme in the criticism.
66
Similarly, the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy directive focuses on
ASATs as a matter of unilateral national choice, not international law.
The truculent document may not overtly adopt a goal of procuring new
ASAT capabilities, but the rationale behind its guidelines indicates a
labeling the Chinese test as "very troubling," "very worrisome," "destabilizing" and "quite
unpleasant").
163. Boese, supra note 162, at 27-28.
164. SPACE SECURITY 2008, supra note 2, at 55 (quoting a U.S. official calling the Chi-
nese test "inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil
space area"); see also Richard Weitz, U.S. Allies Criticize China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test;
Media Notes Concerns About U.S. Space Policies, 13 WMD INSIGHTS 2, 3 (2007) (quoting
NASA spokesperson Jason Sharp as saying: "We believe China's development and testing of
such weapons is inconsistent with the constructive relationship that our presidents have out-
lined, including on civil space cooperation").
165. Li Juqian, Legality and Legitimacy: China's ASAT Test, 13 CHINA SECURITY 45
(2009); Eric Hagt, The U.S. Satellite Shootdown: China's Response, BULL. ATOMIC SCIEN-
TISTS, Mar. 5, 2008, available at http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-us-
satellite-shootdown-chinas-response (last visited June 30, 2009); Thom Shanker et al., An
Errant Satellite Is Gone, but Many Questions Linger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008,
at A21, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9ClEODF153BF931A
15751COA96E9C8B63 (last visited June 30, 2009) (quoting Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson for
the Chinese Foreign Ministry); Liu Jianchao, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Re-
marks on the U.S. Plan to Destroy Malfunctioning Satellite (Feb. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t408039.htm (last visited June 30, 2009) (stating
that the Chinese government is "highly concerned" over the U.S. shootdown of satellite USA-
193 and has requested the United States "to fulfill its international obligations in earnest");
Liu Jianchao, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Regular Press Conference (Feb. 21,
2008), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/251 l/t409230.htm (last visited
June 30, 2009) ("China is closely following the possible damage to the security of outer space
[caused by the event].").
166. Hitchens, supra note 75, at 21-22; Richard Weitz, Russia Walks a Fine Line in As-
sessing Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapon Test, 13 WMD INSIGHTS 9 (2007); Tom Bowman,
China Protests After U.S. Shoots Down a Satellite (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 21, 2008),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 19246330 (last visited June
30, 2009).
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clear intention of moving smartly in that direction, with no hesitancy
over any potential CIL hurdle.
167
States beyond those three have followed a similar pattern. In general,
they disfavor ASATs-they frequently criticize or at least challenge the
tests, such as China's in 2007 and the United States' in 2008-but they
have not thought to assert that the activities are already illegal under
CIL. Notably, the most frequent theme sounded by the critics is the need
for a new treaty, or (especially recently) for some non-legally-binding
regime that would pinch off ASAT development before it proceeds too
far. 68
After China's ASAT adventure, the United Kingdom, Australia,
Canada, Japan, Taiwan, India, South Korea, and the European Union
seconded the U.S. protests.' 69 Canada, for example, expressed its "strong
concern" in three separate demarches; 170 Taiwan asserted that China's test
"would have [a] negative impact on peace in the Taiwan Strait and in the
region" 7 1 ; and Australia complained that the action "is not consistent
with the traditional Chinese position of opposition to the militarization
of outer space."'' 72 India warned that "China's ASAT test is definitely a
concern for all countries with satellite launch capabilities."'73 Several
167. U.S. National Space Policy, supra note 7. Likewise, in defending China against
criticism about its 2007 ASAT test, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao
stated:
This test was not directed at any country and does not constitute a threat to any
country. What needs to be stressed is that China has always advocated the peaceful
use of space, opposes the weaponization of space and an arms race in space. China
has never participated and will never participate in any arms race in space.
Joseph Kahn, China Confirms Space Test; Denies Intent to Intimidate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2007, at A8 (quoting Spokesperson Liu Jianchao).
168. Hitchens, supra note 75, at 21-22; Mineiro, supra note 21, at 356; Weitz, supra
note 164, at 2; see also Setsuko Aoki, Japanese Perspectives on Space Security, in COLLEC-
TIVE SECURITY IN SPACE: ASIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 47; SPACE SECURITY 2008,
supra note 2, at 55 (noting that several States warned that they might react to the Chinese test
by increasing their own military operations in space, and several countries called for review of
the Outer Space Treaty in order to prevent similar activities in the future).
169. Hitchens, supra note 75, at 21-22; Weitz, supra note 164.
170. Hitchens, supra note 75, at 21; China Under Pressure to Explain Satellite Missile
Strike, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 20, 2007, available at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/
ChinaUnderPressureToExplainSatelliteMissileStrike_999.html (last visited July 17,
2009).
171. Id.
172. Australia Summons China Envoy Over Satellite, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 19,
2007, available at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/AustraliaSummonsChinaEnvoy-
OverSatellite_999.html (last visited July 17, 2009).
173. Joshi, supra note 12, at 13; China Missile Worries India, TIMES OF INDIA (Mumbai),
Jan. 20, 2007, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1323752.cms (last
visited June 30, 2009).
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national spokespersons highlighted the pernicious effects of the debris
created by the event.'
74
Rudiger Ludeking, then the European Union's Deputy Commis-
sioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, speaking on behalf of the
European Union at a plenary session of the Conference on Disarma-
ment on January 24, 2007, said:
The EU is very concerned about a recent test of an anti-
satellite weapon. Such a test is inconsistent with international
efforts to avert an arms race in outer space. In this context the
EU recalls the Outer Space Treaty and calls upon all signatory
States to abide by their commitment to exercise their space ac-
tivities in accordance with international law and in the interest
of maintaining international peace and security.'75
Tom Kelly, the spokesperson for Britain's Prime Minister Tony
Blair, however, explicitly rejected any suggestion that the ASAT test
constituted a violation of international law, stating:
We are concerned about the impact of debris in space and we
expressed that concern. We don't believe that this does contra-
vene international law. What we are concerned about,
however, is the lack of consultation and we believe that this
development of this technology and the manner in which this
test was conducted is inconsistent with the spirit of China's
statements to the UN and other bodies on the military use of
176
space.
The clear implication of these various comments is that the exist-
ing corpus of international law is inadequate to suppress the emerging
174. Martin Sieff, China Officially Announces Anti-Satellite Test Successful, SPACEWAR,
Jan. 24, 2007, available at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China OfficialyAnnounces_
AntiSatelliteTestSuccessful_999.htm (last visited June 30, 2009).
175. RUdiger Lddeking, Deputy Comm'r of Arms Control & Disarmament, German Fed.
Gov't, Statement on Behalf of the European Union at the Conference on Disarmament (Jan. 24,
2007), available at http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/CFSPStatements/January/O123China.html
(last visited June 30, 2009).
176. Britain Concerned By Chinese Satellite Shoot-Down, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Jan. 19, 2007, available at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/BritainConcerned-By-
ChineseSatelliteShootDown_999.html (last visited July 19, 2009); Richard Spencer,
U.K. Allies Join Protest at China Space Missile, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 20,
2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1540034/UK-allies-join-
protest-at-China-space-missile.html (last visited July 19, 2009); Paul Tighe & Takashi Hi-
rokawa, Japan, Australia Ask China to Explain Space Missile, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 19, 2007,
available at http:// www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aQSEcxOJNoPI&
refer=home (last visited June 30, 2009).
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threat-the remedy they propose is a fresh effort at treaty negotiation,
not a re-vivified CIL.
One conspicuous (partial) exception-the rare sort of official
statement that could carry weight for appreciating a CIL on space
weaponry-came from Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in response
to China's 2007 ASAT test. Asserting that the activity had violated
existing international law (rather than simply calling for new law to
regulate it), Abe said, "I believe it would not be in compliance with
basic international rules such as the Outer Space Treaty."'77 He did not,
however, elaborate that conclusion or overtly cite customary law as an
independent authority.
Another shard of rhetoric that may help promote the notion of a
CIL on ASATs came from G. Madhavan Nair, chair of the Indian
Space Research Organization, who labeled China's test "unethical,"
because it created debris that endangers other satellites. He also as-
serted that India, too, had developed the capacity to destroy satellites,
but had refrained from testing it in space because India adhered to in-
ternational norms on the peaceful use of outer space."'
In sum, general CIL gets us only halfway toward an effective
ASAT ban. There is, I submit, sufficient evidence of congruent behav-
ior by the leading spacefaring States to satisfy the objective criterion;
they have in general refrained from testing or using ASAT devices.
The observed pattern of conformity is not perfect, but especially in the
past two decades (and, specifically, until the U.S. and Chinese events
in 2007 and 2008), the aberrations from a "no ASATs" rule have been
few. If physical actions alone were sufficient to entrench a CIL rule,
then we would have such a standard.
On the other hand, the evidence to satisfy the subjective compo-
nent of the usual definition of CIL is essentially lacking. States have
not generally asserted the belief that ASAT testing or use is already a
violation of the world community's expectations. The three States that
have occasionally conducted ASAT events have certainly not conceded
the illegality of their respective programs, and the many other States
that observe and comment on those ASAT programs have criticized
them with rhetoric that sounds in policy, not in law. To date, there has
177. Japan's Abe Charges China Satellite Test Illegal, SPACE DAILY, Jan. 31, 2007,
available at http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/JapanAbe-Charges-China Satellite Test_
Illegal_999.html (last visited June 30, 2009).
178. Joshi, supra note 12, at 13, 15; Jangveer Singh, China's Space Test Unethical: ISRO
Chief, TRIBUNE (New Delhi), Feb. 6, 2007, available at http://www.tribuneindia.corn
2007/20070206/main3.htm (last visited June 30, 2009).
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been little affirmative argumentation that an opinio juris already exists
to outlaw ASATs under general CIL.'79
V. THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT AND ASATs
Some skeptics may doubt the continued viability or even the sheer
existence of a body of law purporting to regulate international armed
conflict-no less an authority than former Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales dismissively referred to some of its central precepts as
"quaint" and "obsolete."'80 Nonetheless, the Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC) assuredly exists; it imposes important restraints on what
might otherwise be an excessively cruel and costly conduct of warfare,
and States in general endeavor to comply with its terms.' 8' LOAC
179. An alternative legal analysis, beyond the scope of this Article, would ask whether
China has incurred a different type of international legal obligation to refrain from further tests
of its debris-creating kinetic energy ASAT system. That is, in response to the international
outcry in opposition to the 2007 event, China affirmed that it had "no further plans for destruc-
tive ASAT tests." See Moltz, supra note 65, at 203; Richard Weitz, Chinese Anti-Satellite
Weapon Test: The Shot Heard "Round the World", 13 WMD INSIGHTS 2 (2007).
In a somewhat similar circumstance, an official unilateral statement by the French gov-
ernment in 1974 that it did not intend to conduct further tests of nuclear weapons in the
atmosphere in the South Pacific, after international complaint about prior explosions, was
deemed by the ICJ to be a binding legal obligation which France could not thereafter unilater-
ally withdraw. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267-70 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472-75 (Dec. 20); see also Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
(Den. v. Nor.), 1933 EC.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 69-73 (Apr. 5) (construing the unilateral
statement of the Norwegian foreign minister as a binding commitment abandoning national
claims to a disputed island); Elizabeth Wilcox, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, U.S. Statement to the U.N. 6th Committee (ILC Report) Re: Unilateral Acts
of States (Oct. 30, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/98333.htm (last visited
June 30, 2009).
180. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to the President of the United States, De-
cision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al
Qaeda and the Taliban 2 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/cheney/gonzales.addington-memojan252001.pdf (last visited June
30, 2009).
181. David Graham, Operational Law, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 18, at
373. See generally Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444, U.N.
GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Dec. 19, 1968); JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE
COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES (2007); JUDITH GARDAM,
NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (2004); MARY ELLEN
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2d ed. 2009); PETRAS, supra note
20; A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD (2d ed. 2004); James E. Baker, When Lawyers
Advise Presidents in Wartime, 55 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 11 (2002); Jackson Maogoto & Steven
Freeland, The Final Frontier: The Laws of Armed Conflict and Space Warfare, 23 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 167 (2008); W. Hays Parks, The Law of War, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 21, at 1053; Ramey, supra note 7; Florencio J. Yuzon, Delib-
erate Environmental Modification Through the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons:
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seamlessly embraces both treaty law and customary law; for present
purposes, we are concerned principally with the CIL measures, as
these would be fully binding (as discussed above) even on countries
that had resolutely refused to adhere to the relevant treaties.
Within the specialized realm of LOAC customary law, three cru-
cial centuries-old precepts of interest to the ASAT saga stand out:
* Discrimination (or distinction): a military force may legiti-
mately target only military objectives, and must not
deliberately attack civilians or neutrals;
" Proportionality: a military force may not undertake an at-
tack that would inflict excessive damage on non-
combatants, when compared to the direct, concrete military
advantage gained from the action; and
* Necessity: a military force is authorized to undertake only
those attacks that are indispensable in securing the prompt
submission of the enemy.
The following subsections consider each of these inter-related le-
gal standards in detail and assess their applicability to ASAT
operations. First, however, a limiting condition must be noted: LOAC
applies, for the most part, only to the conduct of hostilities during
time of conflict; these principles are therefore essentially irrelevant to
the testing phase of a weapon's life cycle.
There is a separate mandate, requiring a country to assess the law-
fulness of any weapon it might deploy, to ensure that it does not per se
violate LOAC standards. The United States therefore routinely evalu-
ates each new weapon program, early in its development phase, for
conformity to treaty and CIL standards. One cannot lawfully deploy a
weapon that cannot be lawfully used.'82 If the thesis of this Article
proves correct, then at least some categories of ASAT weaponry
should be screened out at this initial filter, even before testing occurs.
But ill-advised, hazardous, or self-defeating weapons testing programs
are generally not themselves illegal under this branch of CIL; LOAC
rules are generally confined to the combat arena alone.'18
"Greening" the International Laws of Armed Conflict to Establish an Environmentally Pro-
tective Regime, II AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 793 (1996).
182. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
246 (July 8) ("[I]f the use of force itself in a given case is illegal-for whatever reason-the
threat to use such force will likewise be illegal.").
183. The international law expression of the obligation to assess new weapons for com-
pliance with LOAC standards is Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. Although the United States has
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A. Discrimination
The first fundamental precept is that a military force must target
only military persons, materiel, and locations; civilians and other non-
belligerents cannot lawfully be made the direct and intentional focus of an
attack, and neutral States" and their property'85 are similarly off-limits.
LOAC does not prohibit all "collateral damage" harm to civilians-that
would probably be an impossible goal in any realistic military engage-
ment-but it is axiomatic that force may lawfully be directed only at
military objectives. A weapon system that is inherently incapable of that
degree of finesse (or one that is sufficiently directional, but is in fact
wielded in an indiscriminate fashion) is illegal. 8
6
This principle underpins much of the law's hostility to chemical and
biological weapons, among others. Typically, those armaments would be
employed in a scattershot fashion, unleashed as a cloud that may drift
uncontrollably with the wind, rather than being precisely confined to an
enemy's military apparatus. 187 If the user cannot control-or even relia-
bly predict-where the effects of the weapon may be felt, it fails the
LOAC standard.
not joined this treaty, domestic U.S. law accomplishes a similar goal. See U.S. Dep't of Def.,
Directive 5000.1: Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, § El.l.15 (May 12, 2003);
see also Isabelle Daoust et al., New Wars, New Weapons? The Obligation of States to Assess
the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 345 (2002).
184. A neutral country is generally immune from attack by belligerents as long as it
refrains from aiding either side in the conflict. In accordance with general principles of neu-
trality, a State seeking to preserve its status as a neutral would probably have to ensure that
even privately owned reconnaissance and other satellites operated by its nationals also refrain
from providing militarily useful data to either belligerent. However, longstanding exceptions
to the general rules of armed conflict do not require a neutral State to prevent a belligerent
from making use of communications systems, such as telephone or telegraph equipment. This
exception may well extend to satellite communications systems too, rendering them immune
from attack even if they were used to the advantage of a belligerent. See generally ARMY
FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 116, 1 512-21; ROGERS, supra note 181, at 177; Michel
Bourbonniere, The Ambit of the Law of Neutrality and Space Security, 2006 ISR. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 205; Waldrop, supra note 16, at 226-28;.
185. LOAC standards provide protection for "things" as well as for "people." Civilian
objects are ordinarily immune from attack unless they directly support enemy military opera-
tions. ICRC, supra note 11l, at 34; see also ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 116,
48-55; STEPHEN Dycus, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 142 (1996) ("Just
as attacks on noncombatants are usually forbidden, destruction of the environment that sup-
ports those noncombatants is also outlawed.").
186. ICRC, supra note 11l, at 3-8, 37-43, 244-50; Ramey, supra note 7, at 36-39;
Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143 (1999).
187. Martin Calhoun, Chemical and Biological Weapons, FOREIGN POL'Y Focus, Dec.
1966, available at http://www.fpif.org/pdf/voll/22ifbich.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009);
Schmitt, supra note 186, at 155 ("The core reason chemicals and biologicals are prohibited is
that they are inherently indiscriminate .... ).
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An ASAT weapon might appear, in contrast, to be quite discriminat-
ing-it is aimed with exquisite precision at a specific enemy satellite,
and even a whole fleet of ASATs would be steered by the most sophisti-
cated guidance systems to pick off particular hostile spacecraft one by
one.
However, the indirect, or "second-order," effects of a weapon must
also be considered in evaluating its discrimination ability, '88 and any
kinetic energy ASAT system that generates a significant plume of long-
lasting debris would be vulnerable under this analysis. Shards of the
destroyed spacecraft, traveling at hypervelocities, could prove fatal to
any unlucky satellites-civilian or military, from a belligerent State or
a neutral-that happened to traverse the conflict zone for decades to
come. Inflicting those subsidiary combat casualties-randomly distrib-
uted among orbiters from any country, and serving any range of
civilian purposes, with the unavoidable carnage continuing for years
after the immediate war was halted-manifestly fails the discrimina-
tion test. Even where the ASAT user precisely aims at a legitimate
target, and even if only that specific satellite is intentionally hit, the im-
mense, uncontrollable subsidiary effects-lingering far longer, spreading
far wider, and inflicting far more extensive harm to non-belligerents than
chemical or biological weapons ever have-would be illegal under the
CIL of armed conflict.1
89
188. Bourbonniere, supra note 20, at 13, 14 (noting that in dealing with space debris, an
extended temporal dimension is appropriate for evaluating collateral damage); see also Legal-
ity of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 382 (July 8)
(Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (arguing that in evaluating the effects of nuclear weapons, it is
not important to differentiate between by-products and secondary effects of the munitions);
Emily Broad et al., Human Rights Watch, Cluster Munitions and the Proportionality Test:
Memorandum to Delegates of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (Apr. 2008), avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/arms0408web.pdf (last visited
June 30, 2009) [hereinafter CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MEMORANDUM] (arguing that a
weapon's foreseeable after-effects, inflicting second-order injuries, must be taken into account
in assessing its legality); ICRC, supra note I 11, at 40 (discussing Rule 12(c), defining "indis-
criminate attacks" as including those whose effects cannot be limited as required by
international law); ICRC, Explosive Remnants of War: An Examination of Legal Issues Raised
in the ERW Discussion, U.N. Doc. CCW/CGE/II/WP.8 (July 15, 2002), available at http://
www.mineaction.org/downloads/G0262896.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009) (concluding that
"post-conflict responsibility for dangerous munitions has been recognized by states");
Schmitt, supra note 186, at 168.
189. The discrimination requirement also highlights the difficulty posed by the increas-
ing integration of military and civilian space assets. As noted in note 16, supra, and
accompanying text, the United States and other spacefaring States have come to rely on dual-
capable satellites to serve both quotidian civilian functions and military needs. This functional
integration does not comport well with the cardinal LOAC requirement to separate military
and civilian assets, because it excessively complicates the task of an attacker who attempts to
comply with the requirements for discrimination. See Michel Bourbonniere & Ricky J. Lee,
Legality of the Deployment of Conventional Weapons in Earth Orbit: Balancing Space Law
and the Law of Armed Conflict, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 873 (2007).
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B. Proportionality
A similar conclusion is driven by evaluation of the second
fundamental LOAC touchstone, proportionality. When a military force
anticipates (as it virtually always must) that a proposed attack would
generate both positive, direct military value (in damaging or destroying
enemy military assets or personnel) and undesired harm on civilians (and
on neutrals and other non-belligerents) or their effects, then the attacker
must pause to assess the comparative value of those two factors.
Admittedly, this calculation is inherently opaque and inexact, as it
requires weighing starkly incommensurable variables, but LOAC
requires the attacker to consider whether, with all things considered, the
strike is "worth it."' 90
Long-term, as well as immediate, effects must be considered, and
the attacker is obligated to attempt to gather the data necessary for mak-
ing an informed, mature judgment, including assessing the possible
harms inflicted on nationals of neutral countries, and even on the natural
environment.'9 If the anticipated collateral damage is excessive-if the
reasonably expected hardship to protected sites is greater than the bene-
fits that the operation can accomplish-then the attack must be modified
or aborted.' 92
Again, an ASAT operation-especially one that might spawn a per-
sistent debris hazard-is vulnerable under this analysis. The
proportionality calculus could be exceptionally complicated because the
military value of a particular ASAT operation could be high. If the en-
emy force is heavily reliant on its satellites for reconnaissance,
communications, targeting, etc., and if it possesses few alternative "fall-
190. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MEMORANDUM, supra note 188 (stressing the need to
include "aftereffects"-i.e., the foreseeable long-term consequences of a weapon's use-in
calculating proportionality, and noting that there is no time limit for assessing incidental dam-
age); ICRC, supra note 111, at 46-50; Paul B. Larsen, Application of the Precautionary
Principle to the Moon, 71 J. AIR L. & CoM. 295 (2006); Ramey, supra note 7, at 39-40 (judg-
ing that the difficulty in applying the proportionality criterion makes that subjective judgment
"the Achilles heel of the law of war"); Schmitt, supra note 186, at 150-52.
191. See generally CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MEMORANDUM, supra note 188.
192. Glen Plant, Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR:
A 'FIFTH GENEVA' CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN TIME OF
ARMED CONFLICT 3, 17 (Glen Plant ed., 1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND THE LAW OF WAR] (surveying common law of armed conflict principles that apply to the
environment); Schmitt, supra note 186, at 151 (noting the "growing recognition of the need to
protect the environment during armed conflict"); see also Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 243 (July 8) (concluding that nuclear weapons
are contrary to international law because of their "destructive power ... [which] cannot be
contained in either space or time" and their "potential to destroy all civilization and the entire
ecosystem of the planet").
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back" substitutes, then destruction of one (or a few) orbiters could carry
a significant premium.' 93
On the other hand, the "collateral damage" side of the proportional-
ity balance could be weighty, too. If the would-be target satellite is
ensconced in a popular orbit (exploited by many other satellites from
other countries), especially if it is relatively high in space, then the fore-
seeable debris field could be disruptive to the peaceful space activities of
many users over an extended period. Depending on how many and what
size debris fragments the attack might generate, how far they would be
likely to spread, and how reliably they could be tracked (and possibly
avoided) by subsequent space travelers, the costs of the ASAT operation
could be substantial. Those costs would be borne by civilians, by space
programs of other countries, and even by the subsequent satellites of the
attacker itself, for many years after the conflict had tenninated.'9 4
Even a non-debris-generating ASAT, such as one employing a laser
or other directed energy system, could impose significant costs on civil-
ians and neutrals. If the target was a dual-use satellite-and it is
increasingly common for orbiters to serve military and non-military cli-
ents interchangeably' 95-then any interruption in its availability would
negatively impact non-belligerents.
With all those variables, it may not be possible to assert confidently
that no ASAT activity could ever be justified as acceptably proportionate
under the traditional LOAC analysis. But it seems clear that many possi-
ble ASAT operations would be ruled out, and even that most
contemplated kinetic ASAT strikes would be of dubious legality. In any
event, the attacker is required to evaluate proportionality: to gather the
relevant available data about long-term costs and benefits necessary to
making an intelligent decision.
C. Necessity
Finally, the principle of necessity mandates that a military force is
allowed to exercise only those operations that are not otherwise prohib-
ited by international law and are indispensable in securing the prompt
submission of the enemy. A method of warfare that is merely "nice to
193. Petras, supra note 20, at 207-09; Noah Shachtman, How China Loses the Coming
Space War, WIRED, Jan. 10, 2008, available at http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/0l/inside-
the-chin.html (last visited June 30, 2009).
194. See Bourbonniere, supra note 184, at 205, 225 (arguing that the creation of space
debris, and its effects on the rights of neutral States, must be important variables in assessing
proportionality).
Even if the opponent violates its LOAC obligations by failing to separate its military and
civilian assets, the attacker must still undertake a proportionality judgment and endeavor to
protect civilians from the effects of the combat. ICRC, supra note 11, at 46-76.
195. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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have," or a military operation that might be able to make a small contri-
bution, would not pass this test.'96
In the ASAT context, if a country possessed both a kinetic energy
ASAT system and a directed energy counterpart, and if both devices
could suffice to perform a particular mission with equal success, then the
"necessity" standard should help dictate the choice between them. Spe-
cifically, if a laser ASAT is available, and is equally effective, then
employment of the interceptor technology, and the concomitant creation
of hazardous space debris, is no longer "necessary." Where a State can
effectively neutralize an enemy's satellite via mechanisms that do not
impose the persistent debris harm to the peaceful space activities of fu-
ture generations of civilians and neutral States, the LOAC customary
standards would outlaw use of an interceptor. 1
97
196. Judith Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
supra note 11, at 275; Ramey, supra note 7, at 35-40. Among the earliest assertions of the
principle of necessity was the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of
War of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S.
297, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/130?OpenDocument (last visited June 30,
2009), which asserted that there are "technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to
yield to the requirements of humanity" and that "the only legitimate object which States
should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military force of the enemy." To a
similar effect is the "Martens Clause," included in varying forms in numerous treaties on the
law of armed conflict, asserting that even when particular treaty restrictions are inapplicable,
"civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of inter-
national law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience." Additional Protocol I, supra note 183, art. 1(2); ARMY FIELD
MANUAL 27-10, supra note 116, 6; Michel Bourbonniere, Legal Regime for Keeping Outer
Space Free of Armaments: Prospects?, 27 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 109, 126 (2002); Richard
Falk, The Environmental Law of War: An Introduction, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 192, at 78; Adam Roberts, The Law of War and Environmental
Damage, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIEN-
TIFIC PERSPECTIVES 47 (Jay E. Austin & Carl E. Bruch eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR]; Ramey, supra note 7, at 127-29.
In the famous 1837 Caroline case, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated the
law regarding necessity, in language that has now been generally accepted. He argued that
military action is acceptable only on a showing of "necessity of self-defense, instant, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to
show, also, that the local authorities ... did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act
justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it." Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Lord Ashburton (Apr. 24, 1841),
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l9th-century/br-1842d.asp (last visited July 29, 2009);
see also Louis-Philippe Rouillard, The Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-Defence in Contem-
porary International Law, I MISKOLC J. INT'L L. 104 (2004).
197. For comparison, some have already argued that the availability of very accurate
"smart bombs," which can reduce collateral damage to civilians via great accuracy in the
placement of the ordnance, should replace older, less accurate munitions. Indeed, preferential
use of the new technology may now be mandatory, since reliance on traditional "dumb"
bombs is no longer "necessary," and the unintended harm to protected persons and places
could now be avoided. See Stuart W. Belt, Missile Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a
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In sum, the lex specialis of armed conflict already throws a sinew of
law around the prospect of ASAT operations. Discrimination, propor-
tionality, and necessity all militate against the exploitation of debris-
creating kinetic energy interceptors. Even where the contemplated ASAT
operation would fulfill a valid military purpose, it might nonetheless be
illegal on the grounds that it inflicted excessive, uncontrollable, and
largely unpredictable harm to the future space activities of civilians and
of nationals of States that were not engaged in the current fighting.
The LOAC principles apply, as noted, only to the use in combat, and
they bite only at the forms of ASAT weapons that would generate debris.
But it is remarkable that the CIL on these points already exists, that it
requires no further endorsement in the form of treaty enactments, and
that its extension to the novel arena of outer space is relatively straight-
forward, if largely unnoticed.
VI. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND ASATs
We turn next to a much younger'" area of specialized CIL, one that
may also extend restrictions on ASAT operations in surprising ways. In-
ternational environmental law attempts to rein in national behaviors that
pollute, damage, or jeopardize the natural environment in significant
measure, even when no particular State is individually aggrieved. As
with LOAC, skeptics may doubt the efficacy or even the existence of
international environmental law, but, again as with LOAC, the reality is
now abundantly clear: hundreds of treaties, UNGA resolutions, and dec-
larations of other noteworthy international bodies attest to the ambition,
competence, and accomplishment of the international environmental
movement.'99
Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L.
REV. 115 (2000); Danielle L. Infeld, Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pin-
point Accuracy in Desert Storm; But Is a Country Obligated to Use Precision Technology to
Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 109
(1992); Christopher B. Puckett, In This Era of "Smart Weapons," Is a State Under an Interna-
tional Legal Obligation to Use Precision-Guided Technology in Armed Conflict?, 18 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 645 (2004).
198. But see Carl E. Bruch, Introduction to THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF
WAR, supra note 196, at 13 (quoting Deuteronomy 20:19-20 as establishing a Biblical legal
norm about environmental protection during armed conflict, when saying "[w]hen you are at
war, and lay siege to a city for a long time in order to take it, do not destroy its trees by taking
the axe to them ....").
199. See generally LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 75-105 (1994); DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (3rd ed. 2007); ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 105-07 (1991) (arguing that "it is possible to discem
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A prominent early example of this emergent international environ-
mental law is the pathbreaking 1972 Stockholm Declaration, crafted at
the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, through which all
leading States confirmed that protection of the environment is a major
issue affecting everyone's well-being and "is the urgent desire of the
peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments. 2° Principle
21 of the Declaration affirms that States have "the responsibility to en-
sure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. 2°' Identical language was featured two decades
later in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, in
its Principle 2.202
The UNGA has repeatedly confirmed and elaborated those asser-
tions, urging all governments to pursue and effectuate the Stockholm and
among current norms [of customary international environmental law] 'evidence of a general
practice, accepted as law,' even though only a short period of time has elapsed"); Edith Brown
Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New
World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675 (1993) (noting nearly 900 treaties concerned with international
environmental law).
Regarding the intersection between environmental law and the law of armed conflict, see
generally Dycus, supra note 185; THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note
196; U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CON-
FLICT (Richard J. Grunawalt at al. eds., 1996); EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 723-55 (2d ed. 2006); Aoki, supra note 168, at 47 (con-
sidering international environmental law and the 2007 Chinese ASAT test); Plant, supra note
192; Bernard K. Schafer, The Relationship Between the International Laws of Armed Conflict
and Environmental Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of Conduct Are Permissi-
ble During Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 287 (1989); Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An
Assessment of the Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(1997); Edith Brown Weiss, Opening the Door to the Environment and to Future Generations,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
supra note I 11, at 338; Marco Roscini, Protection of the Natural Environment in ime of
Armed Conflict, Univ. of Westminster School of Law, Research Paper No. 09-07 (2008),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1351888 (last visited July 29,
2009).
200. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm Decla-
ration, pmbl., 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972).
201. Id. princ. 21.
202. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (June 13,
1992); see also id. princ. 13 ("States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and more deter-
mined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for
the adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or
control to areas beyond their jurisdiction."); id. princ. 24 ("Warfare is inherently destructive of
sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing protection
for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as
necessary.").
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Rio pronouncements, 23 emphasizing the special responsibility to protect
the environment in times of armed conflict,2 and stressing that all States
should "ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the natural systems located within other States or in the
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction., 20 5 The UNGA has also
flatly asserted that "destruction of the environment, not justified by mili-
tary necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing
international law."
206
International agreements bespeak a set of similar commitments. The
1993 Convention on Biological Diversity echoes the States' responsibil-
ity "to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction."2 7 The U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change carries forward parallel language, noting that the state-
ment is "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law."200
The Restatement confirms that the core of the Stockholm and Rio
propositions has advanced far beyond the status of mere aspiration, and
has achieved the widespread, longstanding acceptance, pursuant to a
sense of legal obligation, to have risen to the status of binding CIL. Sec-
tion 601 asserts state obligations with respect to the common
environment:
A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary,
to the extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that
activities within its jurisdiction or control ... are conducted so
203. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Environment, G.A. Res. 47/190,
U.N. Doe. A/RES/47/190 (Mar. 16, 1993) (endorsing the Rio Declaration and urging govern-
ments "to take the necessary action to give effective follow-up" to it).
204. Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 47/37, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/47/37 (Feb. 9, 1993) (urging States "to take all measures to ensure compliance
with the existing international law applicable to the protection of the environment in times of
armed conflict").
205. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, 21 (d), U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28,
1982).
206. G.A. Res. 47/37, supra note 204, 5.
207. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Convention on Biological
Diversity art. 3, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818; see WEISS ET AL., supra note 199, at 283 (noting
the incorporation of Principle 21 in numerous international environmental law treaties and
other documents).
208. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Framework Convention on
Climate Change, pmbl., 8, June 3-14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (May 9, 1992), 31
I.L.M. 851.
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as not to cause significant injury to the environment of another
state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.20
The ICJ, too, has had the occasion to recognize the binding quality
of this feature of customary international environmental law. In the 1996
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the court affirmed that "[t]he
existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of
international law relating to the environment."20 A year later, the ICJ
repeated that conclusion in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia).2'
A few vocabulary points about the language of these documents
must be noted. First, in these instruments, the reference to "areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction" was principally intended to refer to
the high seas, Antarctica, and other sectors of the terrestrial "global
commons" that no country could or did claim as part of its sovereign
territory. But the concept certainly embraces outer space as well, particu-
larly given the OST's explicit stricture that no country may subject
space, the moon, or other celestial bodies to claims of national sover-
eignty.
212
Second, the language of these prescient instruments contemplates
not just "pollution" as ordinarily understood, but more generic "damage"
or "injury" to the environment, which would surely include activities
that degrade or despoil outer space by so littering it with hazardous,
long-lasting ASAT debris that vast regions are rendered unfit for transit
or use. In fact, the near-permanent character of high-altitude space debris
far eclipses what would ordinarily be contemplated as serious harm to
the oceans or Antarctica, such as via unregulated runoff, tanker colli-
sions, or even dumping of hazardous materials. In the same vein, where
documents refer to "significant" injury to the international environment,
209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 601(1) (1987).
210. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
241-42 (July 8); see also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 199, at 502-07 (discussing the funda-
mental CL obligation not to cause environmental harm).
211. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 41 (Sept. 25).
212. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. II; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pp. 99 (1987) (referring to "'global commons,'
i.e., areas over which no state has jurisdiction or control but which are of common interest to
all states--outer space, Antarctica, ice floes, and unoccupied islands"); Michael A. Meyer, A
Definition of the 'Environment', in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR,
supra note 192, at 255; David Tolbert, Defining the 'Environment', in ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 192, at 257 (offering expansive definitions of
"environment").
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that threshold would, unhappily, be easily met by the sorts of ASAT-
generated space debris under consideration here. This is not a case of
merely de minimis harms.213
Next, the rhetoric makes clear that this sort of injury to the global
commons is an issue of universal concern, properly raised even by States
that are not individually damaged by the offending acts, and even by
States that currently do not undertake or even contemplate space activi-
ties that would exploit the resources-everyone has a legitimate,
permanent interest in the preservation of that delicate environment.!
4
Finally, to address a point that has surfaced in virulent form in a very
different context, these documents speak of activities undertaken "within
the jurisdiction and control" of a State. The "action" in contemplation
here-the exoatmospheric collision or detonation of a killer satellite-
unquestionably occurs outside any State's territory. But the clear import
of the law would have to reach the "action" that drove that destruction,
that is, a government's decision to test or use its ASAT in a debris-
creating mode, and that decision-making action would ordinarily be un-
dertaken in the national capital, certainly within its jurisdiction and
control.2 5
These crucial environmental protection norms would certainly apply
to a State's ASAT testing activities during peacetime (thereby neatly
complementing the LOAC rules identified in Part V, which by their terms
apply only during wartime). But to what extent are environmental
213. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 601, reporters' note 2 (1987) (quoting the definition of "pollution" from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development as "any introduction by man, directly or indirectly,
of substance or energy into the environment resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as
to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems, impair amenities or inter-
fere with other legitimate uses of the environment"); see also Vereshchetin, supra note 57,
21 (describing human-caused debris as "a new kind of pollution of outer space").
214. Much of the early writing and litigation on international environmental law concen-
trated on situations in which the pollution or other environmental damage caused by one
country was inflicted on a specific other country (usually a neighboring State downwind or
downstream). See, e.g., Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (Panel
of Robert A.E. Greenshields, Jan Frans Hostie, & Charles Warren 1941). More recently, harm
to the "global commons" has been considered actionable, even without identification of a
particular complaining country that is specially afflicted.
215. Cf Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008) (ruling that the constitutional right
of habeas corpus applies to detainees in the U.S. military base at Guantananmo Bay, even
though Cuba retains sovereignty over the area, since United States exercises de facto control);
see also Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (requiring application of
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental evaluation procedures to federal
activities in Antarctica, because the decisions regarding construction activities would be un-
dertaken in Washington, D.C., even though the effects would be felt in an area outside national
jurisdiction); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 199, at 1523 (suggesting that the Massey decision
was driven by the unique jurisdictional status of Antarctica-a region devoid of national sov-
ereignty, where the United States exercises considerable control (much like outer space)).
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protection standards also effective during combat, to help regulate ASAT
uses 
.?2 16
There is often substantial uncertainty regarding the applicability of
ordinary international law during wartime; both treaties and CIL rules
have to be parsed with care to determine whether the parties may have
intended to suspend or terminate the obligations when conflict arises.
Much of environmental law, in particular, is probably designed to be ap-
plicable only during peacetime; obviously, combat can be thoroughly
devastating for the environment, and many standard rules of protection
would be simply held in abeyance until the fighting subsides."7
But some CIL rules are deliberately designed to be applicable even
(or especially) during hostilities, and these postulates provide something
of a bridge between Part V and Part VI of this Article. Unfortunately, this
area of law is one characterized by persistent absence of consensus, es-
pecially regarding the position of the United States, and it is difficult to
state with certainty the content of any CIL rules on States' obligations
regarding environmental protection during combat.28
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) asserts, in its
authoritative tome on Customary International Humanitarian Law, sev-
eral propositions that would explicitly incorporate environmental
concerns into the traditional LOAC standards of discrimination, propor-
tionality, and necessity. For example:
Rule 43: The general principles on the conduct of hostilities ap-
ply to the natural environment:
A. No part of the natural environment may be attacked, unless it
is a military objective.
216. In Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9), the ICJ ruled that Alba-
nia's obligation to notify passing ships about the hazards of mines placed in an international
waterway arose not simply from LOAC treaty law (which would be applicable only during
wartime) but even more from "general and well-recognized principles" and "elementary con-
siderations of humanity," which are "even more exacting in peace than in war." Id.
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 336, cmt. e, reporters' note 4 (1987) (stating that the law regarding application of treaties
during wartime is now "uncertain"); WEISS ET AL., supra note 199, at 344-49, 747-49; Rob-
erts, supra note 196; Christopher D. Stone, The Environment in Wartime: An Overview, in THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 196, at 16, 24; Silja Voneky, Peacetime
Environmental Law as a Basis of State Responsibility for Environmental Damage Caused by
War, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 196, at 190, 193, 197;
Roscini, supra note 199, at 24-28; United States Statement to the International Law Commis-
sion Concerning the Effect of Armed Conflict on Treaties, Nov. 29, 2005, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/1/2005/87206.htm (last visited July 29, 2009).
218. See Gabrynowicz, supra note 146, at 115-16 (arguing that it is now "crystal clear"
that the Outer Space Treaty remains in force during conflict).
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B. Destruction of any part of the natural environment is prohib-
ited, unless required by imperative military necessity.
C. Launching an attack against a military objective which may
be expected to cause incidental damage to the environment
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated is prohibited.
Rule 44: Methods and means of warfare must be employed with
due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural envi-
ronment. In the conduct of military operations, all feasible
precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to mini-
mise, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientific
certainty as to the effects on the environment of certain military
operations does not absolve a party to the conflict from taking
such precautions.
Rule 45: The use of methods or means of warfare that are in-
tended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment is prohibited. Destruc-
tion of the natural environment may not be used as a weapon.219
If these postulates genuinely constitute universal CIL, they would
impose on military forces a duty of care in any wartime ASAT opera-
tions that would be entirely consistent with their more general LOAC
obligations. Specifically, a State contemplating an ASAT attack would be
enjoined:
" to attack only legitimate military objectives (and the natural
environment-including outer space-does not count as a
military objective);
" to calculate the proportionality assessment weighing unin-
tended damage to civilian and neutral persons and assets
versus the military value expected from the attack (and harm
to the natural environment-including outer space-must be
factored into the mathematics); and
" to undertake only those strikes that are militarily necessary.
In most respects, these specific obligations dovetail with those de-
scribed in Part V, and the United States generally accepts these
postulates of the international environmental law of armed conflict. In
219. ICRC, supra note 11, at 143-58; see also United Nations Decade of International
Law, G.A. Res. 49/50, GAOR, 49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/50 (Feb. 17,
1995) (inviting States to consider adopting the guidelines and instructions drafted by the ICRC
for protection of the environment in times of armed conflict).
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some specific areas, however, the United States has taken a different
view, rejecting the ICRC's contention that CIL has already fully evolved
on these points. 220 The most salient illustration of the difference concerns
the ICRC's contention that CIL categorically bars any warfighting action
that would inflict "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natu-
ral environment." In contrast, the United States asserts that even such
catastrophic actions might be justifiable as "proportionate" if sufficient
military gain could be garnered thereby. The United States views the
ICRC Rule 45 obligations as being grounded exclusively in treaty law,
not CIL, and the relevant treaty (the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the
1949 Geneva Conventions) is an instrument that the United States has
not joined, and is therefore not bound to implement.2 2 '
There may be a soupgon of difference between the ICRC view and
the U.S. view, but both would provide substantial protection to the inter-
national environment as such, as well as to transiting satellites, and both
would affirm that harm to outer space itself must be taken into account
in assessing the discrimination, proportionality and necessity of an at-
tack 22 As a practical matter, the separation between the two perspectives
220. ICRC, supra note 11, at 151; Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 117, at 6; see also
Emanuelli, supra note 117 (critiquing ICRC methodology in assessing CIL).
221. Additional Protocol I, supra note 183, art. 35(3) ("It is prohibited to employ
methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment."); id. art. 55 ("Care shall be taken in
warfare to protect the natural environment against wide-spread, long-term and severe
damage.").
Regarding American views on Additional Protocol I, see Bellinger & Haynes, supra note
117; Roberts, supra note 196, at 68-71; Michael N. Schmitt, War and the Environment: Fault
Lines in the Prescriptive Landscape, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra
note 196, at 87.
Regarding the status of Protocol I as CIL, see Harry Almond, Jr., Weapons, War and the
Environment, 3 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 117 (1990) (arguing that the "practice of states
during hostilities shows a relatively limited tolerance with regard to protecting the environ-
ment, and a wide degree of freedom in resorting to violence," and noting that even the
language of the 1977 Protocols is ambiguous and hortatory); Bourbonniere, supra note 189, at
128-32; Yuzon, supra note 181, at 823 (stating that Protocol I "has not risen to the level of
general acceptance by states needed to constitute a customary principle").
Another arms control treaty might at first blush appear relevant to ASAT testing and use
in this context. The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use
of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151, 31 U.S.T.S.
333, commits its parties not to engage in environmental modification techniques that have
widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. This treaty, however, applies only to warmaking
activities that manipulate the natural processes of the environment for hostile purposes (such
as by triggering earthquakes or monsoons), not to those that damage the environment.
222. See Susana Pimiento Chamorro & Edward Hammond, Addressing Environmental
Modification in Post-Cold War Conflict: The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) and Related Agree-
ments (Edmonds Inst. Occasional Paper, 2001), available at http://www.edmonds-
institute.org/pimiento.html (last visited June 30, 2009) (arguing for a less anthropocentric
approach, protecting the environment per se, independent of its value for human beings).
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is small for our purposes; via either route, CIL standards inveigh against
debris-creating ASATs, during either wartime or peacetime.2 ' As the ICJ
stated in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion:
The Court does not consider that the [environmental protection]
treaties in question could have intended to deprive a State of the
exercise of its right of self-defense under international law be-
cause of its obligations to protect the environment. Nonetheless,
States must take environmental considerations into account
when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pur-
suit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the
environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether
an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and
proportionality.
224
VII. THE PRECEDENT: THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Could this really happen? Could evolving customary international
law "sneak up" on the world community in this way, effectively emplac-
ing meaningful constraints on the testing and use of a particular weapon,
with nobody quite realizing that it was occurring?
Sheer precedent provides one important reason for taking the possi-
bility seriously: this inchoate CIL law-making process has operated
previously in much the same way elsewhere within the national security
sector. Chemical weapons-an even more problematic issue for the
world community, dispersed over a far longer time period to many more
countries and used with alarming frequency in international and internal
combat-were rendered illegal under invisibly evolving CIL, long before
any treaty codified the world's revulsion with that form of belliger-
225
ency.
223. INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK
386 (2008).
224. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
242 (July 8); see also Bourbonniere, supra note 20; Arjen Vermeer, A Legal Exploration of
Force Application in Outer Space, 46 MIL. L. & L. WAR REv. 299, 324 (2007).
225. See Susan Benesch et a]., International Customary Law and Antipersonnel Land-
mines: Emergence of a New Customary Norm, LANDMINE MONITOR, May 1999,
http://www.icbl.orglm/1999/appendices/customlaw.html (arguing that CIL already forbids
use of anti-personnel land mines, independent of treaty commitments); Karen Parker, The
Illegality of DU Weaponry, Working Paper Prepared for the International Uranium Weapons
Conference in Hamburg, Germany (Oct. 16-19, 2003), available at http://
www.uraniumweaponsconference.de/speakers/parker illegality.pdf (last visited July 19, 2009)
(arguing that customary LOAC principles already render depleted uranium weapons illegal);
see also Karen Hulme, Of Questionable Legality: The Military Use of Cluster Bombs in Iraq
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A. A Brief History of Chemical Weapons
Chemical weapons have been researched, developed, tested,
manufactured, deployed, used, and retired by many countries in diverse
settings throughout the ages. Occasional CW applications (or myths)
predate the biblical era, and as technology opened new, more lethal
doors, the military forces of many States rushed through. The insidious
carnage reached its zenith during World War I, when mustard gas,
phosgene, chlorine and a hoard of other noxious agents killed 100,000
and injured one million more." 6
At the same time, public opinion has always recoiled against chemi-
cal warfare, seeing it as a particularly loathsome form of combat, and
international diplomatic efforts have responded (slowly and fragmentar-
ily) to that perspective, attempting to craft meaningful legal impediments
against CW. Some of the earliest arms control treaties-the Brussels
Declaration of 1874227 and the Hague Conventions of 1899228 and 1907,229
for example-were crafted with this horrific invisible weapon clearly in
mind.230
By 1925, the Geneva Protocol achieved a major milestone, with the
parties declaring that "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases ... has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civi-
in 2003, 2004 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 143 (suggesting that CIL may already outlaw cluster muni-
tions).
226. Regarding chemical weapons (CW) and arms control, see generally Charles C.
Flowerree, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Arms Control, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT supra note 21, at 999; Timothy L.H. McCormack, International
Law and the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Gulf War, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991); John
Ellis van Courtland Moon, Controlling Chemical and Biological Weapons Through World War
I1, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT supra note 21, at 657; Julian
Perry Robinson, Chemical and Biological Weapons, in COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DE-
STRUCTION: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 74 (Nathan E.
Busch & Daniel H. Joyner eds., 2009); Jean Pascal Zanders, International Norms Against
Chemical and Biological Warfare: An Ambiguous Legacy, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 391
(2003); see also Bruce Bower, Early Chemical Warfare Comes to Light, SCIENCENEWS, Jan.
11, 2009, available at http:/Iwww.sciencenews.orglview/generic/id/39814/title/Ancient-
chemicalwarfarecomes to.light (last visited July 29, 2009) (reporting evidence of chemical
warfare by Sasanians against Romans in what is now Syria in 256 AD).
227. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
Aug. 27, 1874, art. 13(a) (not in force), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/
135?OpenDocument (last visited July 29, 2009).
228. Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which Is the Diffusion of As-
phxiating or Deleterious Gases, July 29, 1899, Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
229. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(a), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1
Bevans 631 ("[I]t is especially forbidden to employ poison or poisoned weapons.").
230. See U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISAR-
MAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 5 (1996) (noting that
after World War I, prohibitions against CW were also built into the Versailles Treaty and into
the peace treaties with the defeated Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary).
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lized world; and ... to the end that this prohibition shall be universally
accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and
the practice of nations .... ,,23' The Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of
what we now classify as both chemical and biological weapons, but its
archaic terms (and a raft of reservations, through which many countries
limited the application of the treaty) converted it essentially into a ban on
232thefirst use of those armaments.
During the remainder of the twentieth century, those two trends ac-
celerated: countries continued to develop new, increasingly deadly CW
(especially nerve agents, manufactured in huge quantities by both sides
during World War II but not much used in the central battlefields) and
people everywhere rejected CW as illegitimate. There were occasional
episodes of use of CW (by Italy in Ethiopia in 1935-1936, by Japan in
China in 1937-1945, by Egypt in Yemen in 1963-1967, by Libya in
Chad in 1986-1987, and by Iraq and Iran against each other in 1980-
1988),23 but these were widely criticized by the world community. The
global diplomatic engagement continued, ultimately producing the com-
prehensive Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)1 4 in 1993, to prohibit
chemical weapons and chemical warfare absolutely.
B. A Customary Interational Law About Chemical Weapons
An equally remarkable development during the twentieth century (at
some point after the 1925 Geneva Protocol and before the 1993 CWC)
was the formation of a customary international law rule that outlawed
chemical weapons, or at least first use of CW, for all countries, even
those that refrained from affiliating with any of the relevant treaties. It is
not easy to ascertain exactly when this rule emerged, nor can we be
231. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare pmbl., June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571 [here-
inafter Geneva Protocol].
232. U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 230, at 5; George
Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree?, 1969 Wis. L.
REV. 375, 389-94 (1969); McCormack, supra note 226, at 7; Roberts, supra note 196, at 54-
55.
233. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., DEADLY ARSENALS: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND
CHEMICAL THREATS 62-67 (2d ed. 2005); Flowerree, supra note 226, at 999-1002; McCor-
mack, supra note 226, at 2, n.3; Moon, supra note 226, at 666, 668-70; J.P. Perry Robinson,
Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in SHADOWS AND SUBSTANCE: THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION 40 (Benoit Morel & Kyle Olson eds., 1993); Jonathan B. Tucker,
Multilateral Approaches to the Investigation and Attribution of Biological Weapons Use, in
TERRORISM, WAR, OR DISEASE? UNRAVELING THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 270 (Anne L.
Clunan et al. eds. 2008).
234. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 103-21, 32 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter CWC].
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completely confident about its exact content. It did not outlaw posses-
sion of chemical agents, and it might have tolerated a defensive or
retaliatory application of lethal chemicals in response to an aggressor's
prior CW attack.
But leading authorities concur: CIL, arising from the considered
opinion of mankind, and reflecting the world community's collective
rejection of this form of combat, banned chemical warfare globally. That
ban was independent of the written instruments and was fully binding on
the entire world, including the United States, which signed the Geneva
Protocol in 1925, but did not ratify it until 1975. No country acted to
position itself effectively as a "persistent objector."235
There is no authoritative determination by the ICJ that details the
origins and content of this CIL rule, but there is plenty of consensus for its
establishment. The UNGA in 1969, addressing "the question of chemical
and bacteriological (biological) weapons,' ' 216 noted that these forms of
warfare have "always been viewed with horror and been justly condemned
by the international community,' 237 and that they are "inherently
reprehensible" because their effects "are often uncontrollable and
unpredictable and may be injurious without distinction to combatants and
non-combatants., 23 8 The UNGA therefore recognized that "the Geneva
Protocol embodies the generally recognized rules of international law
prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and
chemical methods of warfare ' 239 and it declared "as contrary to the
generally recognized rules of international law," as embodied in the
Geneva Protocol, any such use.240 Then Secretary-General of the United
235. ICRC, supra note 111, at 259-63; R.R. Baxter & Thomas Buergenthal, Legal As-
pects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 853, 853 (1970) ("The weight of
opinion appears today to favor the view that customary international law proscribes the use in
war of lethal chemical and biological weapons."); Bunn, supra note 232, at 388; McCormack,
supra note 226, at 5 ("It is generally assumed and commonly argued that the [Geneva] Proto-
col has become a part of customary international law and therefore binds all states whether or
not they have become a party to it."); id. at 6 ("No non-party state has ever made the claim that
it is not bound by the Protocol and therefore justified in international law to use chemical
weapons in warfare."); Schafer, supra note 199, at 302; Lisa Tabassi, Impact of the CWC:
Progressive Development of Customary International Law and Evolution of the Customary
Norm Against Chemical Weapons, 63 CBW CONVENTIONS BULL. 1 (2004); Jonathan B.
Tucker, Multilateral Approaches to the Investigation and Attribution of Biological Weapons
Use, in TERRORISM, WAR, OR DISEASE? UNRAVELING THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 270,
275 (Anne L. Clunan et al. eds., 2008).
236. Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, G.A. Res. 2603-
A, GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2603A (XXIV) (Dec. 16, 1969)
237. Id. pmbl., T 1.
238. Id. pmbl., T 2.
239. Id. pmbl., T 5.
240. Id. 1; see also Measures to Uphold the Authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
to Support the Conclusion of a Chemical Weapons Convention, pmbl., T 4, G.A. Res. 4237-C,
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Nations U Thant concurred in this judgment in 1969, asserting that the
Geneva Protocol "established a custom and hence a standard of
international law.
' 241
To a similar effect is a statement in dicta from the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 1995, asserting in the
Tadi6 case that use of CW by Iraq against its own Kurdish minority
population would be a violation of CIL:
It is therefore clear that, whether or not Iraq really used chemical
weapons against its own Kurdish nationals-a matter on which
this Chamber obviously cannot and does not express any opin-
ion-there undisputedly emerged a general consensus in the
international community on the principle that the use of those
242
weapons is also prohibited in internal armed conflicts.
Likewise, the ICRC analysis of CIL, noted above, states flatly that
"[t]he use of chemical weapons is prohibited," and "[s]tate practice es-
tablishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in
both international and non-international armed conflicts. 24 3
For many practical purposes, of course, the existence vel non of a
CIL rule proscribing CW would now be a moot point, because the 1993
CWC supersedes it for its 188 parties. The treaty constitutes an explicit,
comprehensive, and now nearly universal bulwark against CW; it bans
possession as well as use (and second use, as well as first use); it estab-
lishes an elaborate apparatus of reporting and inspection requirements in
order to verify States' compliance with the obligations; and it creates an
international organization to oversee and implement the terms and to
impose collective sanctions to punish violators-none of which was (or
could be) accomplished via CIL alone.244
But the customary international regime is not quite yet fully
obsolete. There are still two States that have signed but not ratified the
CWC, and five additional States that have not even signed. Those
GAOR, 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/37 (Nov. 30, 1987) (referring to the Geneva
Protocol "and other relevant rules of customary international law").
241. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Chemical and Bacterio-
logical (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use, 7, U.N. Doc.
A/7575/REV.1 (June 30, 1969).
242. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 124 (Oct. 2, 1995).
243. ICRC, supra note 11l, at 259. For comparison, it is worth noting that the ICRC has
not found that the use of anti-personnel land mines is categorically prohibited by CIL (al-
though certain specific applications of the weapons would be barred by more general LOAC
principles) even after two treaties have created explicit restrictions or bans. Id. at 280-86.
244. See Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Chemical Weapons
Ban: Facts and Figures, http://www.opcw.org/publications/facts-and-figures/ (last visited June
30, 2009).
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countries (including some of potentially great interest within the CW
sector, such as North Korea, Egypt, Syria, and Israel) are bound by the
anti-chemical CIL rule, but not by the treaty.
24
C. Comparing Chemical Weapons and ASAT
The parallels between the chemical weapons case in the twentieth
century and the ASAT case in the twenty-first century are striking. In
both instances
a widely reviled weapon had earned significant international
opprobrium, with experts and the knowledgeable public con-
sidering that form of combat to be shortsighted and
reprehensible;
" simultaneously, the weapons were recognized as powerful,
potentially decisive in combat, or at least capable of greatly
disrupting a country's planned military activities (and, per-
haps, the weapons seemed to confer more advantage on an
offensive attacker, with less utility for a defender);
" the weapons had proliferated and threatened to spread further
(while at the same time, the leading military powers (the
United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, and in the case of
ASAT, China) possessed by far the greatest inventories, ex-
perience, and capacity);
" multiple different types of the weapon were available, and in-
ventive minds could be expected to spawn new technologies
in the future (but the old, simple iterations would still work
well, too);
" the weapons were extremely imprecise and indiscriminate,
with effects spreading unpredictably far from the intended
targets, irresponsibly afflicting civilians and neutrals alike;
" the effects of the weapons were notoriously persistent (some
CW linger on, and around, the battlefield for a worrisome
length of time-but nothing like the decades of danger posed
by ASATs); and
* the international community had grappled, with limited suc-
cess, with each topic, generating treaties and other control
245. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Non-Member States, http:II
www.opcw.org/about-opcw/non-member-states/ (last visited June 30, 2009).
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regimes that touched on, but did not fully eradicate, the
weapon (until the 1993 CWC).
Chemical agents, it is true, attracted greater public notoriety than
ASATs have yet drawn, and the state rhetoric casting CW outside the
pale of civilized behavior is stronger than what we have lately witnessed
regarding ASATs.246
On the other hand, the physical evidence for the "objective" side of a
CIL rule is even stronger in the ASAT case than for CW. Many more
States had pursued and demonstrated a CW capability than have entered
into a space weapons race; Western intelligence agencies estimated at the
turn of the century that twenty or more countries possessed CW or were
241assiduously working in that direction. More striking, during the twen-
tieth century, there were far more deviations from the emerging anti-CW
rule; many States tested chemical agents and a few used them in combat.
Sometimes, States criticizing CW use asserted that such activities were
illegitimate and already illegal. Other times (as we now witness with
ASATs), the States asserted simply that the weapon was unwise, unwel-
come, and adverse for the world.
If that contested pattern of state behavior and commentary sufficed
to engender a CIL prohibition on CW, well before the 1993 treaty codi-
fied it, then perhaps the world community can likewise employ the
robust CIL mechanism to create a no-ASAT taboo even before a com-
prehensive treaty about space weaponization appears on the horizon.248
246. Moon, supra note 226, at 657, 662 ("[Clhemical and biological warfare (CBW) is
widely regarded as cruel and inhumane"; after World War I, the Western public "did not accept
CW as legitimate" and "gas emerged as a repellent symbol of the protracted slaughter."); Rob-
inson, supra note 226, at 37 (citing "a perception widespread throughout different cultures that
fighting with poison is somehow reprehensible, immoral, utterly wrong-that to resort to
chemical warfare is to violate a taboo of a particularly deep kind."); see also CIRINCIONE ET
AL., supra note 233, at 62-67; THOMAS GRAHAM, JR. & DAMIEN LAVERA, CORNERSTONES OF
SECURITY: ARMS CONTROL TREATIES IN THE NUCLEAR ERA 7-10 (2003).
247. GORDON M. BURCK & CHARLES C. FLOWERREE, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 164-71 (1991), reproduced at James Martin Ctr. for
Nonproliferation Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past
and Present, http://cns.miis.edu/cbw/index.htm (last visited July 19, 2009); CIRINCIONE ET
AL., supra note 233, at 62-67; Thomas W. Graham, Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Does Globalization Mean Proliferation?, BROOKINGS INST., Fall 2001, http://
www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/fall-weapons-graham.aspx?p=l (last visited June 30,
2009); Arms Control Ass'n, Fact Sheet: Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation at a
Glance (Sept. 2002), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cbwprolif (last visited June 30,
2009).
248. Contra GUIDO DEN DEKKER, THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL SU-
PERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT 62-66 (2001) (concluding that "[iun general, in the law of arms
control, which after all demands as much clarity and predictability as possible, the concept of
treaty law becoming binding as customary international law on States without their express
consent is problematic").
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
What are the implications of this analysis for the security of outer
space and the evolution of a sound legal regime banning ASATs?
I do not pretend that the world community, acting through pious
resolutions in the UNGA or proactive speeches in the CD, could slip
anything past the United States, China, and Russia. Indeed, it is
impossible to imagine crafting a new rule of CIL that overlooked the
activities and failed to accommodate the interests of those three leading
States. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk soberly advised President John
F. Kennedy in 1962, "the U.S. probably cannot keep the Soviets from
attempting physical anti-satellite measures if they decide to do so.''249
Similarly, decades later, when U.S. intelligence officials predicted that
China was preparing its 2007 kinetic ASAT test in space, the U.S.
political leadership decided not even to try to dissuade Beijing from that
path; Washington, D.C. estimated that the proposed intervention would
likely be unsuccessful in tilting the Chinese from the course they judged
to be in their national security interest, and it would be humiliating to try
to persuade them, only to fail.
25
Moreover, it is far from clear that a new CIL rule that banned only
the kinetic energy, debris-creating ASATs, while allowing free reign to
equally lethal but "cleaner" directed energy systems, would constitute a
major gain for the security of outer space. If the new law simply nudged
the rivals in the direction of laser beams instead of interceptors, that
would not provide much additional protection for spacecraft. That result
would mitigate the creation of unnecessary clouds of ASAT-test debris,
but the leading military States could simply pursue the alternative tech-
nology to hold each others' satellites at continuing risk.
The United States, as noted above, has already largely moved in the
direction of non-destructive ASATs, favoring directed energy systems
like lasers over the crudely destructive kinetic mechanisms. (Although it
is still noteworthy that when confronted in 2008 with the risks posed by
the failing USA-193 satellite, the U.S. authorities responded by attacking
it with a missile, not a laser.) Other States and observers, however, may
well consider that half-step inadequate; only a total ban on ASATs could
249. See Samuel Black, Components of a Space Assurance Strategy, 5 HIGH FRONTIER
16, 17 (2008). In a similar vein, see William Matthews, Analysts: Protect Sats with Treaties,
DEF. NEWS, June 10, 2008, at 34, available at http://www.c4isrjoumal.com/
story.php?F=3572863 (last visited June 30, 2009) (quoting John Steinbruner as saying "[y]ou
can't prevent an attack on a satellite; you must delegitimize it").
250. Michael R. Gordon & David S. Cloud, U.S. Knew of China's Missile Test, but Kept
Silent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at AI ("[T]he administration felt constrained in its dealings
with China because of its view that it had little leverage to stop an important Chinese military
program.").
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preserve the stability of space, for any artifice that attempted to differen-
tiate "good ASATs" from "bad ASATs" would miss the point.
A comparison with another, very different type of weapon, anti-
personnel land mines, might be illustrative here. Much of the world has
reacted to the indiscriminateness of these weapons by seeking to ban
them entirely, and by joining the 1997 Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty.5 The
United States, in contrast, has differentiated between "persistent" and
"non-persistent" mines, arguing that the latter category (which neutralize
themselves after a fixed, short period of time, and so do not pose a long-
term hazard to civilians who later transit battlefields) should be an avail-
able military option. Most countries, however, have rejected the effort to
segregate mines into "acceptable" and "unacceptable" categories, and have
concluded that a comprehensive prohibition is the only viable international
approach. A proposal that preserves the (more technologically sophisti-
cated, and therefore more expensive) types of land mines that the United
States would prefer to retain, while banning the (simpler, cheaper, more
accessible) types that others possess, would be a non-starter. 52 The same
logic might inveigh against any two-tiered control regime for kinetic and
directed-energy ASATs.
In any event, it is conceptually difficult for a new norm of CIL to
crystallize as a binding rule over the objection of the States most "spe-
cially affected" by the new standard,2 3 particularly when the States most
affected are among the planet's leading military, political, and economic
superpowers. The old saw that "when elephants fight, the grass suffers"
is as true in outer space as it is on the savannah.
Still, there is more than sleight of hand here. The insistent, thread-
bare refrain from the Bush administration, in rejecting Russian, Chinese,
and other proposals for initiation of talks on "preventing an arms race in
outer space" was to the effect that "there is no need" for any new treaty
on space weaponization because there currently is no arms race in outer
251. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507.
252. See INT'L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2008:
TOWARD A MINE-FREE WORLD (2008), available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2008/ (last visited
June 30, 2009) [hereinafter LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2008]; Peter Herby & Eve La Haye,
How Does It Stack Up? The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention at 10, ARMS CONTROL To-
DAY, Dec. 2007, at 6; Richard G. Kidd, U.S. Dep't of State, Office of Weapons Removal &
Abatement, U.S. Landmine Policy and the Ottawa Convention Ban on Anti-Personnel Land-
mines: Similar Path, Nov. 21, 2007, http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/entries/anti-personnel.
landmine/ (last visited June 30, 2009).
253. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20) (demand-
ing that the States whose interests are most specially affected must participate in an evolving
rule for it to rise to the level of a general CIL); Ramey, supra note 7, at 69-70.
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space, nor any immediate prospect of initiating one.254 The analysis in
this Article turns that conclusion on its head, suggesting that "there is no
need for a new treaty" for a very different reason: because even in the
absence of a signed document, the emergence of an unwritten CIL rule
may already (or soon) accomplish some of the same work.
A new ASAT treaty, of course, would carry many salient advantages.
An agreed document would provide greater clarity about the content of
the rule and about the fact that it was, indeed, legally binding. A new
treaty could cover more verbs than merely "test" or "use"; it could ex-
pand CIL's coverage by prohibiting countries from developing,
possessing or transferring ASATs, and could require them to dismantle
any ASAT mechanisms currently held. A treaty, as with the CWC, could
generate necessary verification mechanisms and procedures, to antici-
pate and resolve satisfactorily any implementation or compliance
controversies; verification and enforcement are always severe challenges
for arms control, and a future space treaty would have to confront them
squarely. In the same vein, a comprehensive ASAT treaty could elicit a
new international organization, which could stimulate additional oppor-
tunities for peaceful cooperation in space.255
254. See generally the Bush administration's statements asserting that there is "no need"
for new arms control measures in outer space, in sources cited supra note 100.
Notably, the Bush administration's 2006 National Space Policy document explicitly af-
firms that the United States "will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other
restrictions" that would limit national access to or use of space. That formula, embracing
"agreements or restrictions," would cover both new treaties and new CIL rules. U.S. National
Space Policy, supra note 7, at 2.
255. See MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 31; Philip J. Baines, Adequate Verification: The Key-
stone of a Space-Based Weapons Ban, in SAFEGUARDING SPACE SECURITY, supra note 21, at
87; Nancy Gallagher, Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON SPACE SECURITY 1, 35 (John M. Logsdon & Audrey M. Schaffer eds. 2005)
(asserting that improved space security is "likely to require formal negotiations, legally bind-
ing agreements, and implementing organizations that have both resources and political clout");
Tannenwald, supra note 20; Walsh, supra note 74; Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Hard Law, Soft
Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 59 (2003) (evaluating the ability of different forms of international law to drive coun-
tries to conform to accepted norms); Duan Zhanyuan, Some Considerations About the
Verification Issue of Preventing Outer Space Weaponization, in SAFEGUARDING SPACE SECU-
RITY, supra note 21, at 83; Geoffrey Forden, After China's Test, Time for a Limited Ban on
Anti-Satellite Weapons, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 2007, at 19, 23 (concluding that "[tihe
time is right for a treaty banning the testing of the most dangerous ASAT systems"); cf John
B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser to the Sec'y of State, The United States and the Law of the Sea
Convention, Remarks at Boalt Hall, University of California Berkeley School of Law (Nov. 5,
2008), available at http://bjil.typepad.com/publicist/2009/03/publicist0l-bellinger.html (last
visited June 30, 2009) (arguing, in a different context, that the United States should join the
Law of the Sea Convention, even though many of its key terms are now accepted as binding
CIL, because CIL by itself is insufficiently clear and reliable and does not secure all the bene-
fits that ratification of the treaty would provide).
1266 [Vol. 30:1187
But there are offsetting advantages to non-treaty systems, too. First,
as noted above, a CIL rule reaches the entire world community (except
for any "persistent objectors") immediately. In contrast, even a widely
accepted document would require many years to approach universality,
and some persistent "holdouts" are likely.
256
At the other end of the timeline, a CIL rule would also continue to
apply to any State that initially joined a treaty, but later changed its mind
and decided to withdraw from it.257 Treaty withdrawals are rare, but the
United States' 2002 pullout from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
258
and North Korea's 2003 withdrawal from the 1968 Non-Proliferation
Treaty259 suggest that this is no longer a trivial consideration. Similarly, if
a treaty party exercises its right to "suspend" temporarily the operation
of a treaty (as, for example, in response to another party's material
breach of the obligations), any underlying CIL obligations could still be
• 260
applicable.
Even the negotiation phase of a treaty can be extended and convo-
luted-a reality that somewhat reverses the traditional notion (perhaps
inspired by cases like The Paquete Habana) that the creation of CIL
256. Even the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty], widely regarded as
the most successful arms control instrument in history, has not achieved truly universal adher-
ence, as India, Pakistan, and Israel have always remained outside the regime, and North
Korea, formerly a party to the treaty, withdrew from it. See List of Non-Proliferation Treaty
Parties, http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf/NPT%20(in%20alphabetical%20order)?
OpenView (last visited June 30, 2009). See generally David S. Jonas, Variations on
Non-Nuclear: May the "Final Four" Join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as Non-
Nuclear Weapon States While Retaining Their Nuclear Weapons?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV.
417.
Also, some treaties are not intended to attract all countries, and some treaties are deliber-
ately drafted with a limited scope (for example, many LOAC treaties differentiate between
internal and international wars). ICRC, supra note 111, at xxviii.
257. The CWC, like many other arms control accords, allows a treaty party to withdraw
if it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its "supreme interests," but it specifies
that withdrawal "shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obliga-
tions assumed under any relevant rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol
of 1925" CWC, supra note 234, art. XVI(2)-(3).
258. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435; Press Release, The White House, ABM Treaty Fact Sheet, Dec. 13,
2001, available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/official-docs/pres/121301pres.pdf (last vis-
ited June 30, 2009).
259. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 256; Nuclear Age Peace Found., North
Korea's Statement of Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
NUCLEARFILES.ORG, Jan. 10, 2003, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menullibrary/treaties/
non-proliferation-treaty/trty nptnorth-korea-withdrawal_2003-01-10.htm (last visited June
30, 2009).
260. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 141, art. 60 (estab-
lishing rules for suspending the operation of a treaty in response to another party's breach);
see also Duncan B. Hollis, Russia Suspends CFE Treaty Participation, ASIL INSIGHTS, July
23, 2007, http://www.asil.org/insights070723.cfm (last visited June 30, 2009).
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takes a great deal of time, while treaties offer the advantage of speed. In
fact, in recent years the national security arena has witnessed a growing
trend toward non-treaty-based arrangements, for precisely this reason.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), to cite one example, is an in-
formal, unwritten, non-legally-binding agreement among more than
ninety participating States, led by the United States, to coordinate poli-
cies and to practice interdiction routines for blocking the spread of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Its advocates
methodically refer to PSI as "an activity, not an organization," and stress
that the quick and unproblematic implementation of the program is at
least partially due to its sponsors' decision to eschew the formal trap-
pings of a treaty-by dodging the wordsmithing of lawyers and the
niceties of negotiations, proponents were able to get the program estab-
lished promptly and to enlarge its subsequent operations without
painstaking renegotiation and reratification."' Other examples, perhaps
reflecting a gravitation away from treaties and toward informal operating
principles comparable to CIL, could include numerous export control
regimes, attempting to align national policies regarding access to missile
technology, chemical and biological substances, and conventional weap-
262
onry.
Other non-treaty approaches may also make a valuable contribution
to preservation of the security of outer space. Non-legally-binding
"codes of conduct" or "rules of the road" can facilitate the evolution of a
modus vivendi, becoming increasingly reliable over time. The device of
"unilateral, parallel statements of intention," through which the partici-
pants each declare what their policies in outer space will be, can drive
261. Bureau Int'l Security & Nonproliferation, U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet:
Proliferation Security Initiative, May 26, 2008, http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/wmd/State/
105217.pdf (last visited July 29, 2009); see also John R. Bolton, Op-Ed., An All-Out War on
Proliferation, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2004, at 21 (noting, as U.S. Undersecretary of State, that
"[w]e say that PSI is 'an activity, not an organization,'" because it does not rely on formal
legal institutions).
262. For example, the Missile Technology Control Regime is a multilateral effort to
retard the proliferation of equipment and technology that could contribute to national or terror-
ist missile programs; it consists essentially of voluntary coordinated national export control
systems in participating States, independent of any legal compulsion. Bureau of Int'l Security
& Nonproliferation, U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Missile Technology Control Regime, Feb.
27, 2008. The Australia Group is a comparable non-legally-binding agreement among like-
minded States to restrict their exports of chemical and biological materials that have weapons
potential. Bureau of Int'l Security & Nonproliferation, U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: The
Australia Group, Aug. 10, 2004. The Wassenaar Agreement provides similar coordination for
export controls related to conventional weapons and dual-use items. Bureau of Int'l Security
& Nonproliferation, U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Con-
trols for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Mar. 22, 2004; see also
Waldrop, supra note 16, at 189-93 (evaluating the contribution that export control regimes can
make in protecting access to sensitive space technology with weapons applications).
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the key actors toward a practical accommodation, even without reaching
any formal "agreement" on paper.2 63 At the simplest level, merely ratch-
eting back each country's rhetoric, national policy statements, and
hyperbolic threat assessments could help cool tempers and pave the way
for more restrained conduct.26 Recall, in this context, the fact that for
twenty blessed years-from the U.S. MHV test in 1985 until the first
Chinese interceptor experiment in 2005-there were no reported ASAT
tests in space by any country, even without any treaty or other overt ex-
• 261
pression of an agreement for self-restraint.
Ironically, there is one way in which even a U.S. administration that
was reflexively opposed to new measures of arms control in space might
find itself more predisposed to a new PAROS treaty than to a regime led
by CIL. That is, suppose that U.S. leadership, such as under the George
W. Bush administration, perceived that the leaders of much of the rest of
the world were issuing public statements that tended to support the no-
tion, as discussed above, that testing and use of ASAT systems was
already a violation of the world community's expectations and settled
sense of legitimacy. The U.S. leaders might warily observe the incipient
creation of a new CIL that would impose a universal rule against ASAT
weapons (either the kinetic variety, the directed energy variety, or both).
Still, the United States might take comfort in the notion that by publicly
and explicitly opposing that emerging rule, the country could exempt
itself from it, firmly claiming status as a "persistent objector."
But those volleys of contrary public statements would not necessar-
ily be the end of the story. Suppose that a subsequent U.S.
263. For example, when the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I Interim Agree-
ment on Strategic Offensive Arms expired in 1977 and the SALT II Treaty had not entered into
force, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to extend the operation of the older
treaty, and provisionally to observe the newer instrument, via an exchange of parallel, unilat-
eral national statements. These declarations were non-legally-binding, but they carried
substantial political weight and guided international practice nonetheless. See GRAHAM &
LAVERA, supra note 246, at 344-46; see generally ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT NEGOTIATION:
FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER (Bennett Ramberg ed., 1993).
For contrasting views on the efficacy of legally binding and non-legally-binding ap-
proaches to arms control in space, see James P. Lampertius, The Need for an Effective
Liability Regime for Damage Caused by Debris in Outer Space, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 447
(1991); Steven A. Mirmina, Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives to a
Legally Binding Instrument, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 649 (2005).
264. See MOLTZ, supra note 20, at 38 (noting various approaches to reducing the incipi-
ent threat to space security, and cautioning against hyping the threat, because excessive
articulation of the potential for hostile action in space risks becoming a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy).
265. GREGO, supra note 64 (citing the Soviet Union's voluntary moratorium on ASAT
testing during the 1980s, which was matched by the United States); Theresa Hitchens, Rush-
ing to Weaponize the Final Frontier, 31 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 16 (Sept. 2001)
(characterizing an unspoken "gentlemen's agreement among the world's space-faring nations
to refrain from putting weapons in space").
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administration, perhaps one led by a liberal Democrat who favored arms
control in space, wanted to move in a different direction. The new lead-
ership could then issue public statements that recanted its predecessor's
antipathy to the new CIL rule. The United States would then surrender
its status as a persistent objector, and become bound by the new interna-
tional law rule. Even if the domestic electoral politics then switched yet
again, and a third president expressed opposition to the anti-ASAT rule,
it might be too late; the United States could not escape liability under the
CIL rule, and could not effectively reestablish itself as a dissenter.
Notably, the decision to end the U.S. posture as a persistent objector is
one that could typically be undertaken by a president unilaterally, without
any congressional participation. On the other hand, a treaty-whether it
limited ASATs in strict way, in a minor way, or not at all-would require
the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate to entrench the rule as a
binding legal obligation for the United States.
Fortunately, international law does not require advocates to select
just one tool; legally binding treaties, politically binding "rules of the
road," unwritten "gentlemen's agreements," and all the rest can make
their distinct contributions. A new PAROS treaty would surely constitute
the clearest, most reliable mechanism for promoting security in space.
But CIL, too, belongs on the advocate's list; it can provide a comple-
mentary tool for reining in the weaponeer's instincts.
In any event, this is an area in which prompt action is necessary. Un-
less some effective combination of appropriate jurisprudential tools is
asserted quickly, the imminent weaponization of outer space may soon
become irreversible. As Thomas Graham Jr. expresses it, "[t]he history
of the last fifty years teaches us that, if dangerous weapons and tech-
nologies are to be controlled to the safety and security of all, it must be
done early, before the programs become entrenched. That time may well
be now with respect to weapons in space. 266
We can now assert that if any CIL regime is to be established as part
of the control regime for ASAT weapons, the crucial components include
what States do (i.e., we would look for a continuing pattern of self-
restraint on the part of the United States, Russia, and China, as well as
any other possible new entrants into the competition, in testing and using
ASATs) and what they say (i.e., how do the other members of the world
community react when one State does undertake an ASAT-related activ-
ity?).
The most powerful speeches in this regard would assert that an
ASAT test (and, a fortiori, any ASAT use) would be illegitimate, not just
unwelcome-it would be incompatible with the settled expectations of
266. Graham, supra note 76, at 16.
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the world community, no longer an acceptable action for a civilized
country to undertake. Countries would have to begin to assert, in the
UNGA, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the CD,
and elsewhere, that ASATs (or at least, debris-creating ASATs) were not
just deleterious for global peace and security, but also that they were
already unjustified, unacceptable, and therefore illegal.
Such a strategy might also be adapted for achieving new restraints
on other types of weapons, too. Both anti-personnel land mines
and cluster munitions have drawn robust international criticism on
humanitarian grounds. Their distressing tendency to afflict civilians and
other non-combatants long after the soldiers have marched away and the
war has terminated sits uncomfortably against the LOAC standards of
discrimination, proportionality, and necessity. In each area, new treaties
have begun the laborious task of ridding the world of the scourge of
unintended civilian casualties, but in each area, the major weapons-
possessing States have generally refrained from adhering.2 67 CIL may
therefore offer an alternative, complementary approach: stigmatize the
weapons as globally unacceptable, even for countries that eschew the
formal treaty obligations. A new treaty on "explosive remnants of war"
may also point the way, perhaps one day driving the world community to
unite against all manner of weapons-land mines, cluster bombs, and
ASAT-generated debris-that linger too long, affect too many civilians,
and jeopardize civil society's ability to access and enjoy important
268places and resources.
This is the magic of "the ceaseless dialectic ' 269 of CIL, a jurispru-
dence that grows incrementally via a process of assertion and reaction,
claim and response: countries advance perspectives about what the law is
and ought to be, and depending on the considered reactions of their
267. See CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MEMORANDUM, supra note 188; LANDMINE MONI-
TOR REPORT 2008, supra note 252; John Borrie, How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won:
Oslo Treaty Negotiations Conclude in Dublin, DISARMAMENT DIPL., Summer 2008, available
at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd88/88jb.htm (last visited June 30, 2009); Herby & La
Haye, supra note 252, at 6.
268. Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, Jan. 21, 2009, S. TREATY Doc. No. 109-10
(2006). This protocol would not directly apply to orbital debris because the treaty's terms
confine it to explosive remnants of war "on the land territory" of its parties, and because it
deals only with ordnance that "should have exploded but failed to do so." Id. arts. 1(2), 2(2).
Still, the ethos of the treaty resonates: countries should avoid generating unnecessary hazards,
even under the stresses of wartime, and after the war, they should clean up the messes they do
create.
269. W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 82 (2003).
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neighbors, the gap between the "is" and the "ought" becomes nar-
rowed.7
This is also a leading instance of how the apparently less-powerful
countries can, with strategic deliberation, exert a greater influence over
the planet's major States---or, at least, how they do not have to wait for
them in order to push for the progressive development of law. While a
recalcitrant United States can effectively block any effort to articulate a
formal ASAT treaty in the CD, it cannot similarly squelch other coun-
tries' foreign ministries from asserting contrary views into the public
domain-views that can cascade into a new CIL rule. It is hard to imag-
ine a space-related treaty moving very far forward without the
participation of the leading spacefaring countries, but it is at least con-
ceivable that the public dialogue can proceed more rapidly than some of
those States might wish.27'
That global public dialogue, in the long term, may help change the
terms of the debate; create some long-overdue momentum toward a
meaningful, legally binding inhibition on ASATs; and ultimately help
elicit more "satisfaction" in the secure exploration and exploitation of
outer space.
270. Myres S. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the
Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 357 (1955) (characterizing CIL as "a process of continuous
interaction, of continuous demand and response" by affected nations); National Sovereignty of
Outer Space, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1961 (1961).
271. Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses,
and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban andmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty,
20 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 561 (2003) (noting that like-minded States proceeded without
the United States, Russia, and China in developing and strengthening international norms and
in creating a treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines); see also Borrie, supra note 267, at 40
(describing how a similar process led like-minded States to craft a treaty banning cluster
bombs, even over the opposition of the United States, Russia, and China).
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